Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-003
Thursday
4 January 1990

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-003 *4 January 1990*

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

General Comments on Progress of INF Treaty *[TASS]* 1
Military Commentator Discusses INF Treaty *[Chernyshev on TASS]* 1
U.S. Experts Support Naval Arms Reduction Talks *[Lunev on TASS]* 1
Roles of NATO, Warsaw Pact Reexamined *[Chernyshev on TASS]* 2

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Gerasimov Holds Briefing in Moscow 3 Jan 3
Shevardnadze Visit to Romania *[TASS]* 3
Political Change, Arms Cuts *[Moscow Radio]* 3
U.S. Intervention in Panama *[TASS]* 3
Contras' Actions in Nicaragua *[TASS]* 4
Situation in Afghanistan *[TASS]* 4
North Korean Leader's Remarks *[TASS]* 4
United Nations Funding *[TASS]* 5
Coming CEMA Session *[TASS]* 5
Kasparov's Remarks on Mongolia *[TASS]* 5
Gerasimov Hits Kasparov Remarks 30 Dec *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 6
Writer Reviews 'Turbulent Year' of 1989 *[Kondrashov in IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 6

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

U.S. Statement on Baltic Separation 'Surprise' *[Yakubov on TASS]* 10
AUCCTU Halts Vorkuta Miner's U.S. Trip *[TASS]* 10

Northeast Asia

Deputy Minister Rogachev on Japanese Ties *[Moscow Radio]* 11
Japan's Increased Defense Budget Criticized *[Dmitriyev on Moscow Radio]* 11
No Reduction of U.S. Forces in ROK Planned *[TASS]* 12
Primorskiy Expands Economic Ties With S. Korea *[Moscow Radio]* 12

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Cambodian Issue *[Hanoi VNA]* 12
Indonesia's Alatas Favors Cooperation with USSR *[TASS]* 13
Problems Facing Philippines at Year's End Analyzed *[Silipov on Moscow Radio]* 14
Vietnamese Decide To Ban Private Publishing *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 15
New Zealand's Foreign Minister on Region, Ties *[IZVESTIYA 3 Jan]* 15

Near East & South Asia

United Arab Emirates Minister Visits Moscow *[Manama WAKH]* 16
Economic Agreement Signed *[Manama WAKH]* 16
Moscow Radio Report 17

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev Congratulates Zimbabwe's Mugabe *[TASS]* 17
Commentary Examines South Africa's Future *[Fedorov on Moscow International]* 17

De Klerk's Reforms of RSA Seen as Inadequate *[IZVESTIYA 2 Jan]* 18
Solidarity Committee Head Interviewed on Africa *[Moscow International]* 18
Commentary Assesses African 'Era of Compromise' *[Asoyan on Moscow International]* 19
1980's, 1990's in Eastern Africa Viewed *[Moscow International]* 20
CPSU Sends Greetings to Congo Labor Party *[PRAVDA 31 Dec]* 21
Lukyanov Receives Zairian Envoy's Credentials *[IZVESTIYA 29 Dec]* 21

East Europe

Romania's Brucan Tells of November Moscow Visit *[London ITV]* 22
Moldavian Deputies, Writer Interviewed on Romania *[Moscow TV]* 22
BCP Central Committee Holds Plenum *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 23
PRAVDA on Bulgaria's Reversal of Muslim Policy *[2 Jan]* 24
CPCZ's Mohorita Says Crisis Avoidable *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 20 Dec]* 25
Havel's New Year Strictures as President Noted *[IZVESTIYA 3 Jan]* 26
CSSR President's Talks in GDR Reported *[PRAVDA 3 Jan]* 27
SED-PDS' Gysi Thanks Gorbachev for Greetings *[PRAVDA 31 Dec]* 27
Gysi Contacts Envoy Over Vandalized Memorial *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 27
Protests Neo-Nazi Attacks *[IZVESTIYA 3 Jan]* 27
GDR Political Roundtable Holds Fifth Session *[TASS]* 28

West Europe

'Danger' of FRG Kohl's Position on Border Noted *[Balebanov on TASS]* 28
France's Dumas Cited on 'Right to Interfere' *[TASS]* 29
French Speaker Fabius Views Political Scene *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 51]* 29
Thatcher Broadcasts Message to Soviet People *[PRAVDA 3 Jan]* 30

Latin America & Caribbean

Vatican Issues Communique on Noriega Case *[TASS]* 30
Further on Communique *[TASS]* 30
Noriega Surrenders, Flown to U.S. Base *[Moscow TV]* 30
Vatican Statement on Surrender *[TASS]* 31
President Bush on Surrender *[TASS]* 31
Radio Details Surrender *[Moscow International]* 31
TASS Describes U.S. Policy Toward Panama 32
Withdrawal of U.S. Units From Panama Noted *[PRAVDA 3 Jan]* 32
Commentary on U.S. Invasion, Troops in Panama *[Mayorov on Moscow International]* 32

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Congress of People's Deputies

Text of Bakatin's 22 Dec Report *[IZVESTIYA 24 Dec]* 34
Prosecutor's Speech on Fight Against Crime *[IZVESTIYA 24 Dec]* 45
Soviet Committeeman on Congress Debates *[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 22 Dec]* . 51
Resolution on Fighting Organized Crime *[PRAVDA 8 Dec]* 53
Burlatskiy Gives Impressions of Second Congress *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 52]* 55
Moldavia's Khadyrke Speaks to Congress *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 52]* 56
Yevgeniy Yevtushenko Addresses Congress *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 52]* 57
Ovcharenko Assesses Congress Results *[PRAVDA 28 Dec]* 58
Opinion Poll on Congress Cited *[IZVESTIYA 1 Jan]* 59

Political & Social

Gorbachev Asks Kinnock To Postpone Kremlin Visit
[London PRESS ASSOCIATION 4 Jan] 61
Gorbachev To Visit Lithuania After 9 Jan *[Vilnius International]* 62
Lithuanian Leaders to Meet CPSU Leaders in Moscow *[Vilnius International 4 Jan]* 62
Lithuania 'Naive' To Hope Commission Will Arbitrate *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jan]* 62

KGB Holds News Conference on Nakhichevan Events 63
Britvin Comments *[Moscow Radio]* 63
TASS Report 64
Incidents Called 'Illegal' *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jan]* 64
5,000 Protest TASS Report on Nakhichevan Events *[ROBOCHAYA TRIBUNA 4 Jan]* 65
One Drowned Trying to Swim River to Iran *[Tehran TV]* 65
Azerbaijani Nationals Attacked in NKAO Incidents *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jan]* 65
Azerbaijanis Reportedly Chant Islamic Slogans *[Tehran Radio]* 66
Lithuanian Communists Against Break With Moscow *[TASS]* 66
Lithuania To Vote on Soviet Military Election Role *[Vilnius Radio]* 67
Lithuanian Radio Begins Program for Tatars *[Vilnius Radio]* 67
Brazauskas Responds to Gorbachev Statement *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 2 Dec]* 67
1 Dec Lithuanian CP Plenum Proceedings Reported *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 2 Dec]* 72
Komsomol Secretary on Congress, Draft Statute *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA 31 Oct]* 73
Laanem Addresses Estonian Komsomol Congress *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 25 Nov]* 76
Estonian Komsomol Congress Resolutions *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 29 Nov]* 82
Estonian Komsomol Dissolution Plans Viewed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 13 Dec]* 83
Estonia's Toome on Situation, Reforms *[Vienna VOLKSSTIMME 3 Jan]* 85
Estonian Officials View Communist Party Policy *[Tallinn Radio]* 86
Estonian Deputies 'Factions' Air Viewspoints *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 17 Nov]* 88
Latvian Creative Unionists Seek Independent Party *[Vilnius Radio]* 90
Conservatives To 'Prevail' at Latvian Plenum *[Vilnius Radio]* 91
Latvian Program Broadcasts for Last Time *[Riga Radio]* 91
Chief of Staff Outlines Draft Defense Law *[TASS]* 91
Armenia's Arutyunyan Gives New Year Address *[ARMENPRES]* 92
Armenian, NKAO Radio, TV Committees Merged *[Yerevan International]* 93
Commission Chief Receives Meskhetian Turks *[IZVESTIYA 31 Dec]* 93
Solzhenitsyn Exhibition Opens in Moscow Store *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 3 Jan]* 93
Gidaspov Comments on Gorbachev, Article 6 *[Moscow Radio]* 94
Moldavian Pre-Election Campaign Detailed *[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 28 Dec]* 94
Informals Blamed for Fueling Religious Strife *[PRAVDA 1 Jan]* 95
Orthodox Clergymen on Religious Problems in Ukraine *[TASS]* 95
Greek Catholic 'Violence' Protested *[Moscow TV]* 96
New Center for European Civilization Studies *[TASS]* 96
New Youth Papers Published in Ufa *[Moscow Radio]* 97
Magadan Plenum Replaces Retiring First Secretary *[IZVESTIYA 23 Dec]* 97
Reader Denounces 'Perniciousness' of Perestroyka *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 31 Dec]* 97

Economic

Ryzhkov Issues Statement on Economic Program *[Moscow International]* 97
Railways Ministry Notes Freight Shortfalls *[Moscow TV]* 98
People's Deputies Call for Anti-Inflation Law *[TRUD 16 Dec]* 98
Sverdlovsk Socioeconomic Problems Examined *[TASS]* 98
Shortfall in Oil Deliveries to Hungary Reported *[Budapest MTI]* 98
Coal Stocks Held Too Long, Ignites *[IZVESTIYA 23 Dec]* 99
Magadan Gold Mining Operations Reported 99
Units Fulfill Extraction Goals *[Magadan Radio]* 99
Further Details *[Magadan Radio]* 99
Wish for 'Simple' Economic Answers Derided *[PRAVDA 21 Dec]* 100

Military

Reaction to 8.2 Percent Cut in Defense Budget 103
Generals Respond *[Moscow International]* 103
Deputy Minister Shabanov *[Moscow International]* 103
Moiseyev Addresses Commission on Defense Law *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 31 Dec]* 104
Defense Ministry Declassifies 1937-1941 Documents *[TASS]* 104
Zaykov Comments on Problems of Defense Conversion *[Moscow International]* 105
Lizichev Addresses Military Journalists *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Dec]* 105
Army Political Chiefs Discuss Ethnic Questions *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Dec]* 107

General Comments on Progress of INF Treaty

LD0301134990 Moscow TASS in English 1226 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—"The elimination of missile systems and facilities, as well as inspections, under the INF Treaty are being carried out strictly in accordance with treaty provisions," Major General Vladimir Medvedev, head of the USSR Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre, told TASS.

He commented on the Soviet Defence Ministry's official report concerning the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles, published in the Soviet press on Monday [1 January].

The general believes that the implementation of the treaty is proceeding normally. "The Soviet and American sides are strictly abiding by all the treaty provisions," he emphasised.

Medvedev explained the difference in the percentage of eliminated intermediate and shorter-range missiles (81.1 in the Soviet Union and 53.3 in the United States).

This is only natural. Over the first 18 months, 957 shorter-range missiles were to be eliminated in the Soviet Union, and this was done, Medvedev said.

The Americans were to eliminate 169 missiles. The difference in the number of missiles eliminated accounts for the difference in percentage."

General Medvedev assessed prospects for the implementation of the treaty as "clear and reassuring". Within the three years of the operation of the INF Treaty, i.e. by the middle of 1991, a total of 1,846 missiles in the Soviet Union and 846 missiles in the United States should be eliminated, Medvedev said.

Military Commentator Discusses INF Treaty

LD0201143990 Moscow TASS in English 1429 GMT 2 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 2 TASS—By TASS military commentator Vladimir Chernyshev:

The implementation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by the Soviet Union and the United States was undoubtedly one of the most important events of 1989.

The INF Treaty provides for the complete elimination of two types of nuclear weapons: missiles with a range from 500 to 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and related structures and equipment.

According to a Soviet Defence Ministry's official report, as of December 31, 1989, the Soviet Union had destroyed 1,498 medium and shorter range missiles (81.1 per cent of the initial number) and 555 launchers for such missiles (67.2 per cent). The United States has destroyed 451 missiles (53.3 per cent) and 92 launchers (31.8 per cent). In 1989, both sides completed the destruction of their shorter range missiles and launchers.

Out of 79 Soviet missiles operating bases, 47 have been dismantled, and out of nine American, three have been dismantled.

The signing of the treaty has completely justified itself. The treaty became the first step towards nuclear disarmament. One can even say that it prompted a distinct psychological shift in the disarmament process, reviving hopes for a stable peace with smaller arms arsenals.

The treaty's provisions, especially about on-site verifications, both surprise and permanent, are being tested in practice and can undoubtedly be useful in developing new arms accords.

The implementation of the treaty releases human, technical and financial resources for civil industries, which in fact gives an added boost to the guns-for-butter campaign.

It has enabled defence industries and researchers to concentrate on developing and producing consumer products and released money for social needs.

The implementation of the INF Treaty will free more than 400 million roubles annually from 1988 to 1990 and more than 600 million annually over the next five years. The money will be used for civil purposes.

Plants that produced medium and shorter range missiles are being converted to manufacture drilling equipment, metal-cutting machine tools, efficient agricultural machinery, etc.

Some parts of military complexes are donated for use in civil industries.

These are only the first steps towards a demilitarised economy. An expected agreement on fifty per cent cuts in strategic offensive forces should have an even greater effect. Expectations are even higher as regards a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe.

There is now a good chance to complete these treaties by 1990 and thus ensure the continuity of the disarmament process.

U.S. Experts Support Naval Arms Reduction Talks

LD0301113290 Moscow TASS in English 1059 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Washington January 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Stanislav Lunev:

The implementation of a recent Soviet proposal to reach an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the elimination of tactical or short-range sea-based nuclear weapons could become a logical continuation of the expected Soviet-American agreement on conventional arms reductions in Europe, according to an

information bulletin circulated by the Washington Committee on American-Soviet Relations here on Tuesday.

The refusal of the U.S. Administration to discuss the Soviet proposal or to enter into any negotiations on naval reductions demonstrates the contradiction between U.S. policy in this sphere and the general trend towards more intensive Soviet-American arms control talks, the document said.

Such U.S. actions reveal the inability of the U.S. Administration to adjust its policy to the fast-changing realities in relations between the two superpowers.

However, current international conditions put increasing demands on the U.S. to abandon "old thinking" and cast aside old bureaucratic approaches to the issue.

The Soviet Union has tabled several proposals on naval reductions, including proposals to withdraw groups of Soviet and U.S. naval vessels from the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and to create an Arctic zone of peace—all of which have fallen on deaf ears in the U.S. Government, according to the document.

However, the White House will find it increasingly difficult to avoid naval arms control negotiations as the Soviet Union continues to show good will in comprehensive disarmament.

The document is understanding towards the U.S. Administration's geo-strategy of maintaining a powerful navy to protect America's national interests.

However, developments over the past few years and radical changes in the field of international security place a serious task before the United States—to engage all ideas that could promote international stability and diminish the threat of war.

A mutual destruction of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons is in the interest of the Soviet Union and the United States and would be an important factor in eliminating a major element of instability in the current nuclear force structure, it said.

Roles of NATO, Warsaw Pact Reexamined

LD0301162990 Moscow TASS in English 1526 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner stressed, in an article published by the WELT AM SONNTAG newspaper, that the North Atlantic Alliance is assuming an increasingly political posture at present. He said that along with "the classical tasks" of preventing war by defensive means, there emerged new key areas that primarily aim to promote arms control and reduction, as well as the common European process started in Helsinki.

The general's predecessor, Lord Carrington, convincingly illustrated the need to boost the political functions of the alliance in THE TIMES newspaper. Shortly before this U.S. Secretary of State James Baker made a programme speech at the West Berlin Press Club, calling for creating a new security system, which will lay more emphasis on the political rather than the military component, as the top priority task of NATO.

Such statements can be seen as evidence of a realistic approach to the military-political situation in Europe, an approach that takes account of the end of the "cold war" and markedly improved East-West relations. It should also be stressed that shifting the accent to political tasks is the current aim of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

Europe's socialist countries have now entered a new stage in their relations. Work is under way to bring all forms and methods of cooperation in line with the real requirements and possibilities of states. At their meeting in Moscow on December 4, 1989, heads of the Warsaw Treaty countries stressed the need to revamp the alliance in order to transform the Warsaw Treaty from a military-political organisation into a full-blown political alliance.

What does this mean? First and foremost, it means overcoming Stalin's legacy in the Soviet Union's relations with East European countries and fostering an alliance based on the actual rather than formal equality of its members. The Soviet Union, which is undergoing perestroyka and has embraced new political thinking, denounced and resolutely dissociated itself from the past practices taht put these countries into the position of satellites.

The Soviet Union rounded the former intra-alliance policy, called in the West "the Brezhnev Doctrine." The fundamental tenet of new thinking concerns the freedom of choice of any country. It is undoubtedly a major step towards politicising the Warsaw Treaty, and is being vindicated in practice.

By present-day standards, a full-blown political alliance is an alliance based on the various political structures of member countries and on various development models. This attitude has been reflected in Soviet policy, which welcomes the in-depth internal political changes in the East European countries. Also positive is the Soviet attitude to "breakthroughs" by any Warsaw Treaty state to the common European structures and institutions, to the development of their bilateral relations with any capitalist nation.

The extension of crisscross relations in political, economic and other fields between the members of the two blocs sets the stage for the disintegration of military-political alliances, for a common European home.

Gerasimov Holds Briefing in Moscow 3 Jan

Shevardnadze Visit to Romania

LD0301152790 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will visit Romania shortly, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today. He said he does not have more specific information about the date of the visit or about the composition of the Soviet delegation.

The invitation for the Soviet foreign minister came from Romanian Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac, the spokesman said. There are plans for the Soviet foreign minister to meet President of the Executive Bureau of the National Salvation Front Council of Romania Ion Iliescu, with Prime Minister Petre Roman and Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac.

The Soviet Union's non-interference in Romania's internal affairs during the recent events in that country was another confirmation of the basic course of the Soviet foreign policy, Gerasimov said.

He noted a positive assessment of the Soviet Union's stand given in a recent televised interview by Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, who assessed the stance as very clever.

The Spanish minister noted that some countries were pushing the Soviet Union towards interventionist actions in order to divert attention from the United States' invasion of Panama and from its violation of the United Nations Charter, the spokesman noted.

Political Change, Arms Cuts

LD0301202390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] The first briefing in the new year for Soviet and foreign journalists took place today at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center. It was conducted by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Foreign Ministry Information Directorate. Among other things, he said:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] I would like to note that the leaders of various countries welcomed 1990 in an optimistic mood, and many added that changes for the better which have occurred in the world have resulted from the new political thinking. These leaders mentioned the personal contribution by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who has been named, by the way, man of the year, or even man of the decade, in many countries by various organizations, from the journal TIME to other publications.

In general, the political barometer's needle is turning toward fair weather. If it were not for the U.S. aggression in Panama, things would be completely fine. In any case, the new horizons which have opened up allow us to look to the future with optimism. For Instance, look at U.S. President George Bush's remark that we can proceed toward a new world, which we are creating with our own hands by way of cooperation, beginning with frank dialogue. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl considers that we have every reason to hope for an end to the conflict between East and West. President of France Francois Mitterrand thinks that in the coming years it will be possible to create a European confederation, uniting all European states into a common, permanent organization. Many speeches and New Year's messages express confidence that our country and the countries of Eastern Europe are capable of overcoming current difficulties and bringing their peoples onto the path of prosperity.

We share this optimism and believe that the coming years should become a turning point in forming a new world with new relations between states based on respect for universal human values and a balance of interests. One must say that the changes that have happened already are overtaking some former borderlines. It is possible to say that the engine of change is overtaking the engine of diplomacy. For example, in Vienna there are talks on a reduction of arms, armed forces in Europe. Talks are held over the arithmetic; tanks and artillery are counted on calculators. Arguments are held over definitions—what is considered to be a tank, a cannon, and so on. So, there is such an arithmetical discussion which, in my opinion, already has been left behind by the algebra of political changes.

In connection with this, I want to refer to the U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Carl Levin. Nunn has stated in his interview to THE NEW YORK TIMES that a change has occurred in the political situation on the European continent which demands reassessement of the whole U.S. military strategy. Senator Levin, who has just returned from Czechoslovakia and the GDR, has expressed an opinion that the democratic reforms in East European countries are removing from the agenda the very thought of the possibility of a Warsaw Pact countries' attack on the NATO countries. Hence, the main conclusion of these two senators: The United States could painlessly reduce its armed forces in Europe up to 200,000 men, and reduce significantly at the same time its military budget. As an instrument to achieve these reductions, the second round of the Vienna talks, which should follow as soon as the aims of the first round were achieved, is being suggested. [end recording]

U.S. Intervention in Panama

LD0301152190 Moscow TASS in English 1500 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—"Most members of the international community are not going to put up with the power policies that run counter to prevalent world trends, no matter what reasons are given," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

He was commenting on the discussion of the Central American situation in connection with the U.S. armed action against Panama at the 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

In the December 29 vote on a draft resolution expressing profound regret over the intervention and demanding the immediate pullout of American troops from Panama, 75 nations backed the document.

The Soviet Union supported the resolution, the spokesman said. The USSR favours the immediate termination of the intervention, proceeding from the premise that armed incursions, which do credit neither to arms nor to policy, should be totally excluded from international life.

Commenting on the U.S. January 1st announcement about the withdrawal of two artillery batteries of 141 men, Gerasimov observed that "the sending home of an insignificant number of troops is not convincing and does not evoke much optimism on our part."

He recalled that by Christmas the Americans had sent 13,000 servicemen to Panama, bringing the total number of troops engaged in the punitive operation to 26,000.

In addition to heavy casualties, the U.S. intervention "caused direct economic damage to Panama, estimated at two billion U.S. dollars," Gerasimov said.

The Soviet Union believes that "only a complete and immediate withdrawal of American troops from Panama can create the conditions necessary for the restoration of peace and tranquility in that country."

Contras' Actions in Nicaragua

LD0301202790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1425 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jan (TASS)—Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, at a briefing today expressed serious disquiet in connection with the reports coming from Nicaragua about the continuing penetration into that country of armed units of the counterrevolution, and about the acts of violence being committed by them. The crime committed on 1 January of this year against a group of religious figures which led to the death of two nuns deserves resolute condemnation, he said.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman also stressed that the transfer of the Contras and their bandit actions run counter to the efforts aimed at the establishment of peace and stability in Central America, and create serious difficulties for the normal progress of the election process in Nicaragua. Such a development of events, he pointed out, once again demonstrates the urgent necessity for the accords reached by the presidents of the countries of the region to be implemented in full, and in particular with regard to the disbanding of the units of the Nicaraguan armed counterrevolution.

Situation in Afghanistan

LD0301213390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1450 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jan (TASS)—The Afghan armed opposition has been waging terror against the country's civilian population for the whole of the past year, it was stated at a briefing today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate. In 1989 more than 4 million shells were fired at the towns and population centers of Afghanistan, resulting in more than 3,000 people killed and more than 6,000 injured. Just over the last 3 months 786 civilians died as a result of shelling. The most intensive shelling was against the towns of Jalalabad, Khowst, and Kabul.

Gennadiy Gerasimov described the creation of a national parliamentary group of the National Assembly of Afghanistan as an "important initiative," directed toward restoring peace in the country. Among the aims of the organization is explaining events occurring in Afghanistan to the broad public circles of other countries, attracting attention to this country's peace initiatives, and contributing to a peaceful solution of the Afghan question. The chairman of the Senate, Habibi, has become the head of the group's executive committee. The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that this initiative of the Afghan parliamentary body, which really reflects the interests of many sections of the population, merits support and approval.

North Korean Leader's Remarks

LD0301203190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1440 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jan (TASS)—The USSR considers that the strengthening of the foundations of inter-Korean contacts and the removal of barriers on the path of dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul are in the interests of the whole Korean people. Such contacts also would serve the cause of peace and stability on the peninsula and in the Asian-Pacific region as a whole. That is how Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, commented at a briefing here today on the message to the country from Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee, president of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. In the message, the Korean leader called on the Seoul administration to tear down the wall built on South Korean territory along the military demarcation line, to permit unhindered trips by Korean citizens, and to open wide the doors for reciprocal exchanges between North and South Korea in the spheres of politics, economics, and culture. Kim Il-song also expressed readiness to demolish the obstructions in the northern part of the demilitarized zone at any time. He also came out in favor of convening a consultative conference with the participation of the top leaders of the north and south and for the active continuation of broad intra-Korean dialogue.

Gennadiy Gerasimov stressed that the USSR fundamentally supports the peaceful solution of conflict situations and consistently expresses support for dialogue between the two Korean sides. He stated that the USSR is convinced that genuine peace on the Korean peninsula can be ensured not by the path of confrontation and increasing the sides' military might, but only by deepening mutual understanding and the establishment of an atmosphere of trust between them, and the Korean People's Democratic Republic's new proposals are called upon to facilitate this.

United Nations Funding

LD0301135590 Moscow TASS in English 1347 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—Last year the Soviet Union completely fulfilled its financial obligations to the United Nations, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The Soviet side paid out 86,400,000 U.S. dollars to the U.N. regular budget and 96,800,000 dollars to finance U.N. peace-keeping forces, he said.

Late last year the Soviet Union paid an additional 47 million dollars to repay its arrears for U.N. peace-keeping forces. These arrears now amount to 125 million dollars. The spokesman added that the USSR plans to pay them off over the next few years.

Gerasimov emphasised that the Soviet Union expresses hope that the other U.N. member states that are also in arrears, will honour their financial obligations to this organisation.

Coming CEMA Session

LD0301213490 Moscow TASS in English 1905 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—The Soviet delegation to the 45th sitting of the session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), opening on January 9 in Sofia, Bulgaria, will be led by Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a news briefing here today.

On Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Romania, he said the visit will take place "shortly." Shevardnadze, invited by Romanian Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac, will hold talks with President of the Executive Bureau of the National Salvation Front Council Ion Iliescu, Prime Minister Petre Roman and Celac.

Last year the Soviet Union completely fulfilled its financial obligations to the United Nations, Gerasimov said. The Soviet Soviet side paid out 86,400,000 U.S. dollars to the U.N. peace- keeping forces.

"Most members of the international community are not going to put up with the power policies that run counter to prevalent world trends," the spokesman said. He was commenting on the discussion of the Central American situation in connection with the U.S. armed action against Panama at the 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

In the December 29 vote on a draft resolution expressing profound regret over the intervention and demanding the immediate pullout of American troops from Panama, 75 nations backed the document.

The Soviet Union believes that "only a complete and immediate withdrawal of American troops from Panama can create the conditions necessary for the restoration of peace and tranquility in that country."

Gerasimov expressed serious concern in connection with reports from Nicaragua on the continuing penetration into the country by armed groups of Contras and denounced the killing of two nuns in Nicaragua on January 1.

The spokesman said the Contra invasion and their actions "are at variance with the efforts to establish peace and stability in Central America and create serious difficulties for the normal course of the election process in Nicaragua."

Gerasimov said Sayf al-Jarwan, minister of economy and trade [words indistinct] foreign economic relations.

During the visit, the Soviet Union and the United Arab Emirates [word indistinct] their first intergovernment [words indistinct] trade, economic and technical cooperation.

On Thursday, Sayf al-Jarwan will meet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov and officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Vnesheconombank (Bank for Foreign Economic Activity) of the USSR.

Kasparov's Remarks on Mongolia

LD0301145290 Moscow TASS in English 1444 GMT 3 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov today described the pronouncements by world chess champion Gari Kasparov, in an interview with the magazine PLAYBOY, as an "unsuccessful move by the chess king".

In an interview Kasparov proposed "as a fantastic idea" to sell Mongolia to China. Gerasimov had earlier stated that these "fantastic ideas" have nothing to do with the official Soviet stance.

The Mongolian side demands apologies from the world champion, Gerasimov said. Numerous letters of protest and petitions with thousands of signatures are coming in to the Soviet Embassy in Ulaanbatar. Four general consulates of the Soviet Union in the Mongolian People's Republic received similar petitions. On December 30 enterprises in Mongolia producing for the Soviet market held two-hour strikes.

Gerasimov Hits Kasparov Remarks 30 Dec

PM0301112990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent G. Charodeyev report: "On Aid for Romania, 'Stealth' Aircraft, and Gari Kasparov's Ideas. From Our Correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Excerpts] Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, has spoken at a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. [passage omitted]

IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked the following question: In an interview with PLAYBOY magazine, the Soviet chess player Gari Kasparov raised a number of unusual political ideas. Could you comment on them?

"PLAYBOY," G.I. Gerasimov said, "has recently been approaching Soviet contributors [avtory] of both sexes quite often. The interview was reprinted in our magazine entitled *64—SHAKHMATNOYE OBOZRENIYE*. In it Kasparov states that it is possible to imagine lots of fantastic and improbable ideas. The other day, he said, he had the following idea: Why don't we sell the Kurile Islands to the Japanese? We also could sell Mongolia to China....

"Of course, a chess champion is used to dreaming up the most unlikely moves, as well as sacrificing positions and sometimes even pieces in the game. But in this case he has sacrificed his common sense, and gained nothing. That is why I would like to stress that Kasparov's fantastic ideas differ from the official Soviet position. Also, his statements are regrettable."

Writer Reviews 'Turbulent Year' of 1989

PM0301103790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Own political observer Stanislav Kondrashov article: "Turbulent End to the Year Heralding the Start of a New Era"]

[Text] In its last days of December the turbulent year of 1989, remaining true to the established pace and vigor of change, finished turbulently—in Romania. The dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu was doomed by what had hitherto protected it—its brutal violence against the people. Romanians rose up in Timisoara—they were machinegunned and run over by tanks. No mercy was shown to adults or children, and the dead were quickly hidden in hastily dug mass graves. But the Romanians rose up again. And not just because there is a collective and desperate condition in which people forget themselves when they throw off the fear of death, being unable to tolerate humiliation and servitude any longer. Romanians also rose up because the flags of freedom were flying nearby—in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. And, above all, because the "big brother" and senior ally—the Soviet Union—has changed, setting a different example, this time by dismantling the authoritarian bureaucratic system which presented itself as socialism and a paradise for working people.

Romanians also rose up in their capital of Bucharest. The most fearless shouted their protest in the very square and at the very time that the dictator, with a loathsome look on his face, was branding the popular demonstrations in Timisoara a "coordinated act by various espionage services and imperialist circles striving to destroy Romania's integrity and sovereignty, to halt socialist building, and to subject the Romanian people once again to foreign oppression." What familiar turns of phrase! They were well-worn both before and, of course, after the Moscow trials of the thirties.

This was the last appearance of the "titan of titans" before the people, these were the last ovations, interrupted by shouts of protest, to the "leader," these were the last lies—just a day before his arrest and 4 days before his Christmas Day execution. The dictator's watch dogs, allegedly safeguarding state security, were still able to kill thousands and thousands of people with their gunfire, and the uprising would have been doomed had not the Army sided with the insurgents.

The events were sudden, but their nature was predictable: In this year of peaceful revolutions in East Europe the last authoritarian regime to fall was bound to be in Romania, since there it was the most brutal, and its downfall was bound to be accompanied by bloodshed and the emergence of today's power vacuum. Under Ceausescu there could be no question of even any elementary organized alternative political structures, and even the National Salvation Front itself—as Ion Iliescu, its council chairman, explained—was not the organizer but merely the consequence of the movement. This is the difference between Romania and its neighbors, where the authoritarian regimes were more tolerant, where an emergent opposition existed one way or another, and where, because of this, the transition to different, multiparty power structures seemed smoother.

In its experiments, which destroyed the country and the people, its system of terror, and its resolve to resort to violence for the sake of maintaining power, the Ceausescu dictatorship was the closest approximation to classic Stalinism for the Europe of the late eighties. A communist tyrant... Socialist despotism... His wife, Elena Ceausescu, was his right hand, a member of the Romanian Communist Party Political Executive Committee, first deputy prime minister, and president of the Academy of Sciences. His son, Nicu, was nicknamed a prince by the people. An experiment entirely new in history was in the making—the creation of a socialist (or communist?) hereditary monarchy. What! Did Europe bid farewell to absolute monarchies 2 centuries ago merely to return to them at a new turn in the march of history? Could the founding fathers of communism have foreseen such a thing?! Unfortunately, our common human—ever-human—nature manifests itself in matters great and small. We, if anybody, ought to know that,

however noble an initial ideal may be, in the absence of democracy it becomes merely a cover and excuse for totalitarian power. For democracy is the only guarantee against dictatorship.

Our rejoicing for another people who have freed themselves from a regime of personal power is devalued to a certain extent by the fact that we were previously silent about their tragedy. The words and epithets used toward Romania changed overnight and this has produced legitimate reprimands for journalists from the public. This is not the first time that the problem has arisen, and a solution for it still has not been found. Although the solution is simple. Official state spokesmen should act and talk within the framework of diplomatic niceties. But journalists, social organizations, and people's deputies should have greater freedom to choose their expressions and descriptions. It transpires that they could have written accurate descriptions of the Ceausescu regime and the Romanian people's sufferings prior to this. They did not do so, and once again we must note the truncated nature [ushcherbnost] of our glasnost, whose limits continue to be set by the official ideas of those at the top rather than by the need and right of society to know the truth—and in good time!

The turbulent end to the year in Romania provides other food for thought too. In connection with the favorite question of influential Soviet conservatives, for instance. Where are we headed, they ask, alarmed by the drop in the prestige of their offices and using as an argument the woeful state of the economy and the consumer market and the growing shortages of everything under the sun. In itself this question is by no means pointless. Man may not live by bread alone, but glasnost and democracy will not provide full bellies, and sometimes there isn't even anything to wash with. Where are we headed? For us, the new mechanism of parliamentary democracy, which is now working quickly, has coincided with the deepening economic crisis, creating an overall impression of collapse, and this in turn is becoming a dangerous material force, compounding the panic which we now term inflated [azhiotazhnyy] demand.

Romania, bidding farewell to a totalitarian regime before our very eyes, will not answer our question, of course. But it makes us refresh our memory about a few things by answering another very meaningful question: Where have we come from? What have we left behind? Or, more accurately, we should ask what are we leaving behind, because the "encounter" lasted for decades and the parting cannot be brief. Others ask critically about the road to the future and about where we are headed, while merely dreaming of a return to the stagnant, if superficially stable, past. But the undemocratic past led us into the dead end of low living standards for the people and simultaneously a high level of military confrontation with a Western world, with which, it happens, it is entirely possible to live in peace and cut military spending without reducing our own security. People say that Ceausescu could not match Stalin or Brezhnev. They say that Romania has nothing to teach us [nam ne ukaz]. No, it hasn't, but only in the sense that our dead end was longer and deeper—worse than Romania's—and it is far harder to extricate one-sixth of the earth's surface from it.

The past year was special. History seemed to step up its pace, resolving long-postponed tasks and releasing the peoples' long-suppressed energies. The political face of four East European countries has radically changed in the past 2 months alone. In our country, too, a genuine breakthrough in citizens' political self-awareness has been achieved during this long year. What would have been extraordinary in the spring looked quite natural by the winter. Remember, for instance, the heated election feelings in Moscow in March, when the city's party committee helped one candidate obtain almost 90 percent of the vote by unleashing nearly all of its power against him and thereby rallying the voters around him. Events have outstripped and continue to outstrip the boldness and depth of analysis of them, and it was not back then in March—when a number of party functionaries were defeated in the elections—but later from official rostrums that people started saying that the party was lagging behind the perestroyka processes in society. And now at the second Congress of People's Deputies we see Politburo members no longer in their boxes but in the stalls, among mere and not very mere mortals. And giant portraits of them have long been absent from the main squares before major holidays. They have come down among the people. For the first time in our lives we have seen public criticism of the general secretary as an inevitable attribute of the developing democracy which he initiated. For the first time there have been strikes. For the first time one republic has blockaded another. For the first time a republic party organization has declared itself independent of the CPSU. And the Central Committee plenum broke off, deeming it necessary to send a group of its participants—party leaders—to the area. This also was a first—and it is extremely unusual. It is also a departure from the past, which had seemed immutably eternal. It is also a mark of democracy and of its unfamiliar cost.

What an eventful year—there were events, and there were phenomena which can be seen in those events. One of the main events was the unexpected working meeting in Malta. It indicated yet again one of the main phenomena in international life—the constructive development of Soviet-U.S. relations. Not restricting himself to the role of Ronald Reagan's successor, the new U.S. President expressed a willingness in his contacts with M.S. Gorbachev to go further—both on reducing military confrontation and on economic cooperation. It was stormy in Malta, but the political barometer pointed to "clear"; it was a farewell to the storms of the "cold war."

These events included some which were superficially unprepossessing but did a good job of signposting the path of future progress. In late January the first chapter of glasnost in the military sphere was opened: The Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers' Committee published hitherto strictly secret figures on Warsaw Pact arms and

armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters. This date, 30 January, will not be found in the official lists of the year's main events, but it was on that day that the new principles of our relations with the United States, NATO, and the West were confirmed in writing. The year also opened other chapters in the top-secret book of military matters. We learned the overall strength of the Soviet Armed Forces and the overall size of our military spending—that is, figures which are traditionally revealed by those states where governments' military activities are accountable to parliament. We are learning this accountability, but slowly; in international and military matters our new parliament is probably too timid. Nonetheless, things are moving. At the First Congress of People's Deputies, A.D. Sakharov was shouted down and the subject of our military presence in Afghanistan continued to be interpreted in the fundamentally false light of an international duty. At the Second Congress, the introduction of Soviet troops was recognized to be politically and morally reprehensible, but the first person to publicly state this 10 years ago is no longer alive.

February 15, 1989, is remembered as the date when the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan ended—strictly in line with the Geneva accords. The blood of our sons no longer flowed on Afghan soil. And they stopped shedding Afghan blood there. In our public awareness there is a strong sense of guilt with regard to the Soviet soldiers who were killed or captured, but there is still no sense of guilt or responsibility for what our country did in Afghanistan and to the Afghans. When Yuriy Karyakin, a leading Dostoyevsky expert, reminded the Congress of People's Deputies that Russia not only suffers from, but also is the cause of world problems, not everyone grasped the allusion.

He called on us to purify ourselves and remember "if only for a second" the hundreds of thousands of Afghans who had been killed, and their mothers and widows. But the stenographic record of this remark produced by the Congress Secretariat and published in our newspaper contains a very typical misprint which confirms our insensitivity to the suffering of others. Afghans, that is, the citizens of Afghanistan, is rendered as "Afghans"—that is, our soldiers who went to fight on foreign soil. Have we really expunged the original meaning of this word from our language? Have we really adorned our suffering with quotation marks? Have our problems and troubles—and they are indisputably great—really made us unable to empathize with the problems and troubles of others?

When you look at the way in which emotions purporting to be genuine patriotism and expressing themselves in calls to go so far as to take up arms to suppress the ethnic and even nationalistic sentiments in the Baltic are played upon, you cannot fail to think: Are we Russians—a great people—really so blind to the manifestations of other peoples' national spirit? Is it really not clear to us that only a broad approach, wisdom, and understanding from Moscow within the framework of a new democratic federation can eradicate the original sin discerned by Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians in the annexation of their countries by the Soviet Union on the basis of the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?

It is customary and fashionable, and therefore banal, to talk about the abandonment of former stereotypes. But it is easier to destroy stereotyped phrases than stereotyped realities. Not only customary words but customary realities can be transient, even if they are imprinted in the mind as the only realities possible. Such have been, since Stalinist times, the stereotypes of our relations with the European socialist countries: along party and state lines with only communist parties in power and within the framework of the administrative-edict system which extended the principles of bureaucratic centralism to interstate ties too (naturally, Moscow was the center of this system of interstate centralism). Nothing under the sun lasts forever, though. The year 1989 was a year in which the past was rejected at breathtaking speed. Communists lost their monopoly on power. In Poland one of the leaders of Solidarity—in opposition until recently—became prime minister; in Hungary Imre Nagy, who had described the mass demonstrations of the fall of 1956 as a popular uprising, was rehabilitated and reinterred with state honors; in Berlin the wall erected in 1961, which symbolized the divisions and intolerance between East and West, crumbled politically; in Czechoslovakia the enemies of the "Prague Spring" of 1968 were removed from power; and in Bulgaria the man who had led the country for more than 30 years was expelled from the Communist Party. Finally there was the turbulent end to the year in Romania and the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu.

"Stereotypes" is probably an inadequate term. "Foundations" is more accurate and weighty. The collapse of the foundations was like the collapse of a familiar world. It is of concern not just to Stalinists. Why had the foundations stood throughout previous decades only to fall in six of the seven Warsaw Pact countries in the same year? Yes, administrative-edict systems had proved their ineffectiveness economically (in the sense of material benefits for the people) and ideologically (in the sense of intellectual benefits and political freedoms). Yes, as has already been mentioned, the senior ally set a different example—an example above all accelerated by the process of democratization and the open forum provided by its new-born parliamentarianism.

But I think there is a stricter and more concrete explanation which takes us back to Afghanistan. This—the last Soviet military intervention in the affairs of another country—showed itself to be counterproductive far more graphically than Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia 1968. And the perestroyka-minded Soviet leadership, by agreeing to the Geneva accords, had learned a historic lesson of Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from one country was essentially a signal that they would not be sent into another country. Any repetition would flagrantly contravene the principle of the freedom of choice proclaimed by the new political thinking for

countries and peoples, as well as the entire general thrust of perestroyka, which concentrates its efforts on solving domestic problems and providing foreign policy support for this strategic mission.

But no matter how much Moscow talked about its adherence to new approaches, the world was waiting for practical proof. And such proof followed continually—in Moscow's attitude to the "irregular" [neshtatnyy] situations brought about by radical change and the transition to the multiparty system in Poland and Hungary, and later, from November onward, in other countries too. The "Brezhnev doctrine," as the precedent of the armed suppression of the "Prague Spring" was termed in the West, was indeed withering away. The principle of freedom of choice was reaffirmed in practice time after time. Incidentally, it was proclaimed in its previous form for the last time in Bucharest at the July conference of the Warsaw Pact leaders—with the participation of Honecker, Zhivkov, Jakes, and Ceausescu. When the time came for critical tests, some of them (Honecker and Jakes) experienced their former urge to use force against the mass protesters in their countries, but they changed their minds when they failed to meet with sympathy from the Soviet side. Only Ceausescu did not waver, and the result did not go his way—to put it mildly.

Thus, this has been a turbulent end to a turbulent year heralding the start of a new era. It will not be long in asserting itself in the Soviet Union's relations with its changed allies, in relations between the two military-political blocs—the Warsaw Pact and NATO—in which, clearly, the structures of confrontation will be weakened and structures of cooperation will be created, and in the attitudes of the Europeans and the Americans to the problem of German reunification, in which there is heightened interest following the political elimination of the Berlin Wall. The year that is ending is handing over many issues to the new year, and these are associated not so much with the destruction of obsolete realities as they are with attempts to create new stability in a changed world.

United States & Canada

U.S. Statement on Baltic Separation 'Surprise'

LD0301173490 Moscow TASS in English 1716 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—By TASS Commentator Dmitriy Yakubov:

The New Year's messages by Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush to the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States were received with satisfaction in both countries.

In his message to the Soviet people Bush expressed his "support" for the "dynamic process of reform in the Soviet Union."

These words have been regarded as confirmation of the understanding in America of the difficult and dynamic processes in the Soviet Union that are described as "perestroyka."

Perestroyka includes the processes of renewal in various areas of the economic and political life in the Soviet state. The highest goal of the socialist federation is the revealing of the independent creative potential of every participant in perestroyka.

The political reform of Soviet society and its structures and the republican cost-accounting system are being implemented to achieve this goal.

The process of renewal in the Soviet Union is proceeding with difficulty, which is natural. One of the difficulties complicating this process is the regularly worsening ethnic relations.

The causes of their aggravation differ, yet an objective observer can see that this aggravation leads the processes of renewal in this country into an impasse.

It is obvious that the existence of an integral, firm and strong Soviet Union is the pressing necessity for international stability and security. No one is interested in undermining them.

In this connection, a statement by a U.S. State Department spokesman that the United States would support any peaceful efforts by Baltic republics with a view to achieving self-determination evokes surprise.

This statement, apparently aimed at separating these republics from the rest of the Soviet Union, in its essence and in its spirit is at variance with the U.S. President's New Year's message to the Soviet people.

This statement can only complicate the political situation in the Soviet Union and thus undermine perestroyka which the U.S. President supported in his message.

AUCCTU Halts Vorkuta Miner's U.S. Trip

LD0301180190 Moscow TASS in English 1746 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Igor Agabekov:

Sergey Masalovich, a Vorkuta miner, could not go to the United States because he was dropped from the Soviet delegation on the demand of his colleagues rather than by the whim of some trade union boss in Moscow, the TASS correspondent was told at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU).

A delegation of Soviet miners' strike committees is known to have flown to the United States on December 29, 1989 on the invitation of U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock and the leadership of the U.S. AFL-CIO Trade Union Association. Sergey Masalovich was among those who received the invitation to visit the United States. However, at the last moment he was excluded from the delegation.

In an interview with the Liberty and Voice of America radio stations Masalovich alleged that this was done in revenge for his issuing political demands. American journalists accredited in Moscow tendentiously reported about the dropping of worker Masalovich from the group. What has happened in actual fact?

Aleksandr Zharikov, head of the AUCCTU International Department, told TASS that Masalovich was among other people who asked the AUCCTU for assistance. A foreign passport was urgently issued for him. But the AUCCTU received telegrams from the people with whom Masalovich works, from the trade union of which he is a member, and from the Vorkuta Workers' Strike committee expressing mistrust in Masalovich and demanding that he be refused a trip to the United States.

Follow excerpts from some telegrams: "The Vogalorskaya Mine where Masalovich works and it alone can determine the expediency of his going to the United States", wrote Molchanov, chairman of the Vorkuta Territorial Committee of Miners' Trade Union, and Kopasov, co-chairman of the Vorkuta Workers' Strike Committee.

Another telegram containing similar demands reports that Masalovich "discredits the working class movement". Many members of the Vorkuta Strike Committee put their signatures to it. The telegrams said that Masalovich does not represent the interests of workers, that he has been absent from work for some two months although nobody gave a leave to him.

On the demand of the Strike Committee and the Territorial Committee of the Vorkuta Miners' Trade Union this information was brought to the knowledge of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Zharikov said. The AUCCTU, which was issuing Masalovich's documents, was forced to recall them on the miners' demand.

Zharikov stressed that the AUCCTU did not deny Masalovich the right to leave the country. It only refused to be a sponsor of his trip under these conditions.

Northeast Asia

Deputy Minister Rogachev on Japanese Ties

LD0301175590 Moscow World Service in English 0710 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev by reporter Oleg Sobovyev; date, place of interview not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Our reporter Oleg Sobovyev has interviewed Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev who recently toured a number of Asian countries. In Japan he discussed bilateral relations with Japanese leaders. Now, how would you describe the present state of Soviet-Japanese relations, their dynamics?

[Rogachev in Russian fading into English translation] Our relations with Japan, a big neighbor, cannot be described in one word. Lately, Prime Minister Kaifu and other members of his Cabinet have been speaking of their interest in better relations with the Soviet Union. Naturally, we welcome such aspirations. The political dialogue between the two countries is quite lively. Suffice it to say that last year the foreign ministers of the two countries met five times. Recently a delegation of the Supreme Soviet led by Aleksandr Yakovlev visited Japan. He was given a very favorable reception at a high level and held useful talks with the leaders of the country and the heads of the opposition parties. These negotiations, and the viewpoint is shared by Tokyo, opened up new possibilities for the positive development of Soviet-Japanese relations.

[Sobovyev] And what are the plans for 1990?

[Rogachev] We have planned a number of things, for example, talks have already started on an intergovernmental agreement on environmental protection. Both the Soviet Union and Japan attach great significance to such a document. I would also want to mention the visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan scheduled for the nearest future. The delegation is coming at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. It will be the first visit of this kind in the history of bilateral relations.

[Sobovyev] At the end of 1988 the two countries agreed to set up a joint working group to outline a draft peace treaty. What's the progress?

[Rogachev] The group has held four sessions. The concepts of the two sides have been compared and many points of similarity found. There are difficulties too, the greatest of them the demand of the Japanese side to return four of the Kurill Islands. The Soviet stand on this issue has not changed—appropriate wartime and postwar international agreements regulate the position of the islands. We have made this clear to our Japanese counterparts. What will the future be like? I would not make any concrete forecasts, however, there are grounds for optimism, I think. A few days ago the government report on foreign policy was published in Tokyo saying that with the further deepening of confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union, Soviet-Japanese relations should also improve. I think this is a correct idea.

Japan's Increased Defense Budget Criticized

OW0301050190 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 30 Dec 89

[Commentator Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] The Japanese Government Friday approved a defense budget for the next fiscal year. Thanks to the smooth growth in the Japanese economy, defense spending falls below 1 percent of the GNP. However, when compared with the current fiscal year's defense spending, the amount for the next fiscal year will increase by 6.1 percent, the largest increase in the last 5 years. As a result, the total amount of defense spending will exceed 4 trillion yen.

Mr Pierre Dodras, noted French expert, pointed out in the journal (?COLUMN) on 18 December that while all the Western nations are now reducing defense spending, only Japan is trying to increase its defense spending. And it is not only the Western nations that are reducing their defense spending. The Socialist nations in Eastern Europe are reducing not only their defense spending but also their military strength. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is scheduled to reduce its defense budget for the next fiscal year by 8.2 percent. And as is known to all, the Soviet Union will soon reduce its troop strength by half a million. The reduction will also include 12,000 troops stationed in the Far East.

Under such a global trend, Japan's increasing its defense spending constitutes a striking contrast to the actions of various nations in the East and the West. A large portion of Japan's defense budget will be allocated for procuring new military hardware, including sophisticated tanks, fighters, and such vessels as missile-carrying destroyers. Approximately 104 billion yen will be used for promoting academic research on future weapons and operations, including the research on the FSX, the next-generation support fighter aircraft.

The above-mentioned French expert states in his article that Japan's rearmament has begun to arouse apprehensions among its neighboring nations, particularly the Soviet Union and China, as well as the ASEAN nations and the ROK. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has begun be apprehensive because of military and political reasons.

Among the worldwide detente, Japan's increase in its defense spending indicates that the Japanese leadership

still relies on power while neglecting to strengthen security through political means. Therefore, detente in Asia has been delayed to a far distant future.

When all these facts are taken into consideration, such an idea has aroused sharp criticism. The Japanese opposition parties have severely criticized the government and the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] for the new increase in defense spending. For example, Dietman Shigeru Ito of the Japan Socialist Party [JSP] states that the increase in defense spending cannot be accepted when the rapidly weakening tension in the East-West relations is taken into account.

In fact, a military power named Japan seems to have transformed itself into a bulldozer equipped with no computers. Without responding to the changes that have taken place in its neighborhood, this bulldozer continues traveling along the same line that it sought once before.

According to the next-term defense buildup program worked out by the Japanese Defense Agency, Japan plans to increase its defense spending by 5.5 percent each year. It surpasses any doubt that the implementation of such a program will certainly destroy Japan's image as a peace-loving power.

Incidentally, it seems that this line has already arousd much doubt even within the ruling LDP. JIYU SHIMPO, the LDP's organ, carries in its 28 December issue an unsigned article which states that in accordance with the worldwide trend toward disarmament, Japan will now need to limit its defense spending. The JIYU SHIMPO article also questions as to whether or not the time has now come for Japan to shift its strict position on relations with the Soviet Union to a more flexible one.

No Reduction of U.S. Forces in ROK Planned

LD0301204390 Moscow TASS in English 2034 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo January 3 TASS—The United States and South Korea do not intend at present to discuss the issue of reducing the strength of the U.S. expeditionary corps stationed in the south of the Korean Peninsula, South Korean Defence Minister Yi Sang-hun said in Seoul today.

He told journalists that he received a letter from the U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney, in which the latter notified him that the U.S. Administration does not have any plans to withdraw its troops from South Korea. The letter says that American combat troops in Western Europe will be reduced, as was planned, but this step will not affect in any way the U.S. military presence in Korea.

Therefore, the South Korean minister said, one should not expect Cheney to submit any proposals for trimming the strength of the 43,000 strong expeditionary corps during his visit to Seoul next February.

At present, the South Korean Government also opposes this step in view of the special political and military situation on the Korean Peninsula, which, in the minister's view, has not changed at all despite drastic changes in Eastern Europe.

Primorskiy Expands Economic Ties With S. Korea

SK0401022390 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 28 Dec 89

[From the "Introducing Soviet Primorskiy Kray" program]

[Excerpt] This program introducing the Soviet Primorskiy Kray will be the last one for this year. We have invited many guests to this program. One of the guests is Vasliy Ozodov, deputy chairman of the Committee of External Economic Cooperation, the Executive Committee of Primorskiy Kray. He said as follows:

[Begin Ozodov recording in Russian fading into Korean translation] This year was a particularly important year for Primorskiy in developing its external economic ties. In the past, only traditional trade organizations in Primorskiy had ties with overseas trade partners. However, today, 199 trade enterprises are licensed to engage in foreign trade.

This year, (?225) foreign delegations visited Primorskiy. This number is more than those that had visited during the past 15 to 20 years. In particular, Jilin Province and Heilongjiang Province of China, our neighbor, showed most active attitude toward trade with us. The volume of traditional trade with Japan amounted to 20 million rubles.

A number of South Korean companies, including Daewoo and Hyundai, have not only broadened their knowledge on the Soviet Far East but also worked out plans to cooperate with various enterprises in our Kray.

I participated in the opening ceremony for the mission of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce held this year in Seoul. Just as many people in our Kray, I hope that a country with which we have had no relations for a long time will be our good working-level partner [silmujok sangdaeguk]. We also hope to maintain such relations with the United States, the Philippines, Vietnam, India, and Australia. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Cambodian Issue

BK0301162790 Hanoi VNA in English 1527 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA Jan 3—Eduard Shevardnadze, foreign minister of the Soviet Union, has granted an interview to VNA and SPK correspondents in Moscow on the Cambodia issue.

Asked to comment on the current situation in the settlement of the Cambodia issue, he said:

"We think that favourable prospects are being opened for a really steady and balanced settlement of this drawn-out regional issue.

"Vietnam has withdrawn its army units from Cambodia, thus creating a new qualitative change for a solution.

"Many countries are striving to find ways of solving the problem at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield.

"Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has proposed the convening of an informal meeting in Jakarta between representatives of the Cambodian factions, Southeast Asian countries, and France as co-chairman of the Paris international conference on Cambodia.

"Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan has proposed that matters relating to the establishment of an international control mechanism on Cambodia, the cease-fire and an end to foreign military aid to all Cambodian parties be considered at that meeting.

"Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans' initiative on the United Nations' role in organizing elections in Cambodia along the Namibia formula is a timely initiative full of prospects.

"For its part, the Soviet Union has proposed a moratorium on military aid to the Cambodian parties. This proposal has been supported by the United States which it considers to be part of an overall solution.

"As a demonstration of its good will, the government of the State of Cambodia has put forth a new and important initiative in response to the proposals of Australia and Thailand. Chairman of the Cambodian Council of Ministers Hun Sen has declared his readiness to consider the establishment in Cambodia of a UN office entrusted with the task of supervising the implementation of agreements reached among the Khmer factions and the organization of general elections while retaining the present governments of the State of Cambodia and of Democratic Kampuchea during the transitional period and leaving Cambodia's seat at the United Nations vacant. The leader of the State of Cambodia has called for an early resumption of the negotiation process by convening a new informal meeting in Jakarta within the framework of the Paris forum as proposed by Thailand.

"So, there exist now a whole package of effective and coincidental proposals aimed at continuing and then concluding the present process of finding out a solution. Also a framework of negotiations has been formed to materialize these proposals.

"The important point now is for the parties concerned to show their readiness to make reasonable concessions while taking into account the realities inside and around Cambodia. The Soviet Union has voiced its support for the State of Cambodia's constructive policy and holds that that policy has opened the way to agreements on Cambodia acceptable to each party concerned.

"The Soviet Union has also positively appraised the initiatives of Australia and Thailand.

"The Soviet Union calls on all parties concerned to use their influence to end the bloodshed in Cambodia and prevent its recurrence in the future, and to reach a lasting overall solution to the Cambodia issue."

Asked what is standing in the way of a rapid solution to the Cambodia issue, Eduard Shevadnadze said:

"First of all, the Cambodian opposition forces are still bent on using military force. After the Vietnamese pullout, the launching of a military showdown against the Cambodian people is really nonsensical and absurd. In fact, the continued bloodshed is aimed at forcing Phnom Penh to accept the Polpotists' participation in the transitional power mechanism. The absence of an agreement on cease-fire and on the cessation of military aid to the Cambodian factions is also blocking a solution.

"Once again I want to emphasize that the proposals of the government of the State of Cambodia are opening a direct way to an early solution. These proposals have offered the optimum chance because they take into account the interests of all parties concerned. Let the Cambodian people demonstrate their will and exercise their freedom in deciding the international supervision, their own destiny and the internal structure of their own home as nobody can decide it on behalf of the Cambodian people. The important thing is how to enable all parties concerned to make use of the present favourable conditions to defuse the conflict, and prevent all schemes to impose on the Cambodian people what they cannot accept."

Asked what he thinks of the effect of the settlement of the Cambodian question on the situation in Southeast Asia, the Soviet foreign minister said: "I am firmly concinced that the defusing of the Cambodian conflict, which has for years harboured many regional contradictions, will substantially improve the situation not only in Southeast Asia but also in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, it will also be a driving force to promote increasingly positive processes and trends in the region."

Indonesia's Alatas Favors Cooperation with USSR

LD0301192690 Moscow TASS in English 1815 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Jakarta January 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrov:

Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas today called for the quest of new forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union, for setting up joint ventures and expanding all-round ties between the two countries' business communities.

Alatas, in a statement on the results of the past year, emphasised that the documents signed during the visit of President Suharto to the Soviet Union gave a new impetus to bilateral relations and opened ample opportunities for developing mutually beneficial cooperation, specifically, in the trade and economic area.

Alatas noted that the Indonesian president's visit to Moscow helped clear political and psychological barriers in Indonesian-Soviet relations and raise them to a higher level.

Rapprochement between the East and the West and also positive changes in the Asia-Pacific region open new opportunities for the ASEAN states and other south-east Asian nations to give fresh momentum to the efforts to turn this region into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, a zone free of nuclear weapons. The successful holding of the Soviet-Chinese summit meeting in Beijing had a salutary impact on the situation in the region, the statement stressed.

On the Cambodian issue, Alatas reaffirmed Jakarta's readiness to assist the quest for a comprehensive political settlement to it and launch new initiatives if the Cambodian parties concerned display readiness for a compromise.

Problems Facing Philippines at Year's End Analyzed

HK2312080889 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 22 Dec 89

[Commentary by Vassiliy Silipov]

[Text] A caricature describing the Philippines at the end of the year 1989 was recently published in a Philippine daily, THE MANILA CHRONICLE, which featured the Philippines surrounded by a multi-headed snake with tongues poised to attack its victim. In effect, the lethal tongues symbolized the many problems confronting the Philippines, such as the shortage of development funds, high foreign debts, economic problems, military bases, and coup attempts by military elements. And indeed, try as it may to confront the challenges, the Philippines will have to carry these burdens into the new year.

At the moment, the current Aquino administration is trying to encourage the entry of more foreign capital, as it believes that foreign investment is an important factor in the economic recovery of the Philippines. Huge investments from Japan and the United States, and in recent years, from Taiwan and South Korea, have helped the country immensely, especially in the manufacture of commodities and chemicals. This has, in turn, led to higher exports from the country. In particular, the export of commodities today surpasses that of raw materials. It is for this reason that the Aquino government is bent on attracting more foreign investment.

However, foreign investment can only mean that the country is directly dependent on big companies. These companies require an excellent investment climate, which is usually contrary to the national interest.

What are the prospects for investment in the Philippines in the next few years? Compared to previous years, the prospects are not very good. Rich countries had earlier promised several million dollars' worth of comprehensive aid to the Philippines, but in fact, the country has only received a handful. Meanwhile, hopes for more investments in the country as a result of the president's trips to the United States and Canada have been dashed by the coup d'etat launched recently. Companies that had been attracted by the cheap labor and that had initially planned to bring capital into the Philippines are now hesitant about pushing through with investments plans. The just-concluded coup attempt cost the Philippines $1.3 billion. And worst of all, REUTERS has reported that the coup has chased away hopes for any increase in foreign investment in the country.

This verdict may seem harsh, but the situation appears unlikely to improve. Late as it may seem, a Philippine delegation recently left the country for several major capitals in the hope of persuading potential investors that all is well in the Philippines. Unfortunately, that is not exactly the case. Locally, the Aquino government is deluged with complaints, particularly from local businessmen.

In a meeting with top business leaders this month in Manila, the Aquino government was urged to introduce flexible investment policies and free competition in retail prices and services. And at a time when the Philippines is in dire need of political stability as well as local and foreign investors, how is the Aquino government to give such assurances when anti-government forces refuse to lay down their arms?

Rodolfo Canieso, head of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, has asserted that the threat of another coup in the next 6 months persists.

Even as the country faces uncertainty on the political scene, the future of U.S. military bases has to be decided. How will talks between Washington and Manila take shape next year? And will Washington's role in helping the Aquino government crush the coup d'etat affect the talks? According to Senate President Jovito Salonga, Manila's position has been weakened in the talks, but he added that the strong movement opposed to the maintaining of the bases should be heeded.

Despite the gloomy prospects of the country's economic situation next year, some favorable factors do exist, such as the rise in exports and promotion of economic ties with non-traditional trading partners, including the Soviet Union, Eastern European states, and Indochinese states. We all hope that the coming year will be a better year for the Philippines.

Vietnamese Decide To Ban Private Publishing

PM0301151190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent B. Vinogradov dispatch: "Heated Debates in Parliament"]

[Text] Hanoi—The Hanoi press is assessing the SRV National Assembly session that has just ended as a landmark in the renewal of Vietnamese society. For 10 days deputies discussed urgent questions of economic and social development contained in the Council of Ministers report.

Premier Do Muoi, summing up the results of the past year, noted the improvements in the Vietnamese economy that have come about as a result of the reforms. The stabilization of living standards, the saturation of the consumer market with goods, and plentiful food supplies are the main features of the period under review, which was a turning point and determined real ways of getting out of the prolonged period of crisis. It is generally agreed that the success achieved attests to the correctness of the chosen course in the sphere of production and distribution.

At the same time, the deputies made an in-depth analysis of the existing difficulties connected with the abandonment of old-fashioned economic management methods and the break with the bureaucratic system of administration. Attention was drawn to the continuing imbalance between imports and exports, to the large gap between sectors producing means of production and sectors producing consumer goods, and to the continuing growth in foreign debt.

There was a lively debate in parliament about the press law, a draft of which has been submitted for nationwide discussion. The debate particularly focused on the section covering the impermissibility of setting up private newspapers and magazines in modern Vietnamese society. In this respect the new law differs from the previous law, in force since 1957, which permitted private publishing. The law was adopted by a majority. In their speeches deputies noted that this document is more in line with the current sociopolitical situation in the country and wholly accords with the tasks of renewal. Another draft law—on the trade unions—was less "lucky." After a long debate the parliament decided to postpone it to the next session, sending back many articles for further work. It was a question above all of the formulas defining the trade unions' role, their relations with state organs and management at enterprises, and their specific functions in reliably protecting working people's interests and rights.

The state budget for 1990 ratified by the National Assembly envisages a certain reduction in defense spending. The newspapers are noting that these plans will be implemented along with a further reduction in the numbers of the SRV Armed Forces, whose current strength is 1.5 million.

New Zealand's Foreign Minister on Region, Ties

PM0301163790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with New Zealand Foreign Minister Russell Marshall by IZVESTIYA special correspondent V. Mikheyev: "The Time for Bloc Psychology Is Past"; date of interview not specified]

[Text] Wellington—[Mikheyev] Mr Minister, your viewpoint regarding the division of the international landscape into political groupings, military alliances, and trade blocs is interesting. Doesn't this bloc psychology impede the improvement of the international atmosphere?

[Marshall] I agree with that formulation of the question. However, the rigid model of the world that existed to a considerable extent in our imagination is being destroyed literally before our eyes. Previously the world was clearly divided into "good guys" and "bad guys," with everyone else in the middle. But our world never conformed to such an over-simplified format and it is even less appropriate today. I am sure that the time for bloc psychology, when everyone belonged to either one or the other grouping and was therefore pitted against one another by virtue of that, is past.

New Zealand cannot assume a lone role in asserting a peace-loving psychology, but we have announced our unwillingness to see vessels with nuclear propulsion units or nuclear weapons on board in our ports. This step was dictated by the sentiments of the public and of people of various political convictions and parties, and that is why our government will never go back on its word on this issue. In the last few years support for the antinuclear course has grown appreciably.

[Mikheyev] To what do you attribute the popularity of this course?

[Marshall] Over the last few years the international climate has grown appreciably warmer: U.S. President Reagan and later President Bush met with President Gorbachev, the situation in Eastern Europe is changing, Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war has ended, elections have been held in Namibia, and so on. But there are still environmental calamities. People realize that we live on a very frail planet. It must be protected. All this is also fostering antinuclear sentiments in our country.

[Mikheyev] Does New Zealand intend in this favorable climate to strengthen the regional stability symbolized inter alia by the Raratonga Treaty on the formation of a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific?

[Marshall] We are actively involved in disarmament processes although we are not, for instance, an official participant in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. One of our aims is to introduce an all-embracing universal ban on nuclear weapons testing. We are trying to

persuade the superpowers to sign protocols to the Raratonga Treaty. The Soviet Union and China have signed them and I see no reason why the United States could not follow their exampl. I personally suspect that the United States is not agreeing to this out of solidarity with the French, who carry out their tests in Polynesia. Britain could also join in, by acknowledging the Raratonga Treaty. We support the formation of nuclear-free zones in any region of the globe.

[Mikheyev] In which spheres could the Soviet Union and New Zealand cooperate closely?

[Marshall] The distance between us was previously a crucial factor influencing New Zealanders' notions of your country. Everything is changing. The confused, sometimes grotesque notions of the Soviet Union are becoming a thing of the past. Today the USSR is an important market for us. As we discover the Soviet Union in the future, New Zealanders will be able to learn about your rich and diverse history and cultural traditions, which will help establish cooperation, particularly in the sphere of scientific studies.

[Mikheyev] In this context, could you describe the state of USSR-New Zealand bilateral relations?

[Marshall] We have good relations. We are watching Gorbachev's policy with interested sympathy. Last year parliamentarians headed by the speaker traveled there, and I am convinced that, if the question of who wanted to visit the USSR were raised in parliament right now, everyone without exception would raise a hand. Our contacts, leaving trade aside, are expanding.

[Mikheyev] In which direction do you plan to further your exports and consequently direct your national economy?

[Marshall] The markets in West and East Europe are important for us, but we are linking our future with the states of the Pacific rim, as illustrated by the recent 12-country meeting in Canberra to discuss the prospects for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. The composition of the future association has not yet been finalized. China's participation is not clear, and the Soviet Union's membership has only been marked out as an urgent topic for discussion. The planned association will not be based on principles of a closed trading bloc using protectionist measures. It is important to ensure the equality of the participants, including the small Pacific island states which are very vulnerable with their weak economies. Another element: A broad association must not belittle regional alliances— and the system of mutual assistance organized within them—such as ASEAN or the South Pacific Forum. A place will be found for each of them.

Near East & South Asia

United Arab Emirates Minister Visits Moscow

JN0201155590 Manama WAKH in English 1520 GMT 2 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, Jan 2 (GNA)—UAE Minister of Economy and Trade Sayf al-Jarwan arrived in Moscow today for talks on cooperation.

During the four-day visit, al-Jarwan will sign an economic, trade and technical cooperation agreement.

He was met at the airport by Soviet Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Konstantin Katushev and other officials including UAE Ambassador in Moscow Nasir al-'Abbudi.

Al-Jarwan, who will also visit Egypt, is accompanied by the ministry's Assistant Undersecretary for Trade Affairs Muhammad Jasim al-Mazki and other officials.

Economic Agreement Signed

JN0201190790 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1730 GMT 2 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow, 2 Jan (WAKH)—An agreement on economic, commercial, and technical cooperation between the Governments of the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow today. The purpose is to promote cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefits for both countries.

The agreement was signed for the UAE side by Economy and Trade Minister Sayf al-Jarwan, currently visiting Moscow, and for the Soviet side by Foreign Economic Relations Minister Konstantin Katushev. Members of the two delegations attended the signing ceremony.

The agreement governs cooperation in the fields of industry, agriculture, energy, transportation, communications, construction, investment and its immunities, exchange of technological expertise, manpower training, and any other fields decided on by both sides in the future.

The agreement stipulates that exportation and importation be subject to the laws enforced in both countries and on the basis of the contracts concluded between natural persons and corporations in UAE and Soviet establishments. The contracts shall be made at the prices of major world markets.

The agreement also provides for the encouragement of cooperation between both countries' institutions and agencies in the fields of trade, economy, and technology, as well as in the exchange of economic delegations and participation in international fairs and markets organized in both countries. Each party to the agreement shall allow the institutions of the other to organize exhibitions on its territory.

According to the agreement, a joint committee will be set up to discuss all issues related to cooperation between the two countries, especially to pursue the implementation of this agreement, put forward recommendations to concerned establishments in both countries, establish proposals necessary to promote cooperation in the aforementioned fields, and settle disputes that may arise during the implementation of the agreement.

The agreement does not affect bilateral or multilateral agreements to which the UAE and the Soviet Union are party.

The agreement will remain valid for 5 years and will automatically be renewed for successive periods of 5 years each unless either party to the agreement informs the other in writing of its desire to abrogate it at least 6 months before its expiration date.

The provisions of this agreement shall govern all contracts signed while the agreement is in force.

Moscow Radio Report

LD0301075390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text) An agreement—the first in the history of bilateral relations—on trade, economic and technical cooperation between our country and the United Arab Emirates has been signed in Moscow.

During negotiations a principled agreement to form an inter-governmental commission on interaction of our countries in these spheres was reached.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev Congratulates Zimbabwe's Mugabe

LD2912181889 Moscow TASS in English 1740 GMT 29 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has sent a message to Robert Mugabe, congratulating him on the election to the presidency and the post of first secretary of the Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front.

Mikhail Gorbachev wished Robert Mugabe and all members of the united party successes in their activities for the good of the Zimbabwean people.

Commentary Examines South Africa's Future

MB2912160989 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 28 Dec 89

[Aleksandr Fedorov commentary; from the "South Africa Today" program—read by announcer]

[Text] This is a most difficult time for political analysts and journalists, when the results of the year are summed up and forecasts for the future are made.

It's not too difficult to guess the future of South Africa. After...[changes thought] hardly anyone could foresee that, after President Frederik de Klerk came into office on 14 September, the climate in the country would change like the air changes after a purifying Transvaal thunderstorm. Whatever the president's opponents from the Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Resistance Movement might say, there are evident changes in many spheres of life in the country.

During the 100 days of Frederik de Klerk's Presidency, opponents to the system of separate development have been able to hold demonstrations and other protest actions with almost no police interference. The first desegregated suburbs have been created, many political prisoners have been released, and beaches have been opened for all racial groups.

Political analysts were right last week, saying that the new president has managed to change the nature of parliamentary political life and generate certain careful optimism after a long sinister period. The president is most effective in creating the necessary climate. Besides, he has passed decisions on several difficult questions, what I didn't expect of him, said a white MP and former opposition leader, Colin Eglin.

You probably remember the popular joke of the beginning of the year: A white optimist is the one who studies Zulu; a white pessimist is the one who studies culture.

It is true that, a few months ago, the Zulu chief, Gatsha Buthelezi, was considered a promising political figure due to his attitude to the developments and intentions to start talks with the authorities even if other organizations refuse to enter a dialogue.

The recognized leader of the liberation, Nelson Mandela, who is closer, was always called a red terrorist. After the meeting of Frederik de Klerk and imprisoned Nelson Mandela, the attitude of the white community to the African National Congress [ANC] has markedly changed. The proposals of the ANC on the abolition of the state of emergency and the withdrawal of troops from African suburbs no longer sounds impossible.

The course of developments has not led to a massacre, predicted by Eugene Terreblanche: The conclusion can be drawn, after analyzing the stand of the ANC, the attitude of Africans to white people in Zimbabwe, and, now, in Namibia.

According to a prominent political figure in South Africa, Van zyl Slabbert, progress and the abolition of the ban on the mention of the ANC will help to destroy propaganda myths and calm down the alarmists from the white camp. Africans, he says, should no longer be regarded as [words indistinct] or called monsters from racial cartoons.

Will the country manage to get rid of the obstructions of the image of Africans created for decades by the Boers of (Falwood). Frederik de Klerk has changed the climate to

a certain extent. The (?often) experiment is conducted in laboratory conditions. The temperature impression should be permanent.

It is clear that the changes in the country are (?self-induced), as if in a laboratory. That's why it is gratifying that the president said in an interview with the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES that he intends to renounce apartheid and build a multiethnic state, such as Belgium or Switzerland, in South Africa.

He said that, under his leadership, the country is rapidly advancing to harmony in interracial relations and that he has invited the ANC, the most influential liberation organization of the native population, to join the talks on the new constitution.

In their forecasts, political analysts and journalists like to resort to comparisons. I have defined 1989 as the year of the changing climate for South Africa; 1990, I think, can become the year of the great [word indistinct], just like the Great Trek.

I would want my forecasts to come true and that 1990 would be a happy year for all of you, your families, and your country.

De Klerk's Reforms of RSA Seen as Inadequate

PM0301114390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Jan 89 Morning Edition p3

[Own correspondent M. Pavlov dispatch: "One Hundred Days of De Klerk"]

[Text] Luanda—Just over 3 months have passed since Frederik de Klerk was elected president in the Republic of South Africa (RSA). He promised to open a new chapter in this country's history. His term in office as head of the apartheid state has not been running long enough to draw unequivocal conclusions, but interim assessments deserve some attention.

Considering that a fair number of real changes had been expected of de Klerk following his very promising statements, the correlation between these statements and what has actually been achieved should be noted. Since taking office, the white minority leader has made a delicate attempt to begin a dialogue with the black majority. It is noteworthy that Frederik de Klerk began his work as RSA president by allowing opponents of apartheid to stage a protest march. He has released one of the leaders of the African National Congress (ANC), Walter Sisulu, and several other political opponents of the existing RSA regime and abolished the segregational law, in effect since 1953, on the separate use of beaches, parks, and libraries, although keeping this law in effect in schools and other academic establishments. De Klerk has had meetings with Archbishop Desmond Tutu, an acknowledged leader of the black community, and with Nelson Mandela, currently serving a life prison sentence, and has made contact with African heads of state Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast) and Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique) to discuss the problems of ensuring regional security and ending the war in Angola. He has announced that the RSA intends to cease armed aggression against countries in the region and, in confirmation of this statement, has reduced the length of army service for whites by 12 months and given instructions to close down various military bases on RSA territory. These measures could give some people the impression that, under De Klerk's leadership, Pretoria is making a sharp turn in its policies. This is precisely how the RSA press and Western news agencies are presenting the RSA president's initiatives.

Yes, in comparison with P. Botha's dictatorship, the above measures and Frederik de Klerk himself appear liberal. But, in actual fact, they do not affect the foundations of the apartheid system or its basic laws. There is still a state of emergency in the country, which allows the South African police to act virtually as they want and so, making the most of their unlimited powers, they have the right to break up demonstrations and arrest Africans on beaches and in parks and libraries, where the segregation laws are supposedly no longer in effect. As the JORNAL DE ANGOLA has observed, there are a considerable number of such instances. To this should be added the ongoing intensive campaign of victimization and persecution of the South African opposition press—even more brutal than under Botha—and the continuing criminal activity of the "death squads," which Frederik de Klerk even tries to defend.

In this connection the following question arises: Are the National Party and its leader, De Klerk, prepared to share power with the black majority? On the one hand, the RSA's apparent desire for reforms is encouraging. But, on the other, these reforms do not inspire optimism, because they are not radical and do not convince public opinion of the Pretorian authorities' desire to eliminate racism. In this case the outcome could be chaos and violence in the country, as evidenced by the complex situation in a number of RSA cities and particularly in the black ghetto areas. Consequently, President de Klerk must realise that the reserves of his credit of trust are running out.

Solidarity Committee Head Interviewed on Africa

MB2912151989 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 28 Dec 89

[Report on interview by unidentified correspondent with Mikhail Kapitsa, chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Countries; date and place of interview not given—questions read by announcer; Kapitsa's remarks recorded in Russian, fading into superimposed English translation]

[Text] [Question] The year 1989 saw quite a lot of (?bright) events in different parts of the planet, Africa included. Which of them, do you think, were most important? And, how do you assess the outgoing year?

[Kapitsa] If we assess the outgoing year from the point of view of the world situation, I can say that it was a year of the deepened relaxation of tensions. The god of war is evidently giving up his positions, and this world of ours is gradually stepping away from the brink of the abyss near which we were just recently. I am pleased to note that the course towards the settlement of regional conflicts by political means prevailed in 1989.

It is in this context that we can view the process of decolonization of Namibia. Not so long ago, the influential TIMES of Britain vowed that the granting of independence to Namibia in this century is unrealistic. Now, we can say with certainty that Namibia will be independent, already in early 1990.

The atmosphere has improved in other parts of the African Continent, as well. The concepts of the new political thinking have penetrated there, too. It is ever less seldom that conflicting situations cause irritation, though this is still sometimes the case.

An irritation is a poor helper in politics or intergovernmental relations. It was like this in Africa just a while ago. Two sides could not come to an agreement. Quite often, such situations developed into armed conflicts. The Soviet Union has come to the aid of one of the sides, and the United States to the other, and the conflict sometimes dragged on and on for long years to come. As a result, the peoples that were involved in this (?non-peaceful) conflict suffered. Now, the situation has changed, and the very approach to the settlement of conflicts has changed, too.

Therefore, we can hope that there will still be more concord and dialogue in Africa next year, and, in general, we are all (?going) to assess the outgoing year positively, including in Africa.

[Question] With African countries, as before, running against the [words indistinct] more problems, and the growing foreign debt is making those problems even more complicated. How do you view the way to (?correct) the situations?

[Kapitsa] Frankly, anyone who takes funds must pay. This is the only way to learn how to avoid making debts and ration of the use of resources.

Finally, one has got to respect his partners. This, you will probably agree, is a common international practice. But, (?an evolving) situation has taken shape in some African countries. It is rooted in the heritage left over by colonialism and in the mistakes made in a number of countries during their independence. There are peoples in Africa now living on the verge of virtual starvation. Many African states are making no actual progress but working only to repay interests on debts. In this situation, the developed countries must display mercy and write off a part of the debt and, in some cases, totally.

At present, there are (?completes) in the Soviet Union to sign off debts to 18 less developed African states. Viewing the problem on a global scale, would you state the necessity to resolve it in the framework of broad international involvement by the United Nations of the debtors and creditors? It is clear that the African countries themselves will never find an escape from the quagmire of debts.

[Question] Another question (?for you), Mr Kapitsa. How do you see the development of Soviet-African ties in 1990 and their further prospects?

[Kapitsa] Restructuring is (?no art). We're short of funds, especially foreign currency. I'll make no bones about it.

So, this country will hardly be able to offer gratuitous aid in the near future.

But, on the other hand, I am sure this sort of African cooperation has fair prospects.

We do not always actively seek new forms of ties and cooperation. We hold on to all the old forms. But, how many opportunities are there, say, in joint ventures or industrial facilities on the compensational basis?

The Soviet Union is ready for a joint search of those who want it. We are sure (?to find proof that) stretch out before such time.

In conclusion, I would like to greet our listeners in Africa on the coming year, 1990.

Commentary Assesses African 'Era of Compromise'

MB0301083090 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 29 Dec 89

[Boris Asoyan commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] To put it briefly, Africa in 1989 was, as before, (?a symbol) for misery and violence, but the global dynamics of our time have begun to take hold in that region of the world.

New political thinking, revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe brought about the end of the lies and stereotypes of the cold war. The ideological struggle, one of the major factors in Africa's modern political life, began to give place to pragmatism. This pragmatism provided an insight into the threat which comes of the endless and thoughtless propaganda war in conditions with deteriorating economic development.

Political realism is cutting through the discredited doctrines of violence and destabilization. It can be said, without exaggeration, that there is a speed up in the tempo of the endeavors to undo the most knotted conflicts by political means.

Africa, together with the rest of the world, is taking part in an era of compromise based on the principles of a balance of interests and respect of the right of a free choice.

In South-West Africa, there was a breakthrough in the Namibian settlement. During the year, a way was found out of the dead-end confrontation, and there was action on UN Resolution 435, on the independence of Namibia, the last bastion of colonialism.

After 14 years of war, there is hope for a national reconciliation in Angola. The talks launched in June 1989 have been difficult. They staggered along and saw the country tottering on the verge of war. However, the process of normalization is slowly overcoming its irreversible nature.

The edge has been taken off one of the bloodiest conflicts in the history of Africa, the conflict of Mozambique.

In the largest and most advanced of the African countries to the south of Sahara—South Africa—good progress has been made. It is evidenced by aspirations of various [word indistinct] of the country's population, including the white minority, to reject apartheid as soon as possible and to engage in building a new, nonracist, and democratic society. On both sides, there is a growing understanding of the necessity to bring about a political settlement of the conflict, to clear up differences around the negotiations table.

An important move along this path of consensus was the UN General Assembly's resolution on apartheid. The flexibility of the African countries and the liberation movements of South Africa, their willingness to launch a constructive dialogue and to conclude reasonable compromises is reflected in the document.

In 1989, there appeared a gleam of hope to resolve the drawn out conflict that has gone beyond the Horn of Africa and has been fueled by unbroken droughts and famines.

A dialogue has begun between the Ethiopian Government and the political organization of Eritrea, which wants self-government. There's been several attempts to overcome, by political means, the differences between the countries of the region. Unfortunately, it is a little too early to speak about any results. War continues on no less a scale than before. As before, innocent people are dying, and refugees are being counted by the hundreds of thousands.

Other conflicts are cooling down, like the one between Chad and Libya. Judging by appearances, the sides have recognized that military action in the present political situation that exists in the region will add nothing. Differences do remain, but the political leaders are leaning more towards political settlements.

Today, Africa is taking a different look at following models of development. Three decades of independence have shown that blind copying of any, and often unfortunate, experience often causes no less damage than a war and natural disasters.

In the coming decade, Africa will continue to search for its own model, which will conform to level of its historical development, its economic and financial possibilities, its place in the system of the international sharing of labor. The fact that the OAU has already put forward a plan for the setting up of an African common market in the 90s shows the seriousness of this approach.

The global changes brought about by perestroyka will, no doubt, bring about a change in priorities in interrelations between Africa and the rest of the world.

As the cold war fades away, Africa's struggle for survival will shift from the East-West plane to the sphere of economic interrelations between North and South.

Such interrelations and less hostility will go down through the 90s, which must become the decade of the victory of common sense in Africa, the establishment of a stable peace, a peace based on a common balance of interests of all its peoples.

1980's, 1990's in Eastern Africa Viewed

EA2912181889 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 28 Dec 89

[From the "World Events Today" program]

Text] With a few days to go before the beginning of the new decade it is very difficult to resist asking what the eighties brought to eastern Africa and what the nineties have in store for the region. Is it possible to ignore the events taking place in eastern Africa comprising Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya? Having considered the great difficulties facing Africa, analysts have dubbed the eigties as the lost decade.

Turning to eastern Africa, our correspondent, Vladimir Borisov, says: Those years brought many political problems, most of which were due to economic crises and tribal conflicts. To begin with what happened in the Horn of Africa—in Ethiopia and Somalia—which appeared to be different have turned out to be similar. The political problems facing the two countries are based on tribalism which has plunged the central governments in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu into difficulty. The two governments, which had adopted the systems of [words indistinct] allowing for the existence of single parties, pursued tribal policies and ideologies. The civil wars which ensued and continued for many years have caused economic chaos and social upheavals in the two coutries, giving rise to hundreds of thousands of refugees living in abject conditions. The final years of the decade will be remembered for the extreme hardships experienced by the (?two governments). Will things improve in the Horn of Africa in the nineties? That remains to be seen, but it is certain that the coming years will witness significant events which will affect the future of both Somalia and Ethiopia.

Two decades of tribal enmity have brought about endless civil war and dictatorial regimes in Uganda. The catastrophic wars of the early eighties left about 1,000,000 dead, but after the National Resistance Movement took over the leadership of the country things changed for the the new government acted against tribal policies and ideologies. It also pursued national unity realistically and positively. The new government has also promised to correct the mistakes made by former governments. As the nineties begin, the Uganda people will get a constitution based on real democracy. They will also elect their president with complete freedom. We hope that the kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro and Ankole and their tribal ideologies will not affect the forthcoming national unity program.

Such problems do not exist in Kenya and Tanzania. I feel that the stability that has existed in Kenya and Tanzania in the past decade will not last. In the eighties Kenya?achieved real and tangible economic progress, but the political program of the eighties cannot be easily assessed. In the eighties, Kenya became a one-party state. The Kenyan Government appears to have eradicated tribalism using the one-party machinery, but the [KANU] Kenya African National Union leaders speaking on behalf of the Kikuyu Tribe have spread ill-feeling among the country's other tribes. Many recent events clearly prove this has happened in the country. Is this not going to bring about political and cultural friction in Kenya? Here you will notice that a few wealthy persons are surrounded by an ocean of poverty.

Another worrying issue is affecting Kenya, namely the influx of Somali refugees into its northern areas. These refugees have set off a population explosion in those areas. It is expected that following the influx tribal and religious conflicts may occur in Kenya in the future.

Over the past years, we have witnessed tribal conflicts and animosity in Zanzibar. Our commentator says: I believe that these were basically brought about by the economic crisis facing Tanzania, a crisis that will escalate in the nineties. The major economic catastrophe cannot be easily handled by the Union government. Will the Union government, the only of its type in Africa, be able to survive in the face of this problem? Will the Union government of Tanganyika and Zanzibar be able to contain the uprising which may come as a result of the economic plight facing the country?

In the coming decade which ends this century, east Africa will be beset by economic and social problems. Many countries in the world will witness inevitable and rapid reforms. This process has begun in eastern Europe, the USSR, China, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Namibia and the RSA. Will the east Arican countries witness such reforms? Either way, I believe, said our correspondent, that unless correct policies and ideologies are applied the next decade will become a lost decade in these countries, which are potentially rich in all sectors.

CPSU Sends Greetings to Congo Labor Party

PM0201122190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee congratulations message to Congolese Labor Party Central Committee]

[Text] To the Congolese Labor Party [PCT] Central Committee

Dear Comrades, we congratulate you on the 20th anniversary of the PCT, whose creation was an important landmark in the history of the People's Republic of the Congo. We wish you success in your activity for the good of the Congolese people.

We express our confidence that the friendly relations prevailing between the the CPSU and the PCT will undergo further development.

[Signed] CPSU Central Committee

Lukyanov Receives Zairian Envoy's Credentials

PM2912154189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Credentials Presented"]

[Text] On 27 December, Zairian Ambassador Mutairi Mitima Kaneno presented his credentials in the Kremlin to A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

In his speech, the ambassador gave a high evaluation of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and he noted their beneficial influence on the international situation. For the whole of mankind, he said, perestroyka and glasnost signify the priority given to dialogue, cooperation, the peaceful resolution of problems, rapprochement, and the mutual respect of peoples.

Accepting the credentials on behalf of the Presidium and of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Lukyanov stressed that the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which has just been concluded, once again convincingly demonstrated the desire of the Soviet people to move unswervingly along the path of the country's democratization and to implement reforms more resolutely on the basis of maintaining and enriching socialist values, and using the progressive achievements of contemporary civilization. The new political thinking in international relations is obtaining ever greater support on all the continents on our planet. It is blazing a trail in the struggle against the stereotypes of the past and against the attachment to strong-arm methods of solving problems. It is from these very positions that the Soviet Union is energetically and actively participating in the political settlement of conflict situations in various parts of the world, including in the southwest of Africa.

Both sides advocated the strengthening of mutual understanding and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in USSR-Zairian relations on the basis of respecting sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, freedom of choice, and mutual understanding.

After the credentials had been presented, Lukyanov and Mutairi Mitima Kaneno had a friendly conversation, in which E.L. Kuzmin, chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat's International Relations Department, and Yu.A. Yukalov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry African Countries Administration, participated.

East Europe

Romania's Brucan Tells of November Moscow Visit

PM0401101990 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 3 JAN 90

[Interview with Silviu Brucan, a member of the Romanian National Salvation Front's Executive Council, by correspondent Gaby Rado in Bucharest, from the Channel 4 "News" program; date not given—monitored in progress; recorded]

[Text] [Rado] Of all the people newly installed in Bucharest's still heavily guarded Foreign Ministry, the one who's taken more risks than anyone else is Silviu Brucan. He served as ambassador to first, Washington, then the UN, before falling out with Ceausescu. In the spring of last year, he and five other elder statesmen wrote an open critical letter to the dictator, and in November, as he today revealed, he visited Moscow. In Moscow, can you tell me who you saw and whether you got any assurances about the Soviet Union's support in a case of Ceausescu's downfall?

[Brucan] I couldn't say that, that it was a... It was a promise of support but a very reluctant one because there was already in force in Moscow the new thinking, the new policy of noninterference, particularly in the affairs of Eastern European countries. So they were very reluctant to make public my contacts, and I had to swear that I won't reveal them. But now I can say I didn't keep my promise.

[Rado] Did your meetings go to the very top? Did you see Mr Gorbachev?

[Brucan] No, sir.

[Rado] Even with such tacit support from Moscow, the revolution itself was, according to Silviu Brucan, quite unplanned. He, therefore, quite firmly put an end to speculation that a rebel leadership had been preparing in secret for months before the Ceausescu's overthrow.

[Brucan] The truth is that the mass explosion that took place Friday, December 22d, in Bucharest was 100 percent spontaneous without a political leadership, and it was only in that evening that the leadership of the Front could for the first time meet during the attack on the Central Committee Building, and their first meeting took place in the balcony of the Central Committee the evening of the 22d, Friday.

[Rado] Mr Brucan revealed there were those in the new leadership who'd argued against the hasty trial and execution of Ceausescu and his wife, but he insisted it was tactically necessary. However, he said, the remaining 60-odd members of the Ceausescu clan and the old Politburo now imprisoned would get fair trials. Won't it be rather difficult to show the world that these people will be getting a fair trial? They will be, after all, tried for political offenses.

[Brucan] The range of crimes committed by them... uh... are not essentially political. They either participated in sheer acts of repression, like one of them who is called "Dinca," who used to go with a revolver and shoot people, or cases of gross embezzlement.

[Rado] An active member of the National Salvation Front, Mr Brucan admits to a lack of political experience amongst his leadership. Though it won't call itself a party, he says the Front will contest the elections vigorously.

[Brucan] I consider that we have two big assets in those elections: the first one is that we have led the revolution successfully; and the other one that with regard to the most urgent needs of the population at large, we have obtained some improvements. There is more food, there is more heating, there is more electricity and light, there is better transportation, and there is better medical assistance. These five points constitute our ideology.

Moldavian Deputies, Writer Interviewed on Romania

LD3012181189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Dec 89

[Interviews with Moldavian deputies by unidentified correspondent during a break in the 22 December session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Video shows interviewer standing with group of Congress deputies in foyer] [Unidentified interviewer] Petr Kirillovich, a question addressed to you and to people's deputies from Moldavia: How are events now taking place in Romania being perceived in your republic?

[P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee] It is natural that Moldavia is taking this very much to heart, since we have much in common and much that unites us—culture, traditions, and language. We, our population, simply have many relatives in Romania; that is why we are, of course, anxious and concerned. Well now, today, it is apparently clear that, in the final analysis, the processes of democratization which have gripped all socialist countries have also reached Romania. The only thing

that is distressing to each one of us is that it has not been possible to do without the use of force, without the use of troops. And the saddest thing of all is that there are fatalities there. That is why we are worried and alarmed by this and we note this with great regret. We are disturbed also inasmuch as there is news from the republic. The comrades there have also reacted to this rapturously and, so, naturally, certain emotions have been unleashed. We have been told there have also been some extreme statements there—that is what we believe them to be—we are united in our view that in the given situation they could even obstruct these processes. That is precisely why we are discussing this question.

[N.T. Dabizha, writer] Ceausescu frightened his people with perestroyka and now perestroyka has even touched Romania. That is why we are both alarmed at what is taking place in Romania and glad at the same time.

[G.P. Gidirim, professor at Kishinev Medical Institute] At the [Romanian Party] Congress—which, as is known, ended only recently—he even allowed himself a few critical remarks addressed to our country, where indeed as my colleague Dabizha says, too many concessions were being made [Dabizha interjects: "Concessions to capitalism."]—concessions, yes—and this process of democratization had gone too far. I subscribe to what my colleagues have said: I am glad above all for the fraternal Romanian people, which has at last freed itself from this last, so to speak, representative of the Stalinist system.

[I.D. Khadyrke, chairman of Moldavia's People's Front] It is when all political methods have been exhausted that force is used. Sadly, we note the fact that human rights are being violated. Weapons and troops were used there. We believe that in the tense work of the Congress, these latest events have brought additional tension. But one would like the tension, nevertheless, to be in the channel of democratization, perestroyka, which is now passing through the socialist camp, for these events not to be forestalled, for there to be a balanced approach, and for this to be assessed neither as interference nor as passiveness: moderation in evaluating these events. I think that soon, in the near future we will speak of a new, qualitative leap, also politically speaking, in our neighboring friendly country.

[Video shows different reporter addressing Apostol] [Reporter] What would you say now to your fraternal people?

[V.G. Apostol, chairman of the Board of Moldavian Union of Theater Workers] I would say only: Wisdom, may they have enough wisdom; that they should not be in a hurry to draw conclusions and that they should not look for guilty parties, because guilty parties, when you seek to find who is to blame for the fact that the people have suffered for 20 years, you sidetrack people from seeking the way ahead, from seeking where they go from here.

[Reporter] Is that the main thing?

[Apostol] That is the main thing now, I think.

[M.G. Vulfson, member of the Committee for International Affairs of the USSR Supreme Soviet] The latest events in Romania have shown that the majority of the people oppose the Ceausescu regime, which has repeatedly compromised not only itself but essentially, in my view, the whole of our socialist home. The setting up of a new government in Romania is a step toward major changes in that country, similar to all those which are taking place throughout Eastern Europe. And I am proud of the fact that our country, by its example of perestroyka, has inspired the Romanian people to the actions which have taken place. I passionately deplore the sacrifices which have had to be made in the first stage of this struggle. I wish the Romanian people all the best.

[A.A. Ananyev, writer] This was such a cult that it was impossible even to look at any longer.

[Reporter] Would you also have been able to describe this regime like this as recently as yesterday?

[Ananyev] Yes, not only yesterday. I had that same feeling when I was watching the Romanian party congress on television, how it was passing off and when the hall was chanting "Ceausescu and the people." One had to look at the faces of these people who were chanting. One had to look at the faces of the people sitting in the hall, at their eyes, their expressions. One already had the feeling then, well, that this was some kind of a lie: that people were sitting there, that there was something artificial, and that this was not a natural state of life. I could have said this very same thing then too.

[Reporter] But "Ceausescu and the people" was chanted not simply by the majority but by everyone?

[Ananyev] But we too chanted at one time. Everyone else was chanting, too.

[Reporter] Do you believe that we have now completely rid ourselves of this syndrome?

[Ananyev] I do not think we have.

[Metropolitan Pitrim] It is my heartfelt duty to tell my Romanian brethren and sisters, who have known me for over 35 years—I was there for the first time in '56 as a priest, (Farinta), Konstantin Nechayev; now I am a metropolitan—I send my greetings to my friends and brethren in the Romanian Orthodox Church with the hope that the Orthodox Church, as always at a decisive time for the homeland, will share with its people all the difficulties which arise and will spiritually support its people.

BCP Central Committee Holds Plenum

PM0301114790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Kapralov dispatch: "Muslim Rights Restored"]

[Text] Sofia—A Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee plenum has been held in Sofia. It examined two questions: on the agenda of and preparations for the 14th Extraordinary BCP Congress (main speaker—A. Lukanov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee) and on overcoming the distortions committed with regard to the country's Turkish-speaking and Muslim population (main speaker—A. Lilov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee).

The Central Committee noted that there are clear signs of a definite reduction in tension in society. This has been promoted by the galvanization of dialogue and contacts between different sociopolitical forces. In connection with the calls for a precautionary political strike it was noted that, in the opinion of Bulgarian citizens and labor collectives, this is no way to resolve society's main problems.

The Central Committee welcomes the agreement reached on holding "roundtable" meetings as of January 1990 with representatives of social organizations, movements, and the Union of Democratic Forces. The BCP Central Committee consented during the talks among party representatives to state its readiness in principle to set up the country's government on a broad coalition footing. Naturally, such a decision assumes that during the "roundtable" meetings agreements acceptable to all parties will be reached and will serve as a basis for national consensus on the main avenues of democratization and the renewal of Bulgarian society.

The BCP Central Committee has decided, taking into account the dynamics of the development of the political situation in the country and the need to accelerate the renewal process in the party, to convene the extraordinary BCP congress 30 January 1990. Its agenda will include a report on the state of society and the party's tasks to be delivered by P. Mladenov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee, the ratification of the new BCP Statutes, and the election of central leadership organs.

In order to prepare for the extraordinary party congress a central commission has been set up comprising, apart from BCP Central Committee members and candidate members, Communists who through their ideas and competence can help in preparing for the congress.

On the second question examined at the BCP Central Committee plenum a decision was made which A. Lilov described during a meeting with journalists as the most radical of all the options examined. The problem of distortions vis-a-vis the Turkish-speaking and Muslim population was examined in three aspects. In theoretical terms it was noted that it had been resolved in contravention of socialist principles and not in a Marxist fashion. If we are talking about a political assessment, A. Lilov noted, it is a question of a blatant mistake which had serious consequences both inside and outside the country. And, finally, in practical terms incorrect methods were applied and force was used. The plenum rejected the campaign pursued by the authoritarian T. Zhivkov regime of forcibly creating an "ethnically monolithic Bulgarian nation" and the associated distortions of Bulgarian citizens' constitutional rights as fundamentally wrong and condemned them as a gross political mistake.

On the day the plenum was held the State Council and the Bulgarian Council of Ministers discussed at a joint session the situation created in the country since 1984 as a result of the enforced changing of Bulgarian citizens' Muslim names and the restrictions on the use of language and on religious and cultural ceremonies. These actions, carried out on the basis of arbitrary and individual decisions, seriously undermined the nation's unity. They were a blatant violation of the equality of citizens before the law and run counter to the Bulgarian people's democratic traditions and international commitments in the human rights sphere. The State Council and Council of Ministers adopted a decision condemning all actions infringing on the right to freely choose names, freedom of worship, and the right of all to speak languages other than the official language of Bulgarian in everyday discourse and to maintain their customs.

The Bulgarian People's Assembly has proposed an amnesty for all those repressed for "political crimes" associated with changes of name and unrelated to acts of terrorism.

PRAVDA on Bulgaria's Reversal of Muslim Policy

PM0301085790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Restoring Justice"]

[Text] Sofia, 1 Jan—Broad Bulgarian public circles have greeted with approval the decision of the 29 December Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee plenum and also the joint decision of the Bulgarian State Council and Council of Ministers on overcoming deformations that had occurred in policy with regard to the country's Turkish-speaking and Muslim population. These involved compulsory measures to rename Bulgarian citizens with Muslim names and restrictions on the use of language and the performance of religious and domestic rites which had been applied since the end of 1984.

In this connection the Fatherland Front National Council Bureau resolutely condemned in a published statement the "criminal policy of the authoritarian Todor Zhivkov regime aimed at undermining the people's unity, grossly infringing the rights and freedoms of the population, and violating Bulgaria's constitution and laws and directed against Bulgaria's social and national interests." The new policy in this sphere is a result of the profound revolutionary shift in the party which began in November 1989, the document states.

CPCZ's Mohorita Says Crisis Avoidable

90UI0226A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 51, 20 Dec 89 p 15

[Report on interview with V. Mohorita, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, by APN special correspondent Aleksandr Kuranov for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA: "I Believe in Czechoslovakian Socialism"; date, place not given]

[Text] V. Mohorita is 37 years of age. For the last 3 years he has been the chairman of the Central Committee of the Socialist Union of Youth. Three weeks ago he became a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], and the secretary of the Central Committee for Ideology.

[Kuranov] Could the crisis in the party and the country have been avoided, and at what stage? What are the main reasons for it?

[Mohorita] The current crisis could have been avoided, first of all at the December (1987) plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, which considered the really pressing problems of society and which elected the new leadership of the party. But the correct and timely words that could be heard at that time about democratization, perestroyka, glasnost, and the need for political and economic reforms, in the end remained words. To the contrary, the attitude toward any criticism of existing arrangements became even more intolerant. The right to conduct a dialogue with dissidents—and there were more and more of them among the most diverse strata of the population—was granted to subunits of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

The press used as a bugaboo the Polish and Hungarian experience in the development of society, which was depicted unambiguously as a retreat from the ideals of socialism, and many positive aspects of Soviet perestroyka were suppressed and, on the contrary, negative aspects were over-emphasized.

Even several weeks and days before the current events—I am convinced of this—reacting to the swift development of the situation in the GDR, it was still possible, through decisive personnel, political, and structural changes in the CPCZ and society, to control the situation, and to try at least in a small degree to restore confidence in the party and its leadership. But herein is the tragedy, that no one in the Presidium of the Central Committee—I know about this as a member of the secretariat of the CPCZ Central Committee at that time—wanted to analyze the situation in the CSSR and neighboring socialist countries, or to change anything in our country.

As a result, an avalanche of popular indignation knocked the CPCZ from that administrative leadership pedestal on which the party placed itself at one time, a right which it was not able to assert through its actions in recent decades. Believe me, to talk about this is very bitter and painful. Especially from a realization of the fact that because of the errors of the apparatus and of the leadership of the CPCZ, thousands of rank and file communists, who up until the last minute believed in the ability of the Central Committee to change the situation, and who honorably bore their party name, are forced to pay off with their authority.

Now a majority of them are confused and cannot make up their minds about the future of the CPCZ, about its ability to be reborn, and to realize and to find a new place in Czechoslovakian society. The opinion exists that the party has to return to one of the past stages of its development and start a lot of things from the beginning.

[Kuranov] To which stage specifically—1968, 1948, or 1938?

[Mohorita] I think that the nearest is the 1968 situation, and the events of the spring period. Although, of course, quite a lot that would be useful could also be derived from the experience of the activity of the CPCZ in 1938 and 1948.

Among the many problems that exist in the party, I would highlight its unjustified huge staff numerical strength. Current events confirmed previous conjectures that by far not every one of the 1.7 million members of the CPCZ (and this is almost 11 percent of the population of the country!) is dedicated to it. Too many joined the party for the sake of immediate or future advantages, and that is why they are now turning in their party cards with such ease.

With this kind of dead weight, the CPCZ will not prove itself to be a capable community of like-thinkers, and it will not be easy for it to hold a place in society among the other parties and movements as an equal among equals. Therefore, I do not share the view of those party workers who cling to the old structures and numerical strength of the CPCZ. The Communist Party, in my opinion, should renew itself thoroughly and fundamentally, and this process, apparently, will be initiated by the extraordinary CPCZ congress which is opening.

[Kuranov] It was preceded by rayon party conferences. In what kind of a situation did they occur? Can assumptions be made about the progress of the congress on the basis of their work? What is the make-up of the delegates like?

[Mohorita] The discussions at the conferences were very stormy and lasted for 12-14 hours. They once again, unfortunately, demonstrated passivity, perplexity, a loss of political orientation, and a kind of independence on the part of many workers of the party apparatus.

All of this results from the fact that we believed that all battles were won a long time ago, and that the leadership of the CPCZ in society was assured forever. This makes our present shocks felt even more. For example, imagine, it was learned that the party owned only three buildings in the entire country. The reason for this is that it was asserted previously that the CPCZ and the state are a

single organism, and that all property of the party, everything that was built by its own means, was immediately transferred to the state fund.

But let us return to the conferences. There were various proposals at the conferences on the ways to get out of the crisis and about the future of the party. I think that the debates will be very heated at the congress as well, and that the points of view will be very radical and diametrically opposed. One would like to hope that a cardinal split will not occur in the CPCZ, although even now quite a few independent platforms and directions have arisen inside the party. A lot will depend on the composition of the delegates, half of whom are under 40 years of age. Also exerting an influence is the fact that many communists—and among them is a majority of the workers of the party apparatus—have not properly realized up until now what has taken place in our society and what place in it now belongs to the CPCZ.

[Kuranov] But, in fact, this is not easy: To give up long-standing ideas in 4 weeks, to feel one's dependence not only on the leadership but on the youth filling the square, to see in yesterday's "enemies of socialism" and "dissidents" equal partners in negotiations, and, moreover, to suddenly realize the fairness of many of their demands.

[Mohorita] Nevertheless, we must operate with maximum energy, and without error besides. The "Civic Forum" has nothing to lose. They and their supporters are happy about what its leaders have attained in bringing pressure on the government and on the CPCZ Central Committee. And they begin immediately to put forth new demands. And we more often mark time, or we retreat under the pressure of their demands, both in the center, in Prague, and in the localities.

It is not easy for all of us to reform. Do you know how many unflattering epithets I earned for my participation in negotiations with the "Civic Forum" and other newborn movements and groups? Some workers of the CPCZ Central Committee are ready to think of me as almost a traitor to the interests and ideals of the party. Others, instead of themselves going to square rallies, or to negotiations to the so-called "opposition," reproach me from their offices for incorrect words or formulations. But it is only in a difficult argument with opponents, in search of ways and compromises, and by no means over the telephone, that one can achieve, for example, a make-up of the country's government that is acceptable to the CPCZ.

Under pressure from " Civic Forum" and other civilian initiatives, we have been compelled again and again to justify ourselves, to back down, to agree to their demands. First of all we neglected many things. The president of the country could have gone to his deserved rest a long time ago. During the course of the year we were not able to decide to free Federal Council chairman A. Indra from his post. Chief party ideologist J. Fojtik was well known for his conservative views. But any serious personnel changes were set aside "for later," and as a result the whole pyramid of power collapsed instantly under the pressure from the long-term opponents of the CPCZ.

The 1968 situation has repeated itself again, when the lower levels no longer wanted to, and the upper levels could not, live in the old way. The Stalin-Brezhnev model of socialism finally stopped functioning. One way or another, it would have to become bankrupt in our country, which had deep democratic traditions, and which, in any case, did not acclimate itself to a system in which one party had a monopoly position.

I think that Czechoslovakia will remain a state of a socialist type. But it will be purely our Czechoslovak socialism, originating in the profound traditions of our people—democratic, social, and cultural. I hope that the high standard of living of our people will be preserved and strengthened. And that the people will really take part in the administration of their republic.

Havel's New Year Strictures as President Noted

PM0301150790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov dispatch: "Czechoslovakia: V. Havel: My Dream of the Republic"]

[Text] Prague—The New Year message to the Czechoslovak people delivered by CSSR President Vaclav Havel on television 1 January can be described not only as a program but also as nontraditional. This was underlined, indeed, in the first words of the message.

Warning that he would not speak, like his predecessors, about his "homeland's prosperity," the president depicted the CSSR's far from gratifying position today: the worst environmental status in Europe, high adult mortality, 72d in the world for educational spending, the squandering of energy sources in short supply, and so on Speaking about the disturbed moral atmosphere in Czechoslovak society, the president said that this concerns "every one of us" who became accustomed to the totalitarian system and accepted it as an immutable fact. Thus helping to preserve it.

We cannot forget, Havel said, that other peoples paid a harsher price for their freedom than we did and thus also paid for us... "Without the changes in the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and the GDR, what happened in our country would probably have been difficult and would not at any rate probably have been so wonderfully peaceful."

Havel stressed that it is not a question of what party, club, or group is victorious in the CSSR's impending free election; it is a question of ensuring that the best people among us in the moral, civil, political, and professional context are victorious in these elections. The state's future policy and prestige depend on who is chosen.

In conclusion Havel said: "You may ask about my dream of the Republic. I will tell you: I dream of a free, democratic republic, an economically prosperous and at the same time socially just republic. In short, a human republic, which serves people and may therefore expect people to serve it. A republic of people with an all-around education, since none of our problems—our human, economic, ecological, social, and political problems—can be solved without them."

CSSR President's Talks in GDR Reported

PM0301120990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "In the Interest of Transformations"]

[Text] V. Havel, president of the CSSR, led a CSSR delegation on a visit to the GDR on 2 January at the invitation of M. Gerlach, acting chairman of the GDR State Council. During the visit there was a meeting between H. Modrow and M. Calfa, heads of the two countries' governments, and also between foreign ministers O. Fischer and J. Dienstbier.

The traditionally high level of relations between the two friendly neighboring countries was noted, and it was stressed that both sides attach exceptional significance to the development of bilateral relations. The democratic processes and reforms in the GDR and the CSSR are giving new impetus to the expansion and strengthening of cooperation.

The participants in the talks confirmed that the GDR and CSSR, mindful of their responsibility for peace and security, advocate the creation of a European home in which all people can live in conditions of freedom and confidence. Security and cooperation must be built on the premise that the stability of the borders in Europe is the guarantee of collective confidence. M. Gerlach and V. Havel stressed the great significance of the proposal to hold a top-level meeting of CSCE states this year. In their opinion, 1990 should produce considerable progress in the disarmament sphere.

CTK has reported that CSSR President Havel left Berlin for Munich on the same day.

SED-PDS' Gysi Thanks Gorbachev for Greetings

PM0201120390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Message of thanks from G. Gysi, chairman of Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism (SED-PDS), to M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of CPSU Central Committee—date not given]

[Text] To Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Dear Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, I cordially thank you for your congratulations on behalf of members of the SED-PDS, delegates of the extraordinary congress, the leadership of the party, and myself.

The extraordinary congress marked a historic event in the life of our party. The deep social crisis that has gripped the country has set SED-PDS members the task of decisively breaking with the bankrupt model of administrative-centralized socialism, renewing the party itself, and continuing the struggle for the further existence of a sovereign German Democratic Republic with a new programmtic aim of democratic socialism. A good beginning for this was set by the extraordinary congress.

On the basis of its resolutions and guidelines the SED-PDS is waging a resolute struggle to consolidate the whole party, to prepare for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 6 May 1990, and to ensure that the large-scale tasks in the political, economic, and spiritual spheres are constructively tackled in the independent socialist German state.

Close alliance with the CPSU and the USSR is and will remain an indispensable basis of the policy of our party and state. Prospects are opening up before us today for imparting to this alliance a new quality based on common values, objectives, and tasks in the renewal of socialism. We will be resolutely advocating this.

Socialist greetings,
Gregor Gysi, chairman of the SED-PDS

Gysi Contacts Envoy Over Vandalized Memorial

PM0201093390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Protest Against Vandalism"]

[Text] Berlin, 30 Dec—The GDR's political parties and social organizations are protesting the provocative hooligan attacks recently staged by neo-Nazis. A message from G. Gysi, chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism, to V.I. Kochemasov, USSR ambassador to the GDR, expressed profound concern over the vandalizing of the monument to the Soviet liberator servicemen in Berlin's Treptower Park. The overwhelming majority of GDR citizens assessed this act as an unseemly neofascist attack on peace and humanity, the message states. It also contains a proposal to post around the monument to the Soviet liberator servicemen an honor guard drawn from the Soviet Army and the GDR National People's Army.

Protests Neo-Nazi Attacks

PM0301131590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Lapskiy dispatch: "Desecration of Memorials"]

[Text] Berlin—It was reported before New Year that unknown—to all appearances local—neo-Nazis had desecrated the memorial to the Soviet soldier liberators in

Berlin's Treptower Park. Here is another report: On New Year's Eve memorials on the tombs of Soviet soldiers in Gera in the southwest of the GDR were destroyed and in some cases desecrated. Some 34 memorials in all suffered damage.

The neofascist attacks have aroused indignation in the GDR. A protest demonstration was held near the memorial in Treptower Park. More than 2,000 people took part in it. Heinz Kuhrig, vice president of the German-Soviet Friendship Society, spoke there. He said that the actions of the neo-Nazis who desecrated the memorials to the Soviet soldiers offend the feelings not only of Soviet people but also those of all antifascists. Like other speakers, he urged people to take part in a militant demonstration to be held in Berlin 3 January.

The antifascist rally was held in the center of Berlin by the memorial to the victims of militarism and fascism.

GDR Political Roundtable Holds Fifth Session

LD0301174990 Moscow TASS in English 1703 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Berlin January 3 TASS—Representatives of 16 most influential parties, political groups and public organisations in the German Democratic Republic gathered here today for the fifth time.

The "Roundtable" centres on pressing economic and social problems and on a search for better ways to revitalise socialist society.

The country's economy is living through a difficult situation. Last year the state budget had a deficit of six billion marks. Over 50 percent of combines, the backbone of the economy, did not fulfil state targets.

The situation is aggravated by a labour shortage: it grew by over 100,000 people last year. Enterprises are operating without an approved plan for the first time.

Some "Roundtable" participants critically assess the activities by the Hans Modrow coalition government, accusing him of colouring the truth.

However, the majority agrees that there is no need for holding a non-confidence vote to the government until the free elections are held to the People's Chamber, which are fixed for next May 6.

The GDR Technical Chamber and the German-Soviet Friendship Society today won the right to be represented at various "Roundtable" working groups.

West Europe

'Danger' of FRG Kohl's Position on Border Noted

LD0301181790 Moscow TASS in English 1803 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—By TASS political news analyst Albert Balebanov:

President of the Bundestag Rita Suessmuth, in an interview to NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG last Tuesday, declared in favour of the two German states adopting a joint statement admitting that the Oder-Neisse frontiers are final.

This initiative by a prominent West German politician was apparently prompted by the growing concern in West Germany and particularly in other countries over the Federal Chancellor's unwillingness to assume a clear-cut stand on the question of European frontiers.

The chancellor's plan of ten points regarding the ways of Germany's unification does not contain the statement recognising the fianl character of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

According to GENERAL-ANZEIGER newspaper, the chancellor's conduct is neither accidental nor harmless.

Observers got the impression that refusing to recognise Poland's western frontier, Kohl is encouraging political aspirations of the West German right-wing forces that still proceed from the view that the German reich continues to exist within the 1937 borders.

On the other hand, by his attitude Kohl is striving to secure the backing of immigrants. The chancellor makes such attempts to please everybody with a view to the election, fearing that Social Democrats will prevail over Christian Democrats in the forthcoming elections.

The chancellor's pronouncements create illusions that it is possible to change the status quo in Europe. They clearly suit those who talk about "the special German way" and would like to whip up a debate about the future "united Germany," and to intensify nationalist attitudes.

The danger of this is apparent. The fact that the chancellor says nothing about the frontiers of the German states with their neighbours, first of all with Poland, amounts to an attempt to hamper the processes started by the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and to call in question the European set-up formed after the Second World War, which should become part of a common European home being built by joint effort.

Bonn's manoeuvres gave rise to concern everywhere in Europe, and even to concern of West Germany's allies, particularly the United States and France, which confirmed their adherence to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

It should be noted that these basic principles of respect for territorial integrity of states and for the existing frontiers were voluntarily accepted by all participants in the European conference, the West German Government included.

This is why the fact that the West German chancellor has not assumed a clear stand on the question of European frontiers is not in keeping with the spirit and the letter of

the Helsinki accords. It is in the interests of Europe and West Germany itself to dispel these doubts, for cooperation in Europe is possible only in the atmosphere of confidence.

France's Dumas Cited on 'Right to Interfere'

LD0401064790 Moscow TASS in English 0642 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] Paris January 4 TASS—Lawyers throughout the world should think together about a possible use of "the right to interfere" in case democracy and human rights are threatened within the limits of this or that state, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas told the French Antenne 2 Television.

A gradual disappearance of superpowers' influence zones makes it necessary to use "the right to help or interfere", Dumas noted. According to the minister, the international community remains helpless if the population of either country or its democratic institutions are in jeopardy or when dictator regimes violate human rights.

Touching upon the situation in Romania, which Dumas will soon visit, he noted that it was normalizing. The new Romanian Government has adopted a ten-item program that includes, among other things, free elections in April and the creation of a multi-party system. However, all this will require time, Dumas said.

French Speaker Fabius Views Political Scene

90UI0231A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 51, 23-29 Dec 89 p 6

[Interview with Laurent Fabius, French National Assembly speaker, by P. Lukyanchenko: "New Developments in Parliament"]

[Text] [Lukyanchenko] Last June, immediately following your election to the office of speaker of France's National Assembly, you called for glasnost and openness in parliament's work. Does this mean that before your National Assembly meetings were held behind closed doors?

[Fabius] No. It was a question of the National Assembly practicing outdated methods and not wishing to face the public. Therefore, having become chairman, I proposed making the work of the parliamentary commissions public, expanding the opportunities for questioning the government, convening colloquiums within the parliament, and publishing a number of documents which were not published earlier, in a word, opening the windows to glasnost.

In addition, I proposed that the National Assembly finally monitor compliance with the law. What do I mean? Our National Assembly spends a large amount of time on elaborating laws and voting on various amendments to them. And at this considers its work done. But more important for the citizen is how these laws are applied in practice and whether they are applied at all.

[Lukyanchenko] It is said that you suffered for the criticism when, a year ago, you criticized Premier M. Rocard for the absence of a global government action program formulated in detail and a lack of a vision of the future....

[Fabius] My criticism did not only concern the government. I said at that time that society could progress only on condition that it be inspired by some grand undertaking. Moreover, it is necessary that this grand undertaking be implemented daily and that life improve daily. That is, a social ideal which has constantly to be checked against reality is needed. M. Rocard's program, however, provided for neither.

[Lukyanchenko] You head the country's National Assembly and are simultaneously leader of the faction of French socialists in the European Parliament. The press has criticized you for wanting to wear two hats. What compels you to combine these positions?

[Fabius] This is, indeed, difficult. But I went into this with my eyes open. As you know, France is a member of the EC. But the whole problem is that all the most important decisions in the EC are made without the participation of the members of the European Parliament since there are few leading figures of EC countries among them. I consider this "lack of rights" of the members undemocratic. It is necessary on the one hand that the parliaments of the EC countries monitor their governments to a greater extent on questions concerning all-European affairs and, on the other, that the European Parliament have its telling say at the time of the adoption of decisions determining the future of the community. That is, as in my case, that there be in the European Parliament a little more of France, and in the French Parliament, a little more of Europe.

Of course, I admit that the combination of two positions is forcing me to perform acrobatic miracles since the timetable of the National Assembly chairman is very tight.

[Lukyanchenko] There are in the French Socialist Party currently at least three major competing groupings. Is this not confusing the party ranks?

[Fabius] If we wish to have a viable party, we need there to be an opportunity therein for the expression of the most varied viewpoints—given, of course, general agreement on the cardinal issue of the party's strategic aims. So we are not embarrassed by the present situation in the PSF [French Socialist Party]. I would even say that this is now a party tradition of ours.

[Lukyanchenko] You were the youngest premier in the history of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics, and the press is still calling you nothing less than a "young and brilliant politician". You are considered the most likely candidate for the presidency in 1995. Is this in some way connected with the fact that you, in the opinion of the French, are a "favorite of M. Mitterrand"?

[Fabius] Alas, my youth is with every passing day becoming an increasingly nebulous concept. Favorite of M. Mitterrand? This is nice. I have indeed been so fortunate as to have held serious positions while still very young. But the reason is very simple. In the past 30 years the stratum of French politicians has been updated only twice—in 1958, with the establishment of the Fifth Republic, and in 1981, when the PSF came to power. By this time the party was headed by a generation of young people, myself included. Of course, I shall not go against my conscience, my progress was helped by the fact that I was for a long time Mitterrand's assistant....

[Lukyanchenko] And the final question. You have come to our country together with Frau R. Suessmuth, speaker of the FRG Bundestag. What is your attitude toward the fact that women are today increasingly crowding in on us men, occupying the highest positions in the governments of various countries and heading states?

[Fabius] This is no threat to us in France as yet, thank God. One of my acquaintances, an active participant in the struggle for women's rights, explains this as follows: "In France we would rather relinquish to women a seat on the bus than in the National Assembly."

You may, perhaps, be surprised, but French women acquired the vote only after World War II. We had adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen back in 1789, but forgot about women along the way. In a word, we still have a very long way to go to our fine idea of equality.

Thatcher Broadcasts Message to Soviet People

PM0301123590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "'Great Changes Are Not Made Easily'"]

[Text] London, 2 Jan—British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher expressed confidence in the success of the perestroyka policy being carried out in the USSR, in spite of the difficulties and problems which are emerging.

Giving her New Year address to the Soviet people on a BBC Russian Service program, she stressed: "We believe that your great country will be successful in the coming year. Great changes are not made easily, but the task set is worth any efforts expended, because we are building the future for our children."

Noting the historic significance of the political changes in East Europe, M. Thatcher indicated that they have become possible thanks to the initiatives of the Soviet leadership which proclaimed the course for renewal within the country and the new thinking in international affairs.

Acknowledging the "courage and foresight" of the Soviet leader M.S. Gorbachev in making difficult but necessary decisions, the British prime minister stressed that she is expecting a lot from her forthcoming visit to the USSR this year in the summer.

Latin America & Caribbean

Vatican Issues Communique on Noriega Case

LD3012172489 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 30 Dec 89

[Text] Rome December 30 TASS—The Vatican Secretariat of State today released a communique on consultations held between the Vatican and the U.S. authorities on General Noriega's case. It points out that both sides agreed to examine in a spirit of collaboration various aspects of the complex issue and try to find the possibility of arriving at a mutually satisfactory and just solution.

The communique stressed that in receiving Noreiga in the Papal mission in Panama, the Papal Nuncio "did not intend to block the course of justice regarding a person accused of serious crimes but to promote the end of a conflict that caused so many casualties and destruction and could have gone on indefinitely".

Further on Communique

LD3012174389 Moscow TASS in English 1738 GMT 30 Dec 89

[Text] Panama City December 30 TASS—The Bishops' Conference of Panama has released a communique here saying that the national leadership of the Catholic Church and the Papal Nunciature in that country agreed to hand over General Noriega shortly.

The communique stresses that the Catholic Church demands the guarantees of immunity for Noriega and that he be brought to justice with a due account taken of the opinion of Panamanian authorities.

This information was confirmed to a TASS correspondent at the Vatican mission.

Noriega Surrenders, Flown to U.S. Base

LD0401035590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0330 GMT 4 Dec 89

[From the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] [Announcer Vladimir Belitskiy] Good Morning. First of all, I would like to begin this news edition with probably the most important event of this morning. U.S. President George Bush has just informed journalists in Washington that General Noriega surrendered to U.S. military authorities in Panama and was put aboard a U.S. military helicopter which delivered him to a U.S. base in that country. Then he was taken to a military base in Florida where, as is known, he is to be taken to court charged with contacts with the international drug mafia.

Vatican Statement on Surrender

LD0401075190 Moscow TASS in English 0748 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] Panama City January 4 TASS—The Vatican Nunciature in Panama circulated an official statement reporting a voluntary surrender by General Noriega to U.S. troops blockading the Vatican mission.

The document notes that General Noriega took shelter at the Vatican Embassy on December 24, four days after the beginning of the U.S. armed invasion of Panama, to put an end to senseless resistance offered by troops, loyal to the general to U.S. forces.

Noriega made a responsible and balanced decision to give himself up voluntarily to the U.S. military command after several days' stay at the nunciature. The document says that he walked out of the mission at 20:50, local time, and was brought to U.S. Howard Air Force Base.

In a radio interview, President Guillermo Endara of Panama welcomed the decision by the former commander-in-chief of the country's National Defence Forces and said that the Republic can now calmly get down to reconstruction and rehabilitation of the economy.

He also stressed that Papal Nuncio Jose Sebastian Laboa played a prominent role in resolving the crisis with Noriega.

In turn, Second Vice-President Guillermo Ford of Panama said that Noriega surrendered without any preliminary conditions. This statement contradicts reports from the Vatican mission published before the general's surrender.

The Vatican insisted on fulfilling the following three conditions: The general's guaranteed inviolability prior to a trial, arraignment by a Panamanian court and the general's voluntary agreement to leave the Vatican Embassy.

President Bush on Surrender

LD0401083790 Moscow TASS in English 0806 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] Washington January 4 TASS—"General Noriega turned himself in to U.S. authorities in Panama with the full knowledge of the Panamanian Government. He was taken to Howard Air Force Base in Panama where he was arrested by DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency]. A U.S. Air Force C130 is now transporting General Noriega to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. He will be arraigned in the U.S. District Court in Miami on charges stemming from his previous indictment for drug trafficking," U.S. President George Bush told an emergency news conference in the White House on Wednesday night.

"I want to thank the Vatican and the Papal Nuncio in Panama for their evenhanded, statesmanlike assistance in recent days," he said. "The United States is committed to providing General Noriega a fair trial."

"On Wednesday, December 20th, I ordered U.S. troops to Panama with four objectives: to safeguard the lives of American citizens, to help restore democracy, to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties, and to bring General Manuel Noriega to justice. All of these objectives have now been achieved," Bush said.

"The U.S. used its resurances in a manner consistent with political, diplomatic and moral principles. The first U.S. combat troops have already been withdrawn from Panama. Others will follow as quickly as the local situation will permit.

"We are now engaged in the final stages of a process that includes the economic and political revitalization of this important friend and neighbour, Panama."

"An economic team, under the direction of Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Deputy Secretary of Treasury Robson is just returning from Panama. A team of experts has remained on hand there to assess the full range of needs. We will continue to extend to the Panamanian people, our support and assistance in the days ahead," Bush said.

Radio Details Surrender

LD0401105190 Moscow World Service in English 0910 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] Here are details of the voluntary surrender of the former leader of Panama to the U.S. military.

General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who was commander in chief of the national defense forces, was hiding in the nuncio's residence since 24th December. He took refuge there several days after the United States introduced troops into Panama. The main purpose of the action was to seize the general whom the United States had for long wanted to try on charges of involvement in drug trafficking. The charge was brought by courts in the cities of Pampa and Miami, Florida, and a federal grand jury in February 1988. Noriega is accused of having received from the Colombian narco mafia $5 million in exchange for assistance in smuggling 3 (?tons) of cocaine to the United States. He is facing a maximum of 145 years in prison and a fine of $1.1 million.

As soon as the news of Noriega's surrender to the U.S. military authorities spread throughout the Panamanian capital, people took to the streets to express their joy. Announcing the surrender of the former Panamanian leader at a White House press conference, President Bush noted that all the goals of the U.S. action in Panama had now been reached. He also said that Noriega would be ensured a fair trial. The U.S. President thanked the nuncio in the Panamanian capital and the Vatican for assistance. George Bush promised that the

American troops would be withdrawn from Panama as soon as the situation permitted.

The prominent U.S. political figure, twice a candidate to the post of President, Jesse Jackson, has said that the human, moral, and political price paid for Noriega's removal from power is too high. Jackson stressed the U.S. bombing of a densely-populated area in the Panamanian capital took the toll of more than 600 civilian lives; 24 American servicemen by the Pentagon estimates died during the military operation. According to some estimates the economy of Panama suffered a damage of about $2 billion.

The U.S. intervention in Panama had on the whole a negative response in the world. When the issue was discussed at a session of the United Nations General Assembly, most of the countries expressed deep regrets over the U.S. action.

TASS Describes U.S. Policy Toward Panama

LD0401083190 Moscow TASS in English 0808 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] Panama City January 4 TASS—Diplomats and correspondents accredited in Panama are impressed by the large-scale "pilgrimage" of U.S. politicians and high ranking officials to the country and the first results of their meetings with the Endara government.

It seems that Washington is trying hard to drag the country out of crisis, thus, seeking to compensate the after-effects of the last December invasion and convince the local public that the United States has been the genuine rescuer of Panamanians.

A visiting U.S. delegation led by First Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has met new Panamanian President Guillermo Endara for a two-hour talk to discuss specific ways to normalize the situation in Panama and the amount of economic aid to be rendered to the new government.

In this connection, the United States intends to use its influence so that friendly countries do not leave Panama in trouble, Eagleburger said.

They also discussed the restoration of Panama City boroughs that were damaged in bombing on the first days of the invasion. construction teams of the U.S. Southern Command have begun clearing blockages and preparing construction sites.

A visiting delegation of U.S. Senators acquainted themselves with the situation in Panama and visited Southern Command units, warehouses with seized arms, refugee camps and places where arrested Panamanians are held and devastated areas of Panama City.

They will prepare a detailed report for the congress on prospects for the development of situation in Panama and for rendering a relative financial and economic support to the Endara government.

U.S. combat formations that are returning home will be replaced by special units trained to operate under military-strategic conditions that have emerged in Panama, Southern Command spokesman Colonel Ronald Sconyers said. These are military police and groups of psychological treatment of the population.

He refused to disclose the time of reduction of U.S. military presence in Panama to the pre-invasion level.

Withdrawal of U.S. Units From Panama Noted

PM0401104590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report under the general heading: "Panama's Difficult Times"]

[Text] Washington, 2 Jan—On Monday the White House announced the withdrawal from Panama of U.S. troops which participated in the invasion of the country. Two artillery batteries comprising about 200 people are the first to return to the United States. In all more than 26,000 U.S. servicemen are now in Panama.

"The President is glad that some troops are returning, and he hopes that the rest will also be able to return home as soon as possible," the White House spokesman stated to journalists. But he refused to name a specific date for the withdrawal of U.S. Army subunits from Panama. The announced troop withdrawal does not concern the more than 12,000 U.S. servicemen stationed at U.S. bases in Panama.

Commentary on U.S. Invasion, Troops in Panama

LD0301172490 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Next week we'll see the 26th anniversay of the notorious events in the Panama Canal zone when American soldiers fired on Panamanian students. Dozens of people were killed then and hundreds wounded. It has turned out now that there is no need to read a textbook on history to visualize those days: the present recreates the tragic past. This commentary is on the situation in a country overrun by Amerian troops before Christmas 1989.

The United States forces are pulling out, comments Mikhail Mayorov. The troops that began the fruitless hunt for General Noriega are returning home. There's no end to boasting of a brilliant operation but I see no triumph in it, either military or political. And the bitter pill is not only that the hunted man is still eluding the American (?commandoes) by taking shelter in the Papal nuncio and not that the pullout is incomplete—some American troops will stay behind—the point is even not that it was far from a lighting operation as was initially intended. None of that is the point, though it is enough I suppose to wound the pride of Rambo's land.

The results of wars are not only the killed or wounded or the seized lands. In this instance, the stronger side has

inflicted on itself heavy political, diplomatic, and moral damage. This damage is another and maybe the most tangible result of the war. Some of my Western colleagues, writes Mikhail Mayorov, intimate that the decision on introducing American troops in Panama was taken not so much in Washington as in Malta at the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. Panama, they hint, fell victim to collusion between the two superpowers. But no, I can't agree with that at all. The Malta meeting encouraged political solutions of all regional problems, security, and trust building measures. If there is any link between Panama and Malta it is quite the opposite: this is a violation of the Malta spirit and decisions. This is an old claim of a messianic role for the United States and it is as far from new thinking as bayonets are from democracy.

Some circles still think that Washington has the monopoly of ultimate truth and if the United States acts counter to international norms, it is those norms that are at fault. Sending a large contingent of many thousands troops to another country, the United States Administration failed to see that it could never win a battle it had lost in advance. Not even with the ultra-modern Stealth aircraft, not even if the occupied country is 120 times smaller than yours. The point lies not in military or any other might, the point is how far politics follows morale [as heard]. If the two are at variance, no laurels can be won. We have to see that while pulling out of Afghanistan the United States [as heard] had a similar lesson from their bitter fiasco in Vietnam and I don't think, writes our commentator Mikhail Mayorov, that this undeniable truth had to find its confirmation in Panama.

Congress of People's Deputies

Text of Bakatin's 22 Dec Report

PM0301110090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Dec 89 Morning Edition pp 2, 3

[Report by V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, at 22 December 1989 morning session of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies under general heading: "On Intensifying the Struggle Against Organized Crime"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies!

It has already been repeatedly pointed out that perestroyka in the mainstream of the main strategy of political plans has become irreversible.

At the same time the fact that social tension is growing is indisputable.

Acts of civil disobedience, direct violence against people, blockades, demonstrations and protest rallies, and strikes have become almost a daily occurrence.

Last year 194 rallies were held every month. This year the figure is already 400. In the February-November period alone, there were strikes at 1,500 enterprises involving 1.4 million people.

There has been a sharp increase in the number of criminal offenses. There are more and more instances of various forms of lawlessness.

This would appear to be illogical. Perestroyka, which is approved by the people, has become irreversible, yet tension among the people is increasing. But there can be no revolutionary processes without social tension, without steps backward, and without a temporary deterioration in the situation of the masses. Perestroyka is a peaceful revolution; it was launched from the top; it is powerfully supported from below. All the numerous contradictions here can be eliminated within the framework of democracy and parliamentary struggle.

The country has a future to look forward to, but we need endurance and responsibility. Now, in the conditions of imbalance and tensions, when both old and new forms are simultaneously exerting an influence on society and the economy, it is vitally important not to lose the initiative and long-term vision and to refrain from any steps destabilizing society and the state.

In getting to the actual subject of the report, I had no right to omit mention of this, because the principal guarantee of preserving stability can be provided not by the activity of law enforcement or administrative organs, but only by active political initiative that tries to anticipate events and promptly channels the contradictions and tensions in society in constructive and consolidating directions.

Any measures to intensify the struggle against the most dangerous and most developed organized forms of crime, just as against crime as a whole, can only yield results as part of a package of general political, economic, social, moral, and ethical transformations.

Be that as it may, the concern of Soviet people and of the deputies who express their interests, and the demands for immediate and resolute action against the criminal world are absolutely justified. They are fully shared by the government and the entire system of criminal justice organs.

Crime has sharply risen in the country.

I must digress here. There are two extreme viewpoints on this matter. The first is the most widespread. It is dominated by emotion, eye-catching headlines, fantastic figures for embezzlement, and a savoring of brutality and violence. Inaccurate and sometimes simply unsubstantiated assertions are made here. In short, hysteria is being whipped up.

The representatives of the second viewpoint, on the other hand, believe that nothing supernatural is taking place. Everything is in the natural order of things. It is not the first crime wave in our history. As for the hysteria, it is nothing but the militia trying to frighten people on purpose in order to grab more funding from the state and to revert again to lawlessness.

Neither view is correct. We must not go to extremes. Yes, indeed, the crime rate in our country even in 1989 will be lower by an order of magnitude than in the developed capitalist countries. Nor is it the highest in the entire history of criminal statistics. The situation is extremely serious, however.

Now it is hard to dispute the manifest unpreparedness of the law enforcement system for [coping with] the highest crime growth rates. They grew from month to month in 1988 and reached a peak in January of this year [1989]. Throughout the year they have remained stable at 33%-34%.

An analysis of the causes can be found in an analysis of the crisis phenomena in the sphere of production and distribution and of the mounting imbalances in economic, political and social development. And also in the quite naturally collapsed hopes that the swelling wave of crime can be held back merely by means of humanization, merely by making savings on the repression of crime without outlay on social adaptation and rehabilitation.

In the current year the position has partially changed—the government has adopted a course of reinforcing the criminal justice organs. But this is a lengthy process requiring considerable resources.

The deputies have the statistics. I would like to draw your attention just to the fact that negative changes have occurred also in the qualitative characteristics of crime. It has developed a clearly expressed mercenary and grasping orientation. Burglaries, robberies, thefts, and embezzlements now account for two-thirds of the total

number of crimes. Their rate of growth is in excess of 60%-75%. The rate of growth is particularly high in Moscow, the capitals of the union republics, oblast centers, and other large cities. Mercenary motives have become a normal phenomenon also in the perpetration of murders.

With the renewed increase in drunkenness, crime associated with this phenomenon has again begun to increase.

Twenty-one percent more crimes have been committed by minors. Today the discussion is to be about organized crime. Crime among minors is, strictly speaking, another topic. However, if society seriously intends to get down to fighting the most dangerous forms of crime, it must begin precisely here: With the elimination of the numerous reasons attracting adolescents to crime. At present, the level of crime among 17-year-olds is four times higher than among people over the age of 30. The most alarming point is that this process is highly dynamic.

The aggressiveness and brutality of criminals and their opposition to the forces of the law and order are increasing. In the 1st 9 months of 1989 alone, 146 Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] staffers were killed and 905 were wounded while halting crimes and protecting public order. Unfortunately, this is substantially more than in the whole of 1988.

There has been an exacerbation of recidivist crime. The proportion of recidivism exposed annually amounts to 25-28%. However, it is actually considerably higher. Correctional labor institutions, where the situation has been sharply complicated, now contain 310,000 criminals convicted 3 or more times.

There are signs of professionalization among criminal elements. The criminal activities of a significant number of people are being transformed into their main livelihood. It must be admitted that, to a certain extent, society itself contributes to this by not providing guaranteed job placement and by continuing to restrict residence permits for persons released from places of confinement.

As a result criminal traditions and customs are being revived. They are propagandized among and actively inculcated into young people.

The rapid growth of crime and the qualitative changes in its structure—conditioned by the aggravation of contradictions in various spheres of social life, moral degradation, the imperfection of legislation, and serious faults in the practice of implementing the law—naturally result in the acceleration of the processes of the development of crime as a social phenomenon and in a more intensive formation of its most dangerous forms—organized forms. In other words, we are talking about so-called organized crime.

At this point I must stop once more to tell deputies that not everyone agrees with this. There is an opinion that in our country there is no organized crime. The argument runs as follows. Any crime committed in the country fits perfectly well into the provisions of the current Criminal Code. The concepts and features of "organized crime" are not to be found therein. So if there is no such idea, there is no such phenomenon.

Therefore it is no accident that organized crime is almost always taken to mean group crime.

Statistics are kept, quite scrupulously. Thus every group of adolescents ravaging someone's garden pushes up the statistics of this, if you'll pardon the expression, "organized" crime.

Unfortunately for the time being there are no other statistics. But we certainly must answer these questions—What is organized crime, and is it to be found in our country?

The USSR MVD leadership cannot subscribe to the viewpoint whose proponents depict organized crime in journals as a pyramid whose apex is some center, some "cosa nostra godfather" ruling over all organized crime in the country. There is and can be no such single center. It is useless analyzing such primitive conjectures. Everything is much more complicated.

Unlike those authors, the MVD does not consider organized crime separately from common or vulgar crime. Organized crime is a natural stage of its development. It is a system of links that forms naturally within the criminal environment and leads to concentration and monopolization of certain kinds of criminal activity. Without in any way laying claim to juridical precision in my formulations, I believe exclusively from the viewpoint of substantive evaluations that organized crime can be seen as a complex system with diverse multifaceted links between groups carrying out criminal activity as their business and seeking to ensure their own safety via bribery and corruption.

At any rate, it is obvious that our society is parasitized by criminal structures whose foundation is the financial potential of the shadow economy and whose roof is corrupt officials, primarily in the law enforcement system, as well as degenerates from the party, soviet and state apparatus.

Hence the exceptional social threat of organized crime. The shadow economy which has developed in the country on the basis of economic mismanagement and large-scale embezzlement and speculation is a breeding ground for organized crime.

N.I. Ryzhkov, speaking of the shadow economy, correctly noted in his report that our law enforcement system is not ready to combat it.

That is certainly the case. A shadow economy accompanies the official economy of any country. If there is any

shortage on the "white" market, the goods in question will certainly be found on the "black" market.

According to foreign specialists' assessments, the USSR is among the 20 countries of the world with the most developed shadow economy. Its specific features in the Soviet Union are conditioned by the administrative edict method of managing the national economy, by numerous shortages in the goods and services market, and by the rigid quota-based distribution of resources.

Approximately 30 countries in the world are conducting systematic research into the shadow economy and the causes and trends of its development and have elaborated methods for its quantitative measurement.

Unfortunately, research into the shadow economy in the USSR has not been ordered by government organs and economic departments and has virtually not been organized in the country's scientific institutions.

Investigative research by individual authors on their own initiative does not have the status of work which has undergone strict scientific evaluation and state registration. Therefore the measurements of the shadow economy in the USSR available at present are purely in the nature of estimates (of course, they cannot be otherwise) and express the authors' personal viewpoint.

Most scientists consider R70-90 billion to be the most reliable figure for the overall volume of the shadow economy. An increase to R100-130 billion in the next few years is forecast.

The total turnover of the shadow economy includes overreporting and the receipt of unearned wages and bonuses, direct embezzlement of sums of money, proceeds from the sale of shadow industry output derived from embezzled raw and other materials, transactions not involving goods, speculation mainly in imported and smuggled goods, drug dealing, and the shadow market in paid services.

Since 1986, Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation [BKhSS] organs have brought to light more than 1 million economic crimes, including 40,000 cases of embezzlement on a large and especially large scale, 28,000 cases of bribery, and approximately 170,000 instances of speculation. Some 1.2 million people were party to official and economic infringements.

It has to be admitted moreover that these statistics and law enforcement practice do not reflect the real criminogenic processes in the economy. First and foremost, the high degree of latency (concealment) of such infringements of the law should be taken into account. In the economic sphere up to 70% of crimes are not exposed, including up to 95% of cases of bribery and embezzlement.

Work on preventing and exposing economic crime by economic, control and auditing, financial, and law enforcement organs remains ineffective. In conditions of growing demands regarding the completeness and comprehensiveness of proof the BKhSS apparatus, especially in recent times, has not been able to demonstrate sufficient professionalism and has not mastered the economic and legal means and methods of preventive work under conditions of the incipient economic reform.

It is precisely with the beginning of the economic reform that mercenary crime has sharply intensified. New opportunities are emerging, above all as regards the legalization of capital earned in the shadow economy and prospects for investing it in expanding both underground and legal production.

Stormy debates on ownership are now under way. The whole argument revolves around the main issue: Should private ownership of means of production be allowed or not?

Some people propose that it be allowed, proceeding from a premise already heard from this rostrum—that everything which makes it possible to feed people and make their lives spiritually rich is expedient.

This may be so. But other questions also need to be answered. Who holds the so-called original capital? Are there citizens in the USSR who are right now prepared to acquire the means of production and hire a labor force? And, most importantly, who are they? Will arrant swindlers not exploit this opportunity? These are by no means rhetorical questions.

In 1985 embezzlement on a large or especially large scale uncovered in the country alone showed a fivefold increase over 1971, with 4% of embezzlers accounting for 62% of the total sum embezzled. Individuals have become the possessors of extremely sizable material assets gained by illegal means. One of the deputies who spoke expressed the wish that the minister of internal affairs name in his speech specific individuals among the underground millionaires. Unfortunately, I cannot do this. You understand that the courts decide who is guilty of crimes.

But I can do no more than report that, since 1985, justice organs have sent for trial 629 persons accused of embezzlement and bribery in cases involving total damage in excess of R1 million. Real assets totaling more than R1 million were confiscated from 63 of the accused included in this figure.

According to estimates by academic economists, a much larger number of citizens in the country have fortunes running into millions acquired by illegal means. I am not citing the actual figures because their authenticity cannot be checked. But it would be just as careless not to take them into consideration.

Maybe energetic and enterprising private operators raised on the profound traditions of entrepreneurial ethics would be able to feed people. But our country lacks such private enterprise ethics, and has instead, the

morality of shadow economy swindlers, and before proposing a solution to basic questions we need to think about the criminogenic consequences. At least to think of how to protect society from the newfound nouveaux riches. Of course, this question also applies to the USSR MVD.

Trade, the service sphere, the system of procurements, the meat and fish industries, cotton processing, car servicing enterprises, public catering, sports and cultural spectator events, and others have proved to be most affected by corruption and abuses. In the last few years organized crime has extended its influence to "traditional zones"—prostitution, drug trafficking, and gambling.

It is now becoming possible to earn "easy money" by acting as a kind of broker and by converting noncash resources into cash and cash into securities and foreign currency. There are various forms of machinations. The BKhSS apparatus recently thwarted an attempt by Moscow's "Tezey" and "Volga" cooperatives to obtain credit certificates for a total of more than R23 million from savings banks in a number of central oblasts with the intention of subsequently converting them to cash.

Instances of corruption in the banking system have become more common. For example, the "Tellur" cooperative, which has no facilities whatsoever for processing secondary raw material, was granted credit of no less than R188 million for this purpose without any checks at all being made. The bank personnel were given a bribe of R160,000 for handing it over in cash. This is still under investigation, but Abovyan, manager of the Armenian Republican Savings Bank, who set up a ramified system of bribery and extortion to provide subsidies and loans, has already been sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment.

Bearing in mind the implementation of an "open door" policy, one of the most promising spheres of organized crime is the establishment of contacts with criminals abroad, an interest in foreign firms, and the infiltration of joint ventures by organized criminal communities. Here we have to be especially careful so as not to jeopardize to our foreign partners. Let alone the reverse task—protecting ourselves against the international mafia.

For some reason it has now become very unpopular, especially among legislators and journalists, to talk of cooperatives in unflattering terms. I want to state straightaway that law enforcement organs also believe civilized cooperatives to be a boon, a great boon. But one cannot fail to see the criminogenic side effects of the Law on the Cooperative System which was adopted in 1988.

The virtual lack of control over cooperatives has created ideal opportunities for shadow economy sharks to legalize and augment what they have already plundered. Last year 1,500 offenses were cleared up in the cooperative sphere. In the 1st 9 months of this year there were almost 6,000, and the number continues to grow sharply. And even this figure is far from the real picture.

The chairman of the "Narek" cooperative in Armenia embezzled R700,000. The leader of the "Rossiya" cooperative in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic stole about R500,000. This is a list that could be continued.

Exploiting the persisting shortcomings of the Criminal Code, under which only citizens and certainly not legal persons can be charged with speculation, a substantial proportion of cooperative members have rushed into spheres of activity where it is possible to extract maximum income without producing goods or increasing the volume of services. They have gone in for buying up and reselling, creating artificial shortages, and inflating prices. The USSR Supreme Soviet recently closed that loophole by restricting trade and procurement robbery of the population.

At the same time, cooperative members themselves increasingly often come up against extortionists of various stripes, both in the form of officials taking bribes for allocating premises or raw materials and of people using direct violence and blackmail. A.A. Fedorov, leader of Moscow Cooperative Members Union Board, has already made a statement to this effect in the magasine OGONEK. He estimated that representatives of Moscow's cooperatives have spent R31 million "to buy off various people." Its is hard to tell whether this figure is true or not. Especially since Comrade Fedorov failed to name even a few of the persons to whom bribes have been given.

Still, we are counting on cooperation from cooperative members both in eradicating corruption in soviet and economic organs and in the struggle against "racketeering." It is in the interests of real honest cooperative members themselves and in the interests of consumers and of all Soviet people to thwart the infiltration of organized crime and its control over cooperative activity.

The process of the development of organized crime in our country has not yet attained mature forms. However, this is no reason for nonchalance or relaxation.

The underestimation of this phenomenon and the virtual absence of a coordinated and targeted struggle against it could quickly remedy this "shortcoming." A further strengthening of criminal communities is taking place, and their sphere of operation is expanding. Six organized criminal groups with a total strength of over 1,000 people were recently uncovered in the Moscow region. They have shared out spheres of influence, control cooperatives, markets, and groups of speculators, foreign currency dealers, and prostitutes, and engage in crooked car sale deals, robberies, extortion, and apartment burglaries. Some members of the groups are members of cooperatives, buy up and resell computers, and conduct various nongoods operations.

At present the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Internal Affairs Administration is completing the investigation of a criminal case relating to

one of the criminal groups. The group includes the chairmen of a number of brokerage cooperatives, scientific staffers and specialists from a number of scientific research institutes, and the director of a scientific center.

With a view to embezzling state funds, these people used forged documents to obtain a loan of R32 million at a branch of the USSR Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development. It has become all too easy to obtain bank credit. They then transferred the money to the accounts of various cooperatives, from which they had managed to obtain R7.25 million in ready cash by the time they were arrested.

A total of R1.3 million in cash, about R300,000 in foreign currency, and jewelry and equipment to the value of about R2.5 million—R4.5 million in all [as published]—was confiscated from members of the criminal group. The group possessed firearms, including automatic weapons.

To ensure their personal safety and guard large sums in transit, they had hired militia staffers, to whom large sums of money were paid out.

Organized criminal communities are at work in practically all regions of the country. One out of every two groups in Central Asia was found to have corrupt connections. Illegal transactions in furs by organized criminal groups have been recorded in the Far East, and illegal transactions in caviar in Astrakhan.

During the current year 1,600 criminal groups have been exposed throughout the country. This is 600 more than in 1988. But this is only the tip of the iceberg of organized crime, its less skilled stratum. For the time being, figuratively speaking, the mushrooms are being cut down but the mycelium remains.

This view is fairly widespread among the population. When asked which factor is hampering the economy's perestroyka most, 42% of those questioned replied: Resistance by bureaucrats, and 24% linked their answer with the activities of organized crime and shadow economy dealers.

It should be borne in mind that, in view of the active politicization of society, the criminal world cannot fail to be politicized. Given a certain degree of organization and possessing real resources, it is capable of promoting the destabilization of both the economy and the political system and the national-state structure.

The elections to organs of state power are bound to be of interest to it.

We ought to assume the possible negative development of trends connected with the involvement of organized criminal clans in provoking and taking part in the exacerbation of interethnic relations. Individual cases of shadow economy dealers financing extremist nationalist acts of violence have already been revealed.

Various covert methods are being used, ranging from the payment of wages and expenses to "dead souls" to the making of donations. In the cities of Margilan and Kokand, the pogromists were supplied with vodka and provided with drugs and money.

Cases of material support for extremism have also been noted in Baku and in the unlawful transportation of ammunition from Armenia to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

The most dangerous manifestations of organized crime are terrorism and so-called "contract killings" of officials and citizens adopting an active stand in the struggle against corruption.

Murders for these motives have been uncovered in a number of the country's regions. In Chardzhou (Turkmenia), for example, a former militia colonel hired the murderers of Kh.D. Rozybayeva, instructor with the CPSU Oblast Committee.

In Baku "Bakpivo" Association Director Shiraliyev was murdered in return for a sum of R50,000.

The desire of criminal communities to enhance their mobility and levels of equipment and weaponry is increasing. Weapons and technical facilities are already being confiscated from the majority of criminal groups exposed. In Moscow during the current year, for example, there have been 13 recorded cases of shooting incidents just between criminals themselves fighting for spheres of influence.

The number of cases of embezzlement of ammunition and weapons has increased by 50%. In 11 months 821 cases were recorded, and 174 of them remain unsolved.

The situation is particularly bad in education establishments, in the MVD, in the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy, and in the Armed Forces. (I must make it clear that all military crimes come under the jurisdiction of the Military Prosecutor's Office.)

As of now, the disappearance of around 9,000 rifled weapons, including 732 assault rifles and 180 machine-guns, is being investigated.

Ministries and departments, including the USSR MVD, must ensure far stricter procedures for registering and safeguarding weapons, ammunition, and explosives in the country as a whole.

Bringing to an end the information section of the report, it has to be said that effective crimefighting is being hampered by obsolete norms of current legislation and by vacillation in the practice of law enforcement.

The legislative provisions stipulating liability for banditry are virtually a dead letter. Only six such cases have been instituted in the country to date. Yet in the Ukraine alone the 1st 9 months of this year saw the exposure of 245 criminal groups which had committed around 2,000

crimes, including 20 murders and more than 300 cases of robbery, burglary, and extortion. And 337 weapons were confiscated from them. Despite the proven fact of their being patently and continually armed, not one of those groups has been charged with banditry. This is also due to imperfections in the demarcation of jurisdiction and to the excessive caution and timidity of the law enforcement organs in bringing to bear the full severity of legal norms.

We ought perhaps to give some thought to the justice of the remark that to be equable toward criminals is to be cruel toward honest people.

Unjustified liberalism in selecting measures to secure appearance has had the result that the number of people on the run from investigation and trial has reached 110,000. There are 33,000 individuals still on the wanted list today.

Certain changes are, of course, taking place. The number of detainees in the 1st 10 months of this year was 41% higher, while the number of arrests increased by 37%. Nevertheless, there are still far from isolated instances where individuals guilty of grave crimes are given more than liberal treatment.

Deformations in the moral sphere, declining discipline, legal nihilism, and also the ideology, vigorously fostered of late, of enrichment, acquisitiveness, admiration for "businessmen," and humiliating sympathy for ordinary working life, which it is now unfashionable to describe as anything but "wretched," are negative factors which both hold back the fight against organized crime and, above all, act as incentives for crime itself. It ought to be noted that one in three members of collectives where large-scale embezzlement had been committed was indifferent toward the fact. Over the last few years (1980-1987) the number of leaders involved in economic crime has almost trebled and the number of accountants so involved has doubled, while the number of CPSU members found to have taken bribes has increased by 75% and the number of Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] members guilty of speculation has quadrupled.

Overall, we are seeing a serious drop in the level of activeness of the social crime prevention system. Without the slightest resistance from public organizations, the work of teams for the protection of public order is being curtailed (the number of team members fell by 2.2 million, or 16%). There is a decline in the activeness of comrades' courts and public posts for the protection of law and order.

There is now even a peculiar theory which seeks to justify this passivity: We, it is claimed, can do without dilettantism. Do not prevent people from going about their business. And if you are short of militia staffers, we are prepared to pay your wages.

We are convinced that nothing and nobody, no professionals, can replace the irreplaceable role of the public—of informal organizations, Afghan war veterans, pensioners, trade unions, charitable societies, and the Komsomol. We cannot function without public assistance and support. The situation is now improving.

All this was already noted by deputies at the First Congress, who deemed it necessary to decisively strengthen law and order in the country, to guarantee citizens' safety, and to step up the struggle against corruption, organized crime, embezzlement, and bribery by eliminating their causes. This is the important point—by eliminating their causes.

The USSR Council of Ministers was instructed to draw up a program for struggle against crime and to adopt measures to enhance and consolidate the material and technical facilities of courts, and prosecutor's office, investigation, and militia organs, and to improve their employees' living conditions.

Six months have passed, and today, reporting on the stepping up of the struggle against organized crime, I have to say what has already been done to fulfill the directives of the First Congress of People's Deputies. Especially since, as you may recall, Deputy I. Sorokin suggested that this should be not a report but an account by the minister of internal affairs. I agree with putting the question this way.

But I would ask you also to agree that there are no objective conditions in the country now on the basis of which it is possible to realistically expect to eliminate the causes that give rise to crime. On the contrary, while moving toward a mixed [mnogoukladnaya] economy, toward the market, toward differentiation of incomes, and so on, we must harbor no illusion that the causes of crime are disappearing at this complex transitional stage and that our law enforcement system, which has lagged behind in its development, will become so powerful in 6 months that it will be capable of halting the objectively inevitable increase in crime.

There are no simple and inexpensive solutions here, nor can there be. Organized crime, like crime as a whole, is a complex problem.

The process of the conceptual perestroyka of our vast system—it is quite large and has its own momentum—is fully interconnected and closely interwoven with the economic reform, with imparting new content to our federation, with the political transformations, and with the new international policy.

Without taking all of these factors into consideration it is impossible to build effective legal structures and the legislative foundation for successfully countering organized crime.

Here we are still lagging behind. Hard though it may be to say so, I consider that the militia is working, making every effort, but it is working inefficiently. It is not working in a modern way. Furthermore, the main weakness lies not in the ranks and the junior command staff;

the main weakness is in the management. The MVD Collegium sees its further improvement as one of its main tasks.

It is indeed in the organization of the struggle against organized crime that we asse.s our work as being most unsatisfactory. Until literally very recently, until the interim committee under the chairmanship of A.I. Lukyanov had heard the report on this issue, we lacked even unity in defining the concept of organized crime.

Now this lack of agreement has been overcome. However, the creation of new organizational forms without staffing them with reliable cadres and without ensuring reliable safeguards against treachery and corruption is still not yielding the return for which we hope in the future.

It has to be said that work on bringing to light and eradicating corruption among militia staffers was weakened sharply in the MVD system. During the 1st 11 months of this year, 21% more bribetakers among MVD staffers were exposed jointly with the KGB and the Prosecutor's Office than last year.

It is possible to form an idea of the scale of treachery in our system from just the following example. Last September, when a search was made in the garage and apartment of an investigator of Atbasarskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department in Tselinograd Oblast following his arrest in connection with a traffic incident, 114 hidden criminal case files covering the period from 1970 to 1986 were discovered. A further 123 criminal case files were found to be missing when an immediate count was made in that oblast.

A check throughout the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] as a whole revealed that more than 5,000 criminal case files were missing. The issue was examined by the USSR MVD Collegium. A number of senior officials of the republic MVD organs were dismissed. An investigation is being carried out.

A general audit of criminal case files and of the organization of the registration and storage is now being carried out in all internal affairs ministries and administrations in the country.

Good order and propriety in the militia are the primary condition for a successful struggle against crime, and especially against organized crime.

There will be order in the militia. With active support from the government and keen participation by deputies in making more specific the work of the provisional committees for struggle against crime in a number of republics and oblasts, much is being done now by collectives of enterprises, institutions, and collective farms in giving real material and financial help to the law enforcement organs.

We are grateful for the attention and assistance offered to us on their own initiative by a number of institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Science and Technology, associations in the military-industrial complex, and industrial ministries. The attention and support given to the militia have grown noticeably. We must and shall cherish this.

In the republics and oblasts with the most complicated operational situation the union MVD has set up temporary interregional criminal investigation subdivisions and special teams to clear up the most dangerous crimes which have evoked wide public comment.

Specialized subdivisions engaged in bringing to light and exposing dangerous criminal associations have been set up in most internal affairs ministries and administrations.

In order to investigate this category of cases, a special subdivision has been set up at the Main Investigations Administration. Some 1,700 investigators are engaged in this work.

The ministry has been allocated funds to increase the staff of investigators by another 5,000 in 1990. Measures to provide them with material incentives are being implemented. The situation here is being normalized after a long period of disarray. As a result of the increase in the number of investigators, the shortage of them fell by 34% in the July-November period. This is a good sign. The professional status of chiefs of investigation administrations, departments, and sections has been enhanced. The training facilities for the investigation organs are being expanded. It is planned to establish a second higher school for investigators in Krasnoyarsk and an institute for improving the qualifications of militia and investigation department staffers in Kalinin.

Forms and methods of joint activity during investigation of crimes committed by members of criminal communities and of improving oversight regarding observance of socialist legality have been drawn up together with Prosecutor's Office organs.

We intend to place considerably greater reliance on the enormous potential of the people's control organs, which are undergoing renewal, by cooperating with them.

On the basis of an order signed jointly with the chairman of the USSR KGB, the strategy and tactics of for operational investigative measures in the struggle against organized crime with interregional links and connections abroad and the procedure for collaboration between special subunits of the USSR MVD and KGB organs at both central and local level have been defined. Joint plans for operational investigative measures concerning the most dangerous criminal groups have been worked out and are being implemented. KGB-MVD coordinating councils have been set up and are in o [Journalist] So far we have ignored one of the main parties concerned. Could this impetuous acceleration of reforms—which threatens to overwhelm all the certainties acquired over the past 40 years—not create problems from the Soviet Union?

Genscher: With regard to stability in East-West relations, it must also be said that in seeking to improve Europe's security conditions we are thinking not only of the security interests on our side but also taking account of the Soviet Union's int workers in shop which, if the demand is not met, will be blown up." The news media have already reported this. As a resmedia have already reporte carried out jointly by the KGB and the MVD, the criminal was detained. Similar cases will continue to be given wide publicity.

On 12 September the Kemerovo Oblast KGB Directorate, jointly with the oblast soviet executive committee internal affairs administration, arrested a dangerous criminal group which had committed a number of audacious crimes on the territory of the oblast. Weapons, ammunition, and forged passports and documents were seized.

A special role has to be played by collaboration in the struggle against corruption. Pooled joint efforts made it possible to expose criminal groups with corrupt connections in law enforcement organs in Moscow, Tula, Kalinin, and other cities. But, as I have already said, this is just the beginning.

In fulfillment of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on the organization of work in fulfillment of the Congress' instructions, fundamental work is also being carried out for the longer term.

On instructions from the USSR Council of Ministers, the MVD, the Ministry of Justice, and the union republic Councils of Ministers are elaborating an all-union program of struggle against crime. It is based on a theoretical model worked out at the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute.

One cannot but agree with its authors, who rightly believe that a situation has arisen in our society in which almost the only means of waging the struggle against crime is the criminal prosecution of criminal offenders.

Yet crime prevention and the elimination of the causes of crime have been proclaimed since 1961 to be the chief thrust of policy, but remain no more than a slogan. The criminal justice organs only note the proportion of crime which they choose to record and actually combat not crime but its consequences.

The program, which is based on an integrated approach to influencing precisely the causes that give rise to crime, concerns a broad range of problems—from the economy to education and from culture to religion—and considers them in perspective, is intended to remove these shortcomings.

Its elaboration will require a great deal of time and energy. But the first stage of this work has been completed—a draft of immediate measures to combat crime in 1990-1991, coordinated with union republic councils of ministers, has been prepared and forwarded for consideration by the USSR Council of Ministers.

This draft provides for a serious retooling of law enforcement organs. Over 2 years it is proposed to allocate over 40,000 motor vehicles to internal affairs organs (we used to receive 5,000 per year in the past), including high performance vehicles. It is also proposed to provide proper communications, to begin the computerization of databases and records, and to finish developing and putting into practice new means and methods of criminal identification, personnel protection, and active defense.

The program also envisages the full inventorying of weapons throughout the country and the creation of new systems for guarding installations and citizens' apartments and property, and for the emergency summoning of the militia.

In accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 4 August this year, the government and the union State Planning Committee and State Committee for Material and Technical Supply have allocated additional equipment to the value of almost R100 million already during the current year.

The 1990 state budget for the USSR MVD has been approved with an increase of 13.6% against the current year and will amount to R6.4 billion.

However, one cannot fail to note that it is planned to increase by only 1.9% expenditure on the militia from republican and local budgets, which makes up a considerable proportion of expenditure. This is certainly not the right proportion. You can talk all you like about intensifying the struggle, but without increased resources words will be just words.

It is planned to increase as from 1 January 1990 the wages of rank and file militiamen, Prosecutor's Office and court personnel, and operational investigation personnel of the USSR MVD. At the same time, increasing the pay of the remaining categories of MVD staffers—which we hope the government will be able to implement as of the start of the second half of 1990—will require an additional amount of about R700 million from the union budget.

During the preparation of the report a proposal arose which perhaps ought to be discussed. It was a proposal from the sectorial ministries. If collectives agree, up to 5% of the unutilized surpluses of the development and economic incentive funds of industrial enterprises would be additionally channeled in 1990 into developing criminal justice.

One could speak of numerous other measures but, on the whole, it can can be asserted that there has been no breakthrough in the most important proportion. The growth in the number of crimes remaining unsolved and uninvestigated crimes continues to outstrip the growth in crime. That is, the criminal crisis has not been overcome. But at the same time one cannot fail to say that these and other measures, based on more intensive

and selfless work by cadres of the MVD, the investigations service, and the Prosecutor's Office, whose workload has sharply increased while their size has remained the same, have made it possible to clear up 14% more crimes as a whole compared with last year and 26% more serious crimes.

In order to intensify the struggle against crime it is necessary as a tactical immediate measure to continue to strengthen the whole system of criminal justice.

Additional manpower and resources are needed. Although this matter has been submitted for consideration by the Congress, responsibility for working out and implementing these measures lies with the organs of executive power and criminal justice and by no means with the Congress. Nevertheless, let me touch on certain questions whose solution depends on the legislative organs.

First. I think that we have to begin to restore respect for the law.

We are all witnesses to the fact that union legislation, but primarily republican legislation and political practice have begun to outstrip the constitutional process and are at variance with the fundamental law. However strongly we may dislike our constitution, there is only one method to breach it in a rule-of-law state—by making amendments to it in accordance with the accepted procedure.

Otherwise the foundations of the whole law enforcement system collapse. This has already affected the authority of the law and the efficiency of the practice of law application, and sometimes places criminal justice organs in an ambiguous and at times simply hopeless position. If a legislator ventures to breach the fundamental law, how can he hope that the citizens will observe lesser laws? These hopes are illusory.

Especially since, while condemning the arbitrary rule and lawlessness of the past and holding forth about individual rights, a rule-of-law state, morality, and humanism, we have somehow accidentally, imperceptibly, gradually distorted public awareness to such an extent that many have confused democracy with total license and do not accept the demands of discipline, legality, and law and order, or any lawful use of force by the authorities. Furthermore they portray this as an end to democracy, a retreat from perestroyka, "two steps backward," and so on.

It is no accident that pressure in various forms on legislative and law enforcement organs is increasing, and not just moral pressure.

The investigators and operations officers assigned by the USSR MVD increasingly frequently have to be escorted by internal troops details when conducting their investigations. That was the case in Fergana, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Pressure on the Prosecutor's Office organs and on courts is increasing. There are growing cases of actions by excited [vozbuzhdennyy] crowds demanding the release of detainees, accused persons, and defendants. Such cases have taken place in Moldavia, Georgia, and Lvov.

There are noisy, deliberately inspired campaigns demanding the immediate release of this or that convict, this or that person under investigation. If we do not trust the militia, the court, and the Prosecutor's Office, we must change them. But we must not interfere in their work, which no one today would envy. The sessions of the supreme soviets of some republics took place in conditions of blatant pressure. But the most unacceptable point is that in some places legislators and law enforcement organs are beginning to retreat in the face of arbitrariness.

Connivance and the gradual expansion of unpunished lawlessness may lead us to a point beyond which things will become completely uncontrollable.

We must stop. Anyone who does not respect the law must be forced to respect force. First and foremost, however, it is political steps that are needed. These lie in eliminating the lag between the ideas proclaimed by the party and the Congress of People's Deputies and the real legislative practice of implementing them.

These steps alone can ease the tension and give people guarantees. Guarantees of the structure of society and federation that they expect. Mere words are now given a poor reception and laws are needed.

However, a paradoxical situation prevails now. At a time when it is vitally necessary to introduce countless immediate and serious amendments to the foundations of our legislation, the mighty legislative potential which was created on a permanent basis and is already functioning in a professional fashion—the USSR Supreme Soviet—is being inadequately utilized simply because the right to make amendments to the constitution is now vested exclusively with the Congress. And so we have either to wait from one Congress to another, or to breach the constitution. Neither is permissible. Everything is in the hands of the Congress. The only way out of the prevailing situation would be for Congress to resolve to vest the USSR Supreme Soviet with the right to make amendments to the constitution. This must be a tactical temporary measure in force only until the Congress adopts a new constitution.

But this would make it possible to intensify the lawmaking process without breaching the fundamental law.

In this way we would really begin to restore respect for the law from the top and then, with the passage of time, any legal measures for its defense would be perceived quite differently.

Moreover, the criminal justice organs are not asking for any extraordinary measures. Better to have normal legislative activity, but but let it follow some kind of logical plan.

It is very good that suddenly a law on the fundamentals of the judicial system has been adopted. But there are still no fundamentals of criminal legislation, even though there is a draft. The elaboration of the fundamentals of criminal legal proceedings is lagging behind, and they are already in conflict with the new legislation on the judicial system. Criminal executive legislation is only at the initial stage of preparation. Though all these draft laws should be examined in the sphere of material and procedural law simultaneously, as a single package. The adoption of these decisions, which are of fundamental importance for the efficiency of the law enforcement system in a rule-of-law state, should not be delayed.

The need to improve criminal procedure norms is visible from the following example, for instance.

Despite the acute shortages in the investigative operation apparatus, we are dreadfully wasteful of live intellectual labor because of our adherence to archaic concepts and rules.

Suffice it to say that each day up to 6,000 workers are engaged in utterly futile and totally useless work connected with the procedural formalization of so-called refusals to initiate criminal proceedings on grounds of so-called "insignificance."

Laws are needed on the rights and duties of the militia and the internal troops, on defense attorneys, on the special situation regime, and on stepping up legal protection for workers in the law enforcement system.

Taking into consideration the development of organized crime, it is expedient for the criminal law to envisage norms making it possible to bring people to account for establishing and taking part in organized criminal formations. Measures to protect witnesses and their relatives should be considered. This is a topical question.

The process of supplying the militia with modern operational and crime detection equipment is now unfolding slowly, but nonetheless there has been some acceleration. However, this may be simply a futile waste of foreign currency if our legislators persist in stubbornly failing to recognize in the courts evidence obtained with the help of technical resources, film, video, and tape recordings.

The USSR MVD put forward a package of appropriate legislative acts as priority ones: These were coordinated and discussed in the Prosecutor's Office and the USSR Ministry of Justice with the participation of scientists and practitioners.

Unfortunately our proposals for a long time failed to find support and as a result we have a strange picture. Technical resources for obtaining evidence which are used in the United States, Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Poland and so on cannot be used in our country. The reason is that they allegedly do not conform to the principles of a rule-of-law state. The old method, based upon operational investigative work, is collapsing rapidly. Operations officers, investigators, prosecutors, and judges are being discredited in every possible way by operators engaging in organized crime.

One way out remains, which is tumultuously advocated by the press—that of resorting to extortion by the absolutely illegal investigative cooperatives.

Who actually needs this? The militia does not need it. People need our proposals. We have taken account of the practice of law in action and the objective difficulties connected with exposing the organizers of criminal formations, and have also taken account of the new tough and correct stance taken by our courts and the experience of many countries in the struggle against organized crime. It looks as though the issue is today finding a solution. I hope that we will not continue to create artificial difficulties for ourselves to the delight of those involved in organized crime and of corrupt functionaries.

It is, after all, impossible to seriously believe that crime can be defeated by stationing a militiaman on every square meter and by endlessly increasing the size of the militia. It would be no bad thing to heed the opinion of prominent jurists in Western countries who believe that one should rely mainly on operational and technical infiltration of the criminal world. We cannot avoid this.

Second. It is being proposed to set up under the Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order a standing commission of experts drawn from prominent academics and experienced practical personnel from law enforcement and financial organs.

It should be assigned the task of providing expert advice on draft legislative acts in the sphere of economic activity, the credit and financial system, and foreign economic relations from the viewpoint of forecasting and preventing any possible criminogenic consequences.

It will be harder to rectify mistakes later on if no such forecasts are made. The most convincing proof of this is provided by the example of legislation on the cooperative system, which is being repeatedly amended, yet the criminal liability penalties for its violation remain undefined.

The replacement of relations based on distribution by edict with market-based relations will give rise to new features in the circulation of commodities, money, shares, and securities. There is more and more talk of a commodities market and a securities market. Consequently, provisions must be made to ensure that brokerage and usury, and all sorts of rentier-dealing and stock exchange speculation do not take hold in the healthy tissue of new economic relations. What is needed is comprehensive forecasting and expert study of the institutions of civil and criminal legal liability. In the

process of improving economic law, there is probably some sense in analyzing foreign legal experience.

Third. With the aim of setting up an effective mechanism to combat corruption, above all in the higher echelons of power in law enforcement organs, ministries, and departments, a special commission of deputies to combat corruption should be set up and given broad powers, including the right to demand any information regarding the income of any individual, whatever post he occupies.

You will recall that on 12 December, when the Congress agenda was being discussed, Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov perfectly correctly linked the issue of the struggle against organized crime with the need to work out specific measures to combat corruption. It seems to me that this proposal must not be forgotten.

Fourth. It is necessary to implement serious organizational and functional changes in the way the entire MVD system is structured on a unionwide scale.

Taking into account the main fundamental line of enhancing the status and sovereignty of union and autonomous republics and their autonomy, it would seem expedient to utilize three types of subordination in relations between the USSR MVD and republican internal affairs ministries and oblast internal affairs administrations.

In the broadest of outline:

1. Local militia, operationally subordinate only to the republican MVD or the oblast internal affairs administration. It would include the services protecting public order, crime prevention, highway patrol, and precinct inspectors. All staffing and financial issues would be resolved at local level.

2. Central militia, whose administration would retain the principle of dual subordination. It would include the operational inquiry services. It would also include investigations.

3. The third type of subdivisions is a totally new one which must be created. These are special integrated operational-investigative interdepartmental and interregional subdivisions to combat organized crime, drugs, terrorism, and international links between criminals. They should be subordinate only to the central administration.

Taking into account the transfer of rights to the republics with regard to the formation of the local militia, they must bear full responsibility for order on their territory.

At present all responsibility rests with the USSR MVD. Its central apparatus spends between 70% and 80% of its time not on organizing the struggle against crime but on the unsuccessful settlement of interethnic conflicts.

With the formation of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic MVD—this is a very important political step—and the proposed new structure, an opportunity is being presented to concentrate the efforts of the union MVD apparatus on the primary and central task: The struggle against organized crime and major criminal organizations and active preparation for the implementation of the idea of a common European home. It has to be borne in mind that the explosive nature of the expansion of international communications and human contacts will in the very near future place the whole of the country's law enforcement system in a completely new situation.

I am not even speaking about the need for a part of our operations and investigative system to be integrated into Interpol. In formal terms this is something for the very near future. In essence the rich and diverse instruments of international cooperation in the struggle against crime must be studied and mastered and we must create for ourselves the reputation of a reliable partner.

Within our own country we need a precise mechanism for monitoring citizens' incomes which in conditions of the development of commodity relations provides a reliable barrier to excessively high incomes, especially those concentrated in the hands of dealers in the shadow economy and the leaders of organized crime. The USSR MVD therefore supports the proposal of the Ministry of Finance that a single state taxation service be set up and that financial control in the country be reorganized. It is also important that an economically accountable service be established for carrying out audits and expert economic, technological, and bookkeeping examinations. Today this is a stumbling block which many investigative actions hit.

The practice of the struggle against organized crime also demands serious scientific backup. The MVD also has an interest in implementing the proposals by a number of scientists on the transition from cooperation between various scientific spheres to the integration of sciences and research and the establishment of an autonomous sphere of "economic criminology."

The need to establish conditions for comprehensive influence upon improved morality also requires a deliberate approach. In this connection the stance of the mass media and the creative intelligentsia acquires a special significance.

The responsible and constructive position of the journalist, the scientist, the writer, and the artist is capable of consolidating the healthy forces of society. Today this is task number one. The USSR MVD will continue to cooperate in the spirit of openness and glasnost with the mass media and with cultural institutions in this most important work.

And so organized crime, based upon a symbiosis of the criminogenic stratum of the shadow economy and corruption, does exist in the country. Furthermore, during the period of transition, in conditions of imbalanced

development, it grows and begins to present a real danger to society and perestroyka.

The forms, methods, and tactics of the system of the law enforcement organs for combating it are only beginning to be worked out. Measures are being taken, but it is necessary to step up this work and to organize profound scientific research into the socioeconomic, social, and legal aspects of this problem.

The complexity and the multifaceted nature of the struggle against organized crime are obvious. They go far beyond the bounds of the competence not just of the MVD, but also of the entire law enforcement system. This is a statewide problem demanding the mobilization of all of society's healthy forces.

Prosecutor's Speech on Fight Against Crime

PM0301110190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Dec 89 Morning Edition pp 3-4

[Report delivered by A.Ya. Sukharev, USSR general prosecutor, at the 22 December morning session of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, under the general heading: "On Intensifying the Struggle Against Organized Crime"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies! Allow me to report to the Congress on the Prosecutor's Office's work on a most acute problem that has created a great deal of tension in society. One cannot avoid citing figures, although I do not want to burden you with too many statistics or long lists of measures. Many of the things that Internal Affairs Minister V.V. Bakatin reported to Congress are the result of joint studies and practical efforts by all law enforcement organs.

I think there is no need to demonstrate that the explosion of crime and of its dangerous, organized manifestations is a reflection of a deep-seated, chronic disease of society, affecting practically all its structures. This sad statement itself indicates the enormous problems involved in finding practical solutions, which the people are impatient to have.

So it is important from the outset to define the concept of the struggle against crime, pinpoint the priorities, and, I would add, extricate ourselves once and for all from the dogmatism that is leading nowhere.

It was and remains a strategic error by the state to ideologize the very phenomenon of crime and try to cure this serious social disease using medicines from the juridical pharmacy, garnished with propaganda. We had a mass of laws and an even greater number of directives, we had annotated the criminal code until it was unrecognizable, but never in the country's entire history had we had anything approaching a coherent program reaching to the very roots of crime and the conquest of crime on a comprehensive and coordinated basis.

I begin by making this assertion not to distract the congress' attention from the department's own errors; they are obvious and I will have something to say about them. But to be able, through the authority of the supreme forum of state power, to finally banish the illusions and take the realistic path recognized by other civilized countries. Although there is nothing to envy there either.

What is happening with crime? Where, at what stage did the disintegration of the public sense of justice which so concerns us all occur? I will say right away that there is no fundamental difference between the Prosecutor's Office reading of the process and that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. We are not inclined to panic and resort to extreme methods. In fact, the negative trends did not start today, nor did they start yesterday. Let us leave aside the unique and understandable complexity of the crime situation in the years immediately after October and after the war. As we can now see more clearly, these negative processes developed hand in hand with the socioeconomic development difficulties and the decline of moral and spiritual values. The crisis situation that occurred in the country was bound to bring about a crisis in the rule of law and, if you like, in the entire legal system. In the decade leading up to 1980 the number of crimes rose from 1 to 1.5 million, and in the space of 3 years it had already topped 2 million. Only at the very start of perestroyka—in 1985-1986—did we see for the first time a real reduction in the number of crimes, including serious crimes, as a result of the catharsis of renewal and the fight against drunkenness. But the law enforcement organs' euphoria was premature and short-lived. We had merely removed the surface scum, essentially failing to touch the very foundation of criminality and, above all, failing to block the channels of criminal recidivism and organized crime which had long infiltrated many components of the economic and managerial organism. The situation continues to deteriorate. Whereas in the previous 20-year period the annual increase in crime had been less than 4%, last year it exceeded 28%, and the number of crimes per 100,000 people rose from 395 to 654. This year the increase is one-third. Some 53,000 people have lost their lives, including those killed as a result of drunken recklessness on the roads. Repetition of offenses is on the increase. Social groups formerly regarded as criminologically safe are becoming significantly involved in illegal activities. In the past 8 years crimes committed by people with degrees have increased by 53%. Group crime is becoming increasingly prevalent.

The character and scale of organized crime is causing particular anxiety and stress in society, as we can all see.

Of course, its manifestations have been with us for a long time now. Every now and then, law enforcement organs would detect and expose bandit gangs, sundry underground "businessmen," and nomenklatura bribe-takers. But it was not until the late seventies and early eighties that this crime began to take on new and exceptionally dangerous aspects, namely: consolidation of the criminal community on an interregional and intersector basis,

corruption and utilization of legal structures by criminals, fusion of the criminal world with representatives of the power and administration apparatus including law enforcement organs, and the discrediting and removal of people who would neither fit in nor be bribed.

Evidence of this can be seen in the murder of a principled party official from Turkmenia on orders from a corrupt militia colonel. A gang of some 10 persons which had committed robberies, tortures, and murders in different regions of the country, including murder in exchange for R50,000, was detected and exposed in Azerbaijan through joint efforts by the republic Prosecutor's Office and MVD. The criminals had automatic weapons.

We have repeatedly encountered similar instances of fusion between corruption and the criminal world in Krasnodar Kray, Rostov, Moscow, Tajikistan, and other regions.

We examine investigation data through the prism of Prosecutor's Office investigative policy and arrive at the firm conclusion that organized crime, and especially its corrupt mercenary variety, is not an isolated occurrence but a powerful monster ingrown in the very fabric of society. Its destruction will require tremendous efforts because it feeds on the mighty potential of the shadow economy which, judging by everything, is larger than the state budget deficit. It started gathering pace from the early sixties and was associated with a certain democratization in economic life. But this democratization was not the cause. The shadow economy was also promoted by objective factors, by the expansion of production plans lacking the corresponding material and financial resources. This forced economic managers to seek all possible ways—often including some highly dubious ones—to fulfill them and to set aside bribery funds, using exaggerated reporting and embezzlement as a source. These phenomena became all-embracing in essence during the seventies and especially in the early eighties. A lot was being overlooked. The small fry were being punished for statistical purposes, while the army of wheeler-dealers and fixers was swelling and the "black" market was expanding. According to data from studies, the shadow economy's capital was estimated at R70-80 billion even at that time. Today we have grounds to speak of a system for circulating and reproducing illegal capital which strives to give its representatives access to the levers of political power. The trade mafias, dealers, and top-level entrepreneurs—united and displaying enviable perseverance—are exerting open pressure on society's social foundations and the citizens' rights, exacerbating the shortages. The creation of a vast underground commodities market and the subsequent legalization and laundering of hundreds of thousands and millions of rubles are based on flaws in the economic mechanism for monitoring and taxation alike. But they are also based, to a certain extent, on the cover-up system in management and law enforcement links. An alliance is taking shape between the criminal fraternity in the economy and the traditional criminals. More than 1,500 well-established groups which had managed to commit almost 4,000 dangerous crimes and 250 fraternities with clearly manifest corrupt ties were eliminated with help from state security organs in the first 10 months of this year alone. We have no official statistics, Comrades, but random checks carried out by the Prosecutor's Office indicate that, here and there at regional level, one in every two or three cooperative leaders has formerly stood trial for criminal offenses — embezzlement or bribery, as a rule. The number of cooperative leaders who had previously stood trial and have now been exposed is 160 in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 92 in Kazakhstan, 48 in Saratov Oblast, 46 in Tyumen Oblast, and more than 40 in Krasnodar Kray. This cannot fail to alarm us.

An analysis of Prosecutor's Office practice and the material from thousands of criminal cases make it possible to identify the problems which demand immediate solution if we wish to deal a serious blow against organized crime. There should be no delay in elaborating a special government program for struggle against the shadow economy. There is no doubt that economic measures must be supplemented by organizational-monitoring and legal measures, including rigid restrictions on unearned incomes and the syphoning of criminally acquired accumulations. Otherwise the shadow economy godfathers would succeed in creating fresh shortages from the government's efforts to boost the volume of consumer goods production and eliminate shortages. On the other hand, it is also a matter of resolutely eradicating the blatant economic mismanagement, false reporting, and irresponsibility which create the most favorable conditions for organized embezzlement, bribery, and abuse. According to recorded data alone, the state loses more than R4 billion each year through shortfalls, embezzlement, and waste of material assets. More than one-third of agricultural produce fails to reach the consumer, while livestock losses from murrain approach R2 billion. Some 2.5 million tonnes of meat and meat products and 20 million tonnes of grain are either lost or pilfered within the agro-industrial complex and the transportation system. Uninstalled equipment to a total value of R18 billion, including imported equipment worth R5.8 billion, is either rusting away or being pilfered in the country's enterprises and construction sites. An especially adverse situation prevails at enterprises under the Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry and the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, where one-fourth of the national economy's entire stock of such equipment is concentrated. The following picture emerges from study data, Comrades. Exaggerated reporting ranges between R2 billion and R3 billion annually in motor vehicles transport, and between R3 billion and R4 billion in the construction industry, with every R1 of exaggerated reporting resulting in the write-off and "sidetracking" of construction materials worth R4—which means an additional R16 billion stolen from the working people. Recently the Odessa Transport Prosecutor's Office, on our instructions and with help

from specialists, inspected the state of affairs as regards cargo storage in Ilichevsk, Odessa, Yuzhnyy, and a number of other sea ports. Tens of thousands of tonnes of imported cargo, foodstuffs, clothing, footwear, and detergents have accumulated there. There is a lot of damage and deterioration. Instead of taking appropriate measures, the port leaders extract large sums in payment for storage and are happy. The Prosecutor's Office instituted cases on the basis of these findings. Last month alone we instituted criminal proceedings in 54 cases of blatant economic mismanagement, not to say sabotage, involving railroad cars idling and goods deteriorating at stations and in ports. It does seem, however, as if negligence and economic mismanagement are built in by some chiefs because they facilitate direct abuses. Judge for yourselves, Comrades. More than 136,000 cases of embezzlement through abuse of official position, including 18,000 cases on a large or especially large scale, have been brought to light in just the first 6 months. Prosecutors have initiated 225,000 cases involving different types of liability by officials. You have already heard about the incidence of abuses in state and cooperative trade. Let me add that, over an 18-month period, law enforcement and control organs have brought to light more than 100,000 violations and abuses and 80,000 cases of speculation. According to State Committee for Statistics estimates, speculators' incomes from the resale of industrial goods amount to more than R1 billion. Leaders in the trade sector often create an impression of struggling against violations, while in fact they promote them by issuing illegal orders and instructions, and especially by stockpiling goods in storage bases and warehouses and writing off losses. An amount of almost R2 billion is written off to losses annually. Criminal case investigations show that the main criminogenic element in the trade system lies in the organized system of theft and bribery, mutual protection, and patronage by unscrupulous persons who are often to be found among leadership cadres. More than 2,000 leaders from the system of Moscow's Main Administration for Trade were brought to book, having created—not without help from servants of justice and highly placed patrons—a special system to protect themselves against exposure. It is obvious, Comrades, that radical changes and recovery in production and the service sphere are possible only on the basis of a new economic platform. But while elaborating it, we must finally part company with the obvious and inveterate absurdities, with the legitimized, flawed system of writing off at the state's and the collectives' expense assets worth billions of rubles which have been embezzled or lost.

The time has come to conduct on a centralized, extradepartmental basis a critical reevaluation of the natural loss norm which is used by thieves to amass fortunes. The recently adopted Law on the Enterprise changed virtually nothing as regards the writing off of material assets. Just as before, labor collectives and their councils are uninvolved in the solution of these questions and another floodgate for abuse has opened. Enterprises and associations transferred to full economic accountability and self-financing are now able to write off any shortfall of assets above the loss norm and any wear and tear of assets without having to identify the culprits. It is impossible to even imagine a better gift to economic mismanagement.

The Soviet Union is a unique state in terms of reserves of natural and raw material resources. This is a cause of joy. But bearing in mind the attitude taken to this wealth, it is probably harmful from the moral-psychological viewpoint. Predatory, barbarous exploitation of natural wealth, forests, and mineral raw material corrupts people. There is no clearly established legal and economic mechanism to monitor their utilization, and hence the sundry manipulations with deliveries. We need fundamentally new approaches toward calculating and repairing the damage caused to natural resources and the national economy—approaches which reflect on the economic indicators of economic units and "identify" specific culprits. While dismantling the administrative-bureaucratic economic management mechanism, we went a long way toward destroying the old and—let's be blunt about it—indifferent control system without creating a new one. There has been a sharp reduction of the auditing apparatus which now brings to light not more than 20% of embezzlements and shortfalls, while ministries, enterprises, and organizations employ fewer jurists. It is impossible to see who is going to introduce legal contract standards in the conditions of reform. We would ask the USSR Council of Ministers and the Congress' assistance to ensure the earliest possible elaboration and submission for examination by the Supreme Soviet of a law on a single system for recording and monitoring the expenditure of material assets, on intensification of financial and taxation controls.

The Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Service [OBKhSS] is a special issue, Comrades. It is a very important and necessary service. I have no wish to insult anyone, but confidence in it is scant. Is this not a paradox: Dangerous, venal crime is booming, there are cases involving hundreds of people, reports keep coming in, and yet some officials pretend that nothing is happening. In the course of case investigations, the Prosecutor's Office has repeatedly encountered betrayal on the part of individual OBKhSS officials. A case concerning the Kharkov Oblast Consumer Services Administration and involving more than 100 people was recently investigated. Embezzlements and bribes amount to R8 million. Sentences have already been passed on 70 people. The accused also include 18 officials from the OBKhSS and other services. Prosecutor's Office oversight of the legality of OBKhSS organs' decisions has clearly declined. We are taking measures to radically review our positions. There is obviously also the pressing question of expanding the Prosecutor's Office oversight powers over the OBKHSS and operational services. I do not think anyone would doubt that this service should certainly not be left in its present state.

It must be the subject of unflagging monitoring by soviets, deputies, and the public. I would like to say with the utmost certainty that, in the conditions of growing organized crime, actions by the Prosecutor's Office have been delayed, unsystematic, and indecisive. This is the effect of many factors, Comrades. Primarily the extraordinary nature and scale of the actual phenomenon which needs interpretation. This applies to the leadership of the Prosecutor's Office, and there has been a tangible effect from cadres' self-defense syndrome against press criticism of mistakes and even groundless repressions of enterprising economic managers. Many hundreds of people charged with exaggerated reporting and abuse have had their cases dismissed and have been rehabilitated, often with ensuing organizational conclusions for investigators and prosecutors.

I cannot fail to mention the volume of work which has swelled in an unprecedented fashion along all avenues of Prosecutor's Office activity in the last 1 and ½ years—from investigation oversight to investigation of complaints and reception of visitors. Over the 11-month period the Prosecutor's Office central apparatus alone received more than 260,000 complaints and 4,200 applications from USSR people's deputies following the First Congress. Large contingents of staff from the Prosecutor's Office, the MVD, and the KGB were committed to investigating the tragic events in Sumgait, Fergana, and Abkhazia, many interethnic conflicts in other regions, and the accidents involving the loss of many lives near Ufa and Arzamas.

But this cannot be an obstacle to stepping up efforts by the Prosecutor's Office in the struggle against crime.

I want to report to you, Comrades, that during the first 6 months of this year alone the Prosecutor's Office completed about 54,000 criminal cases, including 9,500 cases of embezzlement and bribery and 14,000 cases of murder and rape. Investigations were completed, and the case of seven corrupt officials from Kazakhstan's party and soviet apparatus was sent to trial. They have been charged with receiving bribes amounting to R700,000.

Askarov, former first secretary of Chimkent Oblast party committee, is accused of receiving R250,000. Valuables worth R1.6 million were confiscated from Bedzhanov, a rayon party committee secretary, who is one of the accused. The well-known cases under which Usmankhodzhayev, Kamalov, Khudaybergenov, and other high-ranking officials from Uzbekistan, a total of 22 persons, are charged with bribery have been sent to trial and are now being heard. The Prosecutor's Office is now investigating quite a few cases of armed banditry.

Comrades, I will also mention our failures, mainly as regards the solution of crimes. During the 11-month period we failed to detect or expose a whole army of criminals responsible for almost 780,000 sundry crimes—which is double the number in the corresponding period last year. They include 2,000 murders, 5,000 armed robberies, 11,000 serious assaults, 48,000 burglaries, and more than 500,000 thefts. It is really regrettable that the number of bribery cases exposed is steadily falling. The numbers brought to light were 7,800 in 1987, around 5,000 in 1988, and fewer than 2,500 in the first half of this year. It is quite clearly impossible to talk of an offensive against crime, especially its dangerous forms, while there is this—objective—retreat along the key avenue of the exposure and punishment of criminals. Generally speaking, here we have major and substantive problems of cadre, organizational, technical, and methodological backup for investigations which are still improperly solved, as the minister of internal affairs said here. But there are also questions which depend on service and procedural discipline, on staffers' conscientiousness. I mean the numerous instances of negligence in responding to reported crimes and covering-up of crimes. During the first 6 months alone, prosecutors brought to light and recorded more than 26,000 previously unrecorded crimes and issued almost 28,000 resolutions repealing unlawful case dismissal decisions and 32,000 resolutions repealing dismissal decisions as incorrect. During the first 6 months, and on the basis of prosecutors' resolutions and submissions, more than 15,000 officials of internal affairs organs suffered disciplinary punishment and more than 200 had criminal proceedings instituted against them for breaches of legality. At this point I cannot fully agree with V.V. Bakatin that there are different perceptions of the meaning of insignificant crimes, seeing that we sometimes deal with insignificant issues and divert staffers from necessary work. No. You know, experience shows, and people say that discipline is slackening. The main danger for us now lies in the fact that many reports produce no response and the necessary measures are not taken. It must be said that the Prosecutor's Office and the investigations apparatus at times fail to set an example of organization. There are frequent instances of red tape and indecisiveness in the investigation of complex cases, especially bribery cases, and liberalism is shown toward recidivists. I am convinced that there are appreciable untapped reserves for enhancing the role of justice administration organs in the struggle against organized crime.

In this context it is necessary to seriously analyze the data showing that only 44% of those found guilty of receiving bribes were sentenced to deprivation of freedom during the first 6 months. Here is one example. A state farm director in Mary, Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, who took bribes and embezzled R115,000, was given a 3-year suspended sentence. I think, Comrades, that we must in many ways correct the practice of applying additional measures of punishment for venal crimes. Even now, only one-fifth of those found guilty of accepting bribes are deprived of the right to hold certain offices. The corresponding percentage is 8% for those giving bribes, and even less in cases of speculation.

Comrades, the functions of Prosecutor's Office oversight appear in a fresh light in the conditions of crime switching to the socioeconomic sphere. We perceive our

task as ensuring that Prosecutor's Office organs actively contribute to the strictest possible observance of legislative acts which develop economic relations on a new basis, from the very first days of their entry into force; I mean the laws on ownership, leasing, the socialist enterprise, and financial reform. For this purpose, the structure of our apparatuses is being reviewed and they are recruiting economic specialists. We thank the government that it has seen the viewpoint of the Prosecutor's Office in this regard. The priority avenues of oversight have been singled out: the economy, the social sphere, and a broad circle of questions concerning the protection of citizens' rights and legitimate interests. A new draft Law on the Prosecutor's Office has been prepared.

An action program to intensify the struggle against organized crime has been formulated and is being implemented. It has been notified to republics and oblasts. Special investigation groups have been set up at central and local level. Permanent contacts have been established with the corresponding MVD and USSR KGB subdivisions. In the Prosecutor's Office, this work is headed by a USSR deputy general prosecutor. Questions of abuses and crimes in transport, the petroleum and gas complex, the construction industry, and the sphere of foreign economic activity were the topic of special examination at a sitting of the Prosecutor's Office Collegium. Decisions were adopted on these questions and criminal cases are under investigation. But some questions, even in our neglected economy, stand out from the ordinary. It is well known that large amounts of foreign currency are allocated to the purchase of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and equipment abroad. But there is hardly any order here, Comrades. Nonrenewable raw materials and strategic resources are squandered in exchange for consumer goods. Foreign currency funds are wasted, and contracts involving losses by the state are at times concluded in exchange for bribes. According to official data alone, the country annually imports substandard goods worth R40 million. Our accumulation of this rubbish is worth up to R1 billion—as if we were incapable of producing our own scrap.

The Prosecutor's Office filed a submission on these outrages with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which examined it at a collegium sitting attended by us. However, with the growing number of joint enterprises (there are more than 1,000 of them now) and the overall expansion of foreign economic ties, it is necessary to radically change the legal regulations applying to them, while preventing, of course, any slackening of state control. Specifically, we believe that departmental norms ought to be replaced by a Law on Foreign Trade and Other Foreign Economic Ties.

One more opinion, Comrades. The shadow economy and the material base may be corrupted by professional crime, but the reserve and breeding ground of professional crime are to be found among the socially neglected and criminogenic strata of society. Last year alone, around 160,000 persons among the perpetrators of crimes had neither worked nor studied anywhere. About 40% of persons sentenced in the past have taken the path of crime anew. As a rule, they are the organizers of criminal groupings and at times they themselves render services to the mafia.

Between 800,000 and 900,000 persons in our country are relieved of criminal liability each year as a result of the application of measures of social influence. In actual fact, and this must be bluntly said, the overwhelming majority of these people remain outside any control. A social prevention vacuum has developed in our country and we need, of course, a system for the social adaptation of such persons. We need a law on crime prevention which should precisely define the role and position of local soviets, trade unions, labor collectives, law enforcement organs, and social formations in the solution of these questions. This, Comrades, applies especially to young people. Last year, 200,000 crimes were committed by adolescents. In our view, there is a need for the reorganization of local soviets, internal affairs organs, and commissions and inspectorates for cases of minors, seeing that their activity is at times purely formal. There are up to 60 sundry organs dealing with crime prevention at rayon level. Meanwhile, more than one-half of offenses remain outside these organs' field of vision.

We are raising again the question of a legislative solution to the problem of the employment of minors who are now being dismissed by economic managers.

Comrade Deputies, I would also like to draw your attention to the following question. Around 80,000 persons have died in the last 18 months as a result of crimes. Almost 140,000 were maimed or injured. I do not in any way intend to burden, as it were, your thoughts with such large and very unpleasant figures. I would like to put the question on a different plane. These figures conceal tens of thousands of disabled, orphaned, and underprivileged people. There are more than 1 million victims of theft, robbery, burglary, and extortion.

You can imagine the state of the victims and their relatives. I must say that, even though we may have learned to somehow quantify the material damage of crime, we are nowhere near an understanding of the moral harm. And yet this is a matter of safeguarding the citizens' constitutional right to have their lives, health, honor, dignity, and property protected. Legal statistics are impoverished, lacking what could be called the sociological hues. Generally speaking, we need a fundamentally different view of damage caused by crime. A rule-of-law state ought to have a different juridical response to compensation for material and moral damage suffered by the victims of crime. Work on this must be done not only by jurists but also by sociologists, psychologists, and representatives of other sciences and state organs. In principle, Comrades, don't we probably need greater certainty as to who is responsible for what in a rule-of-law state, especially when it comes to a major issue like crime? Throughout the civilized world, where prosecutors, judges, and police are also to be found, this sector is under government control. This is no accident,

seeing that the government, as the full organ of power, has the necessary organizational, cadre, and other base potential at its disposal. In our country, however, the government has been detached from these problems for decades on end. The actual approach ought to be changed. If government interest were involved, it would mean that these questions would be part and parcel of plans for socioeconomic development. Material and cadre backup would be available. And the main point is that there would be a different perception of and attitude toward these problems in ministries. Incidentally, this also fits in with Article 131 of the Constitution, "On the Powers of the USSR Council of Ministers." The role of local soviets should also be enhanced in this regard.

Another question which I consider to be of fundamental importance—about the authorities and the administration of justice. Given the exacerbated crime situation, the manifestations of violence and extremism, with politics and legality closely intertwined, it is very important to verify the actions of law enforcement and soviet organs against the basis of the law. Whereas many officials in law enforcement organs previously awaited edicts from above, now they are coming up against impotent authorities. They are starting to sink into time-serving. Some of them betray the interests of the service. This is the kind of situation that develops when interethnic relations are exacerbated in many regions, when decisions by central authorities are not fulfilled, when regions are blockaded, when the regime of legality is openly challenged. There are more frequent cases of attacks on the service premises of law enforcement organs and gross pressure for the purpose of obtaining the release of persons under arrest. Declining social discipline, strikes, interethnic conflicts—all these are exploited by criminal mafia-style forces.

Unfortunately, some representatives of executive and legislative authority, while calling for legality from the rostrum, fail to set an example of respect for the law in extreme situations, while the "two stools" stance plays into the hands of anti-perestroyka extremist forces because it leads to a paralysis of legality.

Today it is incumbent on us to be aware not only of the destructive force of crime but also of the enormous harm done by the parochial view of legality against which Lenin warned when shaping the Soviet Prosecutor's Office.

Finally, it is necessary to realize that law and legality in the conditions of pluralism and the battle of passions is, Comrades, the framework, the coordinating mechanism, and perhas the salutary consensus which can and must consolidate and heal our civil society.

Esteemed Comrade Deputies! In my capacity as general prosecutor I am fully aware of the tremendous responsibility for the state of legality resting with the Prosecutor's Office organs.

There are serious breaches of legality also in the Prosecutor's Office itself. I mean instances of red tape in case investigations, unjustified detentions and arrests, mistakes, and the persisting bias in favor of the prosecution. More than 500 Prosecutor's Office officials were punished for such offenses last year alone.

Now that we are facing up to crime on a broad front, the question of legality acquires exceptional importance. Simplistic recommendations boiling down to stepped-up repression and widespread use of coercive measures can do a disservice to the cause. We have sufficient precedents from our remote history and recent past when, beneath the banner of stepping up the struggle against criminal elements, law enforcements organs left outside the rigid framework of legality committed abuses and gross violations of individual rights and freedoms. The Prosecutor's Office persistently pursues a line of legality and, specifically, draws serious conclusions from violations in the course of investigations of criminal cases in Uzbekistan and some other regions in the country. Prosecutors are making a noticeably greater contribution to correcting judicial mistakes. During the first half of this year alone, prosecutors' appeals have resulted in the quashing or amendment of more than 15,000 sentences at variance with the administration of justice. We associate the level of Prosecutor's Office oversight and legality with cadres who have proved their devotion to the people and their profession, with the fresh recruits arriving to replace the veterans. Perestroyka is also introducing amendments in cadre work. We have reviewed the system of specialist training for Prosecutor's Office organs. Some 1,200 investigators will annually undergo further training on problems of the struggle against organized crime in the Leningrad institute for the further training of investigation officials. Many other cadre questions are also being solved. Prosecutor's Office officials gratefully welcomed the concern of the people's deputies and the government for improving their material situation. For the first time in 10 years we have achieved a small but nonetheless real increase in staff numbers. Especially since we have 4,500 rayons, very many cities, and the Prosecutor's Office as a whole employs 35,000 staffers throughout the entire vast and multifaceted country, including 9,000 investigators. If we wish to establish legality as society's universal value, to be better and more intelligent in building a rule-of-law state, Comrades, we will be unable to manage without specialists equipped with modern knowledge and means, incorruptible and subordinate only to His Majesty the Law. We hope that the Congress of People's Deputies, critically appraising the activity of the Prosecutor's Office, will pay attention also to this aspect of the work.

The very fact that the problem of crime and legality is being discussed at Congress level is perceived by our cadres as a new step by the supreme power along the path of shaping a rule-of-law state. Criticism and advice addressed by people's deputies to the Prosecutor's Office—and I must say that I receive them on a daily basis here—will be perceived by us as a fresh incentive for the improvement of Prosecutor's Office oversight in the country.

Soviet Committeeman on Congress Debates

90UN0553A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 22 Dec 89 p 1

[Interview with Yuriy Boldyrev, a USSR People's Deputy and a member of the Committee on Questions of the Work of Soviets, by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA correspondent L. Telen: "Arrangement of Forces"]

[Text] **The Second Congress of People's Deputies is continuing its work in Moscow, and behind the walls of the Kremlin an extradepartmental examination of each of the past days is going on. The voice "of the street" is imperiously bursting into the meeting hall, dictating its conditions to the congress. A live political situation confronts the deputies with critical questions and forces them to make compromises and to measure the demands of the moment against the future outlook. What is the political atmosphere in which the people's deputies are working? What dangers does it conceal? What hopes does it inspire? These and other questions are reflected on by USSR People's Deputy Yuriy Boldyrev, who is a member of the Committee on Questions of the Work of the Soviets.**

[Telen] Yuriy Yuryevich, it seems that the political situation—whether we want this or not—will get more and more complicated. At any rate, if we do not intend to reject the diversity of views and their free expression. This means that the arrangement of forces in society will continuously change. And the politician, the people's deputy will have to take changes into account and adjust his tactics. Are you ready for this? Do you sense how the mood of the people has changed in the 9 months that have passed from the time of the elections?

[Boldyrev] Undoubtedly, and is it possible not to notice these changes? Last winter, at a meeting of the Leningrad committee "Elections—89," its members said: Of course, "non-apparatus" candidates will not be able to win in these elections, let it be a dress rehearsal before the elections of local soviets... The results exceeded expectations. And the voters, in any case part of them, were seized by euphoria. It seemed that now perestroyka will advance with rapid strides.

But, unfortunately, this did not happen. And the attitude toward the elected representatives underwent a considerable change.

[Telen] Apparently, no matter how earnestly the people's deputies and the Supreme Soviet work, they would nonetheless find themselves under the fire of critics. But if the Supreme Soviet displayed great consistency, I am confident, the criticism would not be so merciless.

[Boldyrev] Very likely that is so. We will recall the renunciation of compensation of losses to trade-purchase cooperatives being stopped by a decision of the parliament. No matter how we treated them, it nonetheless was a harsh massive sanction without a court and an investigation.

The Supreme Soviet could not oppose the steps of the government that lead to a restraint of reform. This relates to the decision on progressive taxation of the growth of the salary fund, a restriction of the cooperative movement, an attempt to freeze prices, and the revocation of appointment by election of managers in entire branches... Although these measures can be justified, all of them are nothing other than changes in the rules of the game at the will of one side. Who wants to play with such a partner?

[Telen] But, perhaps, it is precisely this tension that will urge the supreme authority and society as a whole to more decisive reformation?

[Boldyrev] One would like to see the optimistic side in everything, but, unfortunately, dissatisfaction most frequently finds an outlet in various kinds of emotional manifestations that frequently are rather dangerous.

And it seems to me in general that, today, the socio-psychological atmosphere is less favorable for reform than 1-2 years ago. At that time everyone, without thinking, would have answered yes to the question of whether he would want us to live like they do, let us say, in Sweden! But today we have acquired our own experience in the social stratification of society. And many have not accepted it, and they could not reconcile themselves to the fact that a neighbor suddenly began to earn three times what he did previously. And not because he contributes more physically, but because he displayed keenness of wit and enterprise....

[Telen] However, the propensity for wage-leveling, as I understand it, is not the only social quality that stands today on the road to change. Ideological dogmas have penetrated not only our political structure, but social psychology as well. The absence of experience in political campaigning, the political-economic illiteracy, the closed society, and the dogmatism of ideology have had their effect: The turmoil in minds is not subsiding, but is increasing. Someone from the right, and someone from the left, whom to disown and whom to follow. These are questions that many cannot resolve.

[Boldyrev] The combination of dissatisfaction with the supreme authority and the lack of political experience... This situation is very convenient for those who want to take revenge for failure in past elections. Why not take advantage of the wave of dissatisfaction with the center in one's own interests, which is entirely understandable and it must be admitted, justifiable. One can thereby deflect a strike against oneself and attempt to gain popularity among the voters. Yesterday's warriors in the command system, who had uprooted any shoots of self-conscience, restructured themselves in a virtuoso way to use the same democratic slogans, which they rejected yesterday with indignation. But they are also still the same ones, and they defend that which they defended yesterday. The participants of the regrettably well-known Leningrad meeting of communists tried to divert us from the real problems, and they did not

demand an accounting from their own obkom [oblast party committee]—the Politburo (but, in fact—from the reformers).

In such a large country, it is also not possible to rely on the fact that "Moscow" will pull everyone by the scruff of the neck into democracy. And it would be good even if today the "center" was no longer capable of interfering with those in the localities who know what they want. An example—the Baltic republics: They know what they want—and they are getting it!

[Telen] Yuriy Yuryevich, and, still, let us assume that resolute adherents of perestroyka are victorious in the elections to local soviets. Will they be able to transform them into real sovereign organs? Because the point of view exists that dual authority is inevitable as long as local party organs operate in parallel with local soviets....

[Boldyrev] I would not agree with this. I am confident that it depends on the soviet itself and on its deputies whether they will take authority into their own hands or not. It is possible that they will not be able to do this immediately, and that time and experience will be required. Who is to blame that the Leningrad soviet quietly permits the military parade to be received by the secretary of the obkom Gidaspov, and not by the plenipotentiary representative of the city authority? And look at the Supreme Soviet. It frequently and voluntarily delegates its authority to the presidium or to the government. This means that it is incapable of taking the responsibility on itself. Recently, for example, one speaker declared at a session that the Supreme Soviet can make a decision, because it conforms to a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The other day you were witnesses (and I was a participant) to how more than 1,800 deputies transferred their own exclusive authority to change the constitution, even in its most fundamental part, to the Supreme Soviet, proceeding from "expediency." And there is a paradox in the fact that everything is really reasonable from the standpoint of expediency. But how dangerous this precedent is! If that which the congress is supposed to decide is transferred in trust to the Supreme Soviet, why should not the Supreme Soviet transfer the trust further, for example, to the presidium, or to someone personally?

[Telen] This can be considered growing pains, and we can hope that time will nonetheless compel both the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets to mature. But where is the guarantee that we will attain maturity and not go into a political crisis, when the people finally lose faith in their elected representatives?

[Boldyrev] What sort of guarantees? Any incompetence is first and foremost irresponsibility. However, there are ways of making parliament more independent, and to preserve and even to return the trust of the voters. For example, to make a realizable recall procedure. Frankly speaking, I am disturbed by the attitude of certain people's deputies toward this procedure. As long as the problem was only theoretical, everyone displayed radicalism. Now, however, when the threat of recall can threaten anyone of us, the mood has changed noticeably. Both the left and the right equally do not want to be recalled. Here we link arms and form a united corporation.

There is a reliable way of connecting deputies to their voters—roll call voting. I think that this is precisely what it should be in the Supreme Soviet. This will protect the voters, and it will force a deputy to take their will into account. And, in general, it is indeed time to think about how we vote today. Who needs this secrecy? The presidium? But as I understand it, it can at any moment require the computer operator for a roll call printout—the computer keeps the results in its memory. The colleagues? But the buttons are in everyone's view. It appears that we are voting in secret to keep it from the voters. Isn't this a really convenient mechanism? I am convinced that only independence from the voters guarantees the real independence of parliament.

[Telen] But there is another argument against this: How can the deputies approve if there will be a need for so-called unpopular measures?

[Boldyrev] In my opinion, it is a serious mistake that the Supreme Soviet is able to approve and the government is able to implement measures which give rise to a popular protest. The summer and autumn strikes have shown this rather convincingly. Unpopular measures can be conducted only by a leadership that enjoys the trust of the citizens; otherwise, such measures can only lead to conflicts.

[Telen] Still, Yuriy Yuryevich, it seems to me, that neither the developed recall procedure, nor the roll call vote will return trust in the supreme authority, if in the very near future it does not adopt laws on property, on land...

[Boldyrev] I think that we should start with the Law on the State System, about its structure, which would finally clearly define the principle of building our state. It is time to understand that to force one or another type of relationship on the republics today is no longer possible. We have to be realistic.

[Telen] And a referendum? For example, on the question of private property... Are you prepared to predict the results of such a referendum?

[Boldyrev] There is a fear that people who are nurtured on ideological dogma will be unable to evaluate a problem soberly. All you have to do is to start a conversation on private property, when you will hear then and there: "The people made a choice in 1917." As if there was a referendum in 1917 and as if when the people once decided, then it was decided once and for all. Those who actively come out against private property, as a rule, are those who themselves today enjoy a monopoly of the blessings of a proprietor—the managers of enterprises,

the chairmen of kolkhozes [collective farm]... One constantly hears the voices: Property is owned by shady dealers, and exploitation will start. And no one will explain to the people that the shady dealers already own it. In addition, private property is also property in stocks and in other securities. No one explains to the people that there are known methods of blocking shady capital. So I am for a referendum, but only under conditions of freedom to defend any point of view; that is, under conditions of a free press.

[Telen] And so, the Law on the State System, property, land, local self-government, and further—the rest. Is this your plan?

[Telen] I believe that the committees and the commissions will be able to bring these laws to fruition. It is precisely in these organs that serious work and a consolidation of sound forces is taking place today. There are both leftists and rightists there, but first of all there are people who through their competence and concern in the matter have won authority and who are capable of influencing their colleagues. Moreover, the people's deputies understand that on the eve of the elections to local soviets it is especially important to return the trust of the voters. If the democratic forces win, we will gain a powerful lobby "from below," which will ensure strong support for some and no less strong pressure on others. In any case, I am counting on this.

Resolution on Fighting Organized Crime

90US0350A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Dec Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Resolution of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies: "On Intensifying the Fight Against Organized Crime"]

[Text] The USSR Congress of People's Deputies expresses serious concern over the state of law and order and the growth of organized crime in the country. The crisis phenomena in the economy, the critical shortage of goods and services, the contradictions and difficulties in the social, spiritual, and other spheres of social life, and the slackening in discipline and responsibility promote a growth in crime and its organized forms. There has been an increase in the number of murders, daring types of extortion, embezzlement, bribery, and other serious crimes. Criminals join in organized groups, their level of weapons and technical equipment is increasing, and a linkage is taking place between criminal groups and corrupt officials.

Organized crime creates the conditions for a growth in drug addiction and drunkenness. It is especially alarming that youth is drawn into a parasitic way of life and criminal activity, and that its physical and moral health is being threatened. The activities of nationalistically inclined groups are assuming a more and more organized and extremist character. Taking advantage of the imbalance in the consumer market, the imperfections in the economic mechanism, the deformations in the cooperative movement, and the shadow economy, criminal groups are concentrating substantial resources in their hands.

The actions of the criminals are becoming more aggressive and brutal, which creates uncertainty in citizens about their own personal safety. Organized crime, in fact, has challenged Soviet society. This can no longer be tolerated.

Under the conditions that developed, law enforcement agencies were not prepared for an effective fight against organized crime. The personnel and material-technical support of the law enforcement agencies and the coordination of their activity do not meet current requirements. Serious shortcomings in legal application practice and the imperfection of legislation are being felt more and more. Decisions adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet to intensify the fight against crime are not being adequately implemented everywhere with consistency and purposefulness, and they have not yet brought noticeable results. Measures for overcoming dangerous conflict situations in various regions of the country and disruptions in transport operations have not been very effective, which is frequently taken advantage of by organized criminal groups.

Taking into account the requirement of the Soviet people for maintaining proper order in the country, and expressing their will, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies resolves:

1. To consider the prevention of crime, in particular its organized forms, to be a major national task, on whose resolution the moral-political climate in society and the success of perestroyka depend in many ways. The congress makes it incumbent upon the soviets of people's deputies, temporary committees for the prevention of crime, organs of state control, law enforcement agencies, and voluntary public inspection to unite their efforts with social organizations, labor collectives, and Soviet citizens in strengthening law and order. No one can stand aside in the resolution of this major task. Society must give a resolute rebuff to the criminal world.

General improvement in the socio-economic, political, and moral situation in the country, and a strengthening in state and labor discipline will be of paramount significance in the fight against organized crime.

2. The USSR Congress of People's Deputies requires that the workers of law enforcement agencies ensure speedy and full exposure of crimes, especially those that are serious and conducted by organized groups.

The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the USSR Committee for State Security, and the USSR Procuracy, in cooperation with concerned ministries and departments, will adopt decisive measures to expose organized criminal groups and put a stop to their activity, paying particular attention to an increase in the effectiveness of the fight against conspiring criminal associations that

take advantage of international conflicts associated with the shadow economy and corrupted elements in the state apparatus, and also against those associated with criminal groups abroad.

The USSR Congress of People's Deputies emphasizes especially that all activity in the prevention of crime should be built on the basis of the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics in strict compliance with socialist legality.

3. Instructs the USSR Supreme Soviet:

- to review at the third session the question concerning changes in criminal and judicial legislation directed at ensuring the inevitability of criminal responsibility of all members of criminal groups, first and foremost of their organizers, and also to review a draft Law on the Soviet Militia;
- to accelerate the adoption of new Principles of Criminal Legislation of the Union SSR and the union republics, Principles of Criminal Legal Procedure of the Union SSR and the union republics, and Principles of Criminal-Executive Legislation of the Union SSR and the union republics, legal acts of the USSR concerning criminal responsibility for individual categories of crime, laws concerning the USSR Supreme Court, the USSR Office of the Public Prosecutor, the USSR Committee for State Security, People's Control in the USSR and State Arbitration in the USSR; legislative acts directed at improving the system for preventing law-breaking and also the social rehabilitation of persons who have served their sentences;
- to form a USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Crime Prevention.

4. To recommend to the Supreme Soviet of the union republics to adopt legislative acts in the near future that are directed at the protection of victims and witnesses and also the strengthening of the legal protection of those who carry out official responsibilities or public duty in crime prevention;

5. Charges the USSR Council of Ministers:
to develop a complex of measures aimed at eliminating the causes and conditions that give rise to the shadow economy, corruption, poor economic management, and wastefulness, which are a nourishing environment for crime;

to create a system of effective control over the incomes of citizens and organizations that would prevent illegal enrichment; to broaden and perfect the clearing system between state, cooperative, and other public organizations, establishments, and organizations in the fulfillment of mutual obligations in economic contracts;

to submit proposals for review by the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet concerning urgent measures in the fight against organized crime;

to complete the development in 1990 of a national program for preventing crime, especially providing a system of measures in it of a socio-economic, political, and legal character directed against organized crime, the involvement of minors in illegal activity, and the spread of non-regulation relations in the army which are of a criminal nature;

to resolve the question of a radical improvement in the technical equipping of law enforcement agencies that meets modern requirements in the prevention of organized crime, also keeping in mind the possibility of converting defense branches to increase the effectiveness of operational search and investigative activity and the work of expert establishments;

to examine the question of creating special interdepartmental regional subdivisions to fight organized crime;

to adopt measures for appropriate personnel support for law enforcement agencies, improving training, and increasing the qualifications of their employees, bettering the conditions of work and everyday living, and providing housing and medical services;

to develop cooperation with governments of foreign countries and international organizations on problems of preventing organized crime, and to ensure the participation of interested departments in international programs to prevent crime.

6. To provide systematic research into problems of organized crime, and the development, on this basis, of scientifically based recommendations and technical systems in the fight against it, to the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR State Committee for National Education, scientific establishments, and law enforcement agencies.

7. The USSR Congress of People's Deputies appeals to the mass media, their editorial colleagues, and their corps of journalists to initiate an all-round and truthful interpretation of the problems in the fight against organized crime, to aggressively expose the causes of negative phenomena, to promote the formation among the people of respect for law, to raise the authority of militia employees, the court, the prosecuting attorney, and other law enforcement agencies, and to propagandize the positive experience in preventing law-breaking. The congress deems it necessary to expand the output of legal literature, and to begin the publication of a large-circulation national newspaper concerning law in 1990.

A process of revolutionary renewal is unfolding in the country, and a genuine law-governed democratic state is being set up. Soviet authority and the people have enough strength to stop the outburst of crime through resolute and firm action and to guarantee lawfulness and strict law and order. [Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Moscow, Kremlin, 23 December 1989.

Burlatskiy Gives Impressions of Second Congress

90UN0555A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 52, 27 Dec 89 pp 1, 2

[USSR People's Deputy Fedor Burlatskiy comments on Second Congress of People's Deputies: "Important Decisions, New Issues"]

[Text] The political evaluation of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies is already known to readers from M.S. Gorbachev's closing remarks and from the congress' appeal to the citizens of our country. My brief comments are no more than the first impressions of a person in the hall.

Following stormy and contradictory debate, the government program for economic recovery was supported by the people's deputies. It is seen more as a means of halting a further deterioration in the economic situation than a practicable plan for its radical improvement. Suspicions that this program meant a slide back from perestroyka were confounded on the simple consideration that its opponents were unable to offer any serious alternative. The imposition of rationing and monetary reform have long been discussed in the government and the USSR Supreme Soviet and among scholars, but they are encountering justified fears of an intensification of social tension. The sound idea of the extensive development of economic cooperation with the West has also long been expressed as an immediate job for the government. We may, therefore, draw the following conclusion: Although the culmination of the crisis has yet to be negotiated, the search for a solution of the most acute food problem and the surmounting of the growth of the commodity shortage and inflation should be the principal concern of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the government in 1990.

This applies to problems of profound economic reforms as well, of course. The preparatory work has already been done. We have to enact at the next Supreme Soviet session a whole package of laws: on property, on land, on leasing and on economic freedoms and human rights. And, consequently, there will be debate and a struggle to ensure that these laws not only be enacted in the most consummate form but also be guaranteed in practice.

Most misgivings on the eve of the congress were caused by nationality problems. And, indeed, we witnessed many crisis situations at its meetings, which, however, were, in general, overcome. There are three methods of controlling national conflicts. One is violence and terror; the second is the law and justice; the third is dialogue, compromise and mediation. We have always rejected Stalinist terror. We are only just embarking on the shaping of laws determining relations between the union and the republics and between our peoples. But we have even now begun to learn compromise and mediation. Fortunately, we have the first truly parliamentary leader in the country's history. It was the parliamentary approach which ensured the success of a complex business—the creation of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

The brilliant report of the commission headed by A.N. Yakovlev on one of the most difficult issues of our history and the history of the 20th century: The 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact and the secret protocols thereto on the dividing up of spheres of influence should be highlighted particularly. The support by an absolute majority of deputies for this report is an indicator of the rapid maturation of the new political culture. Nor did the political assessment of the commitment of forces to Afghanistan evoke disagreements. But the discussion of the tragic events in Tbilisi made a distressing impression by its lack of agreement, vagaries and the dangerous confrontation of different political institutions. As far as the Gdlyan and Ivanov case is concerned, it has shown how, playing on the people's hatred of corruption, it is possible to turn legal proceedings into a political drama with populist outbursts.

Speaking as a whole, the congress posed anew at least two major problems. The first is the concept, stages and plan of a transitional period of the reconstruction of society. A mechanism of the more or less smooth transition, without spurts and strains, from the silent screen of an administrative and authoritarian system to the talkies of a controlled market, a mixed economy and political pluralism—this is the question of questions. The second is the separation of power and functions in the state. The conversion of parliament into a parliament, the government into a government, and the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet into the really empowered leader of the Soviet state, have as yet only just begun. It is important here to precisely determine the actual possibilities of such a broad institution (2,250 persons) as the Congress of People's Deputies; to specify what should come under its jurisdiction to ensure that it not become a talking-shop but a true institution of power.

I was gratified by the deputies' almost general aspiration to joint constructive work and the elevation of their political and legal culture. This was expressed, specifically, in the constituting of the USSR People's Deputies Club. The representatives of 22 deputies' clubs and groups, including the Inter-Regional Group, were delegated to it, and 9 cochairmen for areas of political and scientific work were elected. The congress adopted with the same unanimity a recommendation on the creation of a special culture committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The people's deputies paid tribute to the memory of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. His untimely demise makes it incumbent upon each honest individual and all to whom freedom and human rights and dignity are dear to assume part of the burden which was borne for more than quarter of a century by this great liberal figure, unbending Russian intellectual and pillar of this dramatic and contradictory history of our era.

So we are drilling the tunnel, and the light of hope already glimmers ahead. We will do everything to ensure that perestroyka begins to bear for the people tangible fruit.

Moldavia's Khadyrke Speaks to Congress

90UN0559A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 52, 27 Dec 89 p 4

[Speech in the Second Congress of People's Deputies of I.D. Khadyrke of the Kalarashskiy National-Territorial Electoral Okrug, Moldavian SSR—date not given]

[Text] Respected Comrade Deputies! Various approaches to the problems at issue in general and to the problem which we are currently discussing in particular have been observed in our debates. On such matters of principle we need to find that which unites everyone or, at least, the majority. I refer to such a fundamental issue as constitutional oversight because we are dealing with the interests of the nationalities and peoples of our country, and I would like a majority of representatives of the republic to be united. When we discussed the inclusion of this item on the agenda, there were many arguments for and against. Neither a court of law nor oversight in the negative understanding as still interpreted, for example, are acceptable to us. This puts us on our guard and frightens us. And there show up in the draft law the words "under the supervision" and "accountable". I believe that we need to be attentive and cautious with such wording. We are not accountable, we are equal and sovereign. Of course, it is essential to restore the shaken prestige of our state Themis. Considering the path of mistakes that has been trodden, remember what many peoples have gone through. All this testifies that a constitutional court—a constitutional body—is necessary. Many deputies have supported the enactment of this law. A constitutional court is necessary as the highest mechanism of the regulation of interethnic relations, the maintenance of order in the country and the exclusion of the possibility of the return of Stalinism with its repression of whole peoples.

A constitutional court would afford an opportunity for avoidance of such voluntarist decisions as the commitment of limited contingents of forces indefinitely to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. And to take a broader view, a constitutional court would rule out the possibility of compacts, as in 1939, for example. We support a constitutional court in order to avoid lawlessness, arbitary action and voluntarism. Last fall, when the language law was being discussed in our republic, a wave of strikes, which entailed a loss of R180 million, occurred. Such a constitutional court would, I believe, have precluded the possibility of strikes or, for example, would have reimbursed the republic's losses in such unforeseen circumstances. If you remember, an edict on the transfer of enterprises, plants and associations to all-union jurisdiction was passed in the 1970's. It was annulled only this fall. A constitutional court would have precluded the possibility of the passage of such ill-considered edicts because this led for the republics to unforeseen emigration processes. There was still real unsupervisability and exploitation even. Imports of unsupervised components, exports of most valuable raw material—all this after such an ill-considered edict.

Or take the decree on combating drunkenness, which in Moldavia came to be interpreted by local sobriety zealots as a decree on combating vineyards. After thousands of hectares of innocent vines had been uprooted, it was understood that the stupidity has neither bounds nor oversight. Many such instances testify that a constitutional court which would monitor the diktat of the departments is needed.

But there are other arguments also. There is an urgent need—and this has been discussed here—for the compilation of a new pact on a union scale. It is not a matter of indifference to us what this pact contains. The question arises: what is more important—the primacy of the republic and the secondary nature of the union or vice versa? The basis of the union is, for all that, the republic, its sovereignty, the voluntary nature of its incorporation in the union and assurances of self-determination. Equal republics, as the sovereign subjects of a reorganized and restructured union, should develop their relations on the basis of the principles of absolute trust.

If some republics are expressing at this stage doubts apropos the haste of the newly formed body, we need to be even more watchful to see that we do not as a result buy a pig in a poke. If there is no new constitution and if we are hastily patching up the old constitution, is not our old love for superintendence being manifested by force of inertia here?

I propose in this connection that the congress instruct the USSR Supreme Soviet to begin work on a new constitution for the country and adopt it within 1 or 2 years. My main proposition is such: First a new constitution, first a new union pact, first laws regulating relations between equal and sovereign states, and only then a constitutional court keeping an eye on these renewed relations.

The next argument is the absence of a law regulating economic and political relations between republics. Only yesterday did we pass a resolution of the Second Congress to instruct the USSR Supreme Soviet to speed up the elaboration of such a law. Directly connected with this are laws on land and property and also on the republics' economic independence. All this together with the flaws in the old constitution indicates that with the enactment of a law on constitutional oversight in the USSR we are violating the connection of cause and effect and proclaiming the creation of an institution which is essentially progressive, but which, I fear, will be used in a regressive direction. The fact that the draft Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR was not discussed at the Supreme Soviet session introduces additional misunderstandings.

We believe that the acceptance of a document of such importance for the activity of all the peoples of our union without its prior discussion and approval in the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities is unforgiveable disregard for the constitutional authority of this chamber. We believe that the Supreme Soviet should have a priority right—a right of veto over bills which have not been examined therein.

I would like to observe in conclusion that, given all our desire to accelerate the adoption of this document, incontrovertible arguments against haste are preponderant, the more so given the absence of a number of fundamental legislative instruments in our complex state system. Although our parliamentary experience teaches us that in his closing remarks our respected chairman will nonetheless prevail upon us to vote "for."

Yevgeniy Yevtushenko Addresses Congress

90UN0558A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 52, 27 Dec 89 p 4

[Speech at Second Congress of Peoples Deputies by Ye.A. Yevtushenko of the Kharkovskiy-Dzerzhinskiy Territorial Electoral Okrug, Kharkov Oblast—date not given]

[Text] Dear Deputies: I do not wish to respond to the indecorous accusation which was heard against me here because this was just an attempt, with which I have long been familiar, to put our intelligentsia at odds with the leaders of our party and with our president. People succeeded in the past in provoking Khrushchev to quarrel with the intelligentsia. You will recall what lamentable consequences this entailed for our society. It will not succeed on this occasion because we support perestroyka and support its initiator. But there is a person here with whom I would like to take issue.

Dear Deputies, dear young General Surkov: In 1960 the still young Yevtushenko wrote together with the composer Kolmanovskiy the song "Do the Russians Want War." But high-ranking censors of the Army's political directorate of that time stood as a uniformed wall in the way of this song on its route to the people, accusing it of having a demobilizing effect on Soviet soldiers' morale. This all now seems preposterous and implausible after this song has, for all that, made its way through and has in the splendid performance of the Soviet Army Choir gone triumphantly around the whole world.

I have for you, my dear young General, the sound advice of a senior comrade, not in rank but in age: Do not be in any hurry to make accusations against men of letters and remember from recent history that many of the attacks on literature from a platform bearing the emblem of the state have often ended in the undermining of the prestige not of literature but of the statesmen. Really and truly, you are mistaken, my dear young General, regarding the address of the poem "Vast Majority," which has no specific address, no specific application to our Congress. It is a philosophical poem and is far broader than the subject of the Congress of People's Deputies, for it is based on the entire sorry historical experience of mankind and our country.

We would recall that it was not that long ago that the vast majority of writers' meetings was pronouncing anathema on Pasternak and then Solzhenitsyn. It is your good fortune, my deeply respected young general, that you were born in 1945 and could not have been arrested in 1937 together with Tukhachevskiy and other red commanders, when the vast majority at many meetings was demanding their execution as enemies of the people.

And it is not my fault if some lines of this poem offend some people at this Congress also, but by no means all deputies, only those who prevented Academician Sakharov from speaking, stopped his mouth, and finally honored this great citizen with a minute's respectful silence only after his death. Let us, Comrade Deputies, be kinder to one another, if only after this bitter lesson—the premature departure of Sakharov.

My dear young General: A further brief excursion into history. Since the time of Pushkin and Lermontov the progressive Russian officers and freedom-loving poetry have always supported one another. Many officers were fine poets.

The young Simonov experienced at the front the friendly hand of Zhukov. When the marshal was out of favor, the poet did not betray him, as some political cart drivers with gold braid dexterously and airily did. It was they who perpetrated the shameful censorship rape of Zhukov's memoirs and denigrated his contributions. It was they who exaggerated inordinately, to the point of parody, the Little-Land heroism of Brezhnev, attempted to rehabilitate Stalin and at the same time stripped of his rank a courageous officer who defended our Army's honor and refused to fire at the workers in Novocherkassk in 1962. And they shoved into a "psychiatric" the human rights defender General Grigorenko.

I have profoundly respected and continue to respect many honest political workers, but let us acknowledge that a special subdivision of ideological firefighters has been around since Stalin's times. These have been generals of a sort who have with ingratitude turned on all their hoses against the best books on the war: "In the Trenches of Stalingrad" by Nekrasov, Grossman's "For the Just Cause," Bykov's "The Dead Feel No Pain" and Simonov's war diaries.

Meanwhile, having just about knocked down the golden crosses of St. Basil's, an impertinent foreign aerial tyro coolly set down in Red Square, very happy that our ideological generals were with inspiration devoting themselves fully to literary critical activity.

Is it now worth expending so many shells on writers to attack our press: both OGONEK and other publications, insultingly calling our comrades, people's deputies among them, a "yellow press" merely for having justly,

in the interests of the Army itself, posed the question of a purge of hazing, of beatings, and of insufficient culture?

This insufficiency was reflected recently, when one good old general publicly aired his viewpoint on the Tbilisi events. He had every right to do so, of course. But I was stung painfully by the fact that in the ardor of vindicatory argument he lacked the tactfulness and breeding for simply humanly expressing sad condolences that were appropriate for the young Georgian women who tragically perished and other casualties.

My dear young General: We do not want to quarrel, we do not want confrontation. Let us simultaneously raise the level of writers' attitudes toward the Army and the level of the Army's attitude toward writers. Let us seek a consensus, my dear young General. I propose a consensus in the following form: We remain on the side of the majority of the people which wants peace, justice, sufficiency, health and happiness. We remain on the side of the majority which respects the rights of a minority, either national or political. But we also remain against a majority that suppresses a minority, and against a minority that suppresses the majority. Shall we not vote together for such a consensus, my dear young General?!

Ovcharenko Assesses Congress Results

PM0201151690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 89 Second Edition p 3

[Georgiy Ovcharenko article under the rubric "Topical Theme": "Strengthening Democracy" on the Second Congress of People's Deputies]

[Text] There is no denying that big things can be seen more clearly from a distance. But there are some events whose significance immediately places them among historic events. One such is the Second Congress of People's Deputies. Whereas the first forum of elected representatives of the people was a kind of symbol of the rebirth of Leninist principles of people's power, the second showed us people's power in action.

Let us note the most important point at once—the 12 packed working days of the Second Congress continued and developed the line of the first, reaffirmed the people's determination to follow the course of perestroyka and the radical renewal of society on the basis of the preservation and enrichment of socialist values, and strengthened the social thrust of priorities in economic, legal, and political reforms. The congress voted for a democratic, humane socialism.

By virtue of its decisions, the Second Congress can rightly be called the congress of the strengthening of democracy. These are not merely words—they are backed up by the entire course of the second forum of elected representatives of the people, whose agenda consisted of the most pressing questions for the people and the state.

The heated debates at the congress, which were witnessed by many millions of television viewers, were not debates about whether or not radical transformations are needed; they were debates about how to progress more rapidly and resolutely along the path of reforms in the economy and politics, the development of the federation, and the building of a rule-of-law state. This, as M.S. Gorbachev noted in his concluding speech, was the center of gravity of the entire debate.

This dispute emerged particularly clearly in the discussion of economic recovery measures, the stages of economic reform, and fundamental approaches to the formulation of the 13th 5-Year Plan. Remember that at first many deputies regarded the government's proposed action program as more or less antiperestroyka and insufficiently revolutionary. That is understandable: Everyone in the country wants the market to be filled with goods, shortages and the ensuing speculation to disappear, and the purchasing power of the ruble to increase overnight. But economic recovery, as the deputies noted, is not like constructing a new building, when you can start with a clean sheet of paper. Nor can you erase from history the years of the administrative edict style of management, which did serious damage to the national economy. The habit of fulfilling "at any price" plans that were not backed up by resources and capacities had a devastating effect on economic links and business relations, and led to the emergence of the shadow economy. None of this can be disregarded. And, while agreeing that urgent, even emergency stabilization and recovery measures are needed in the economy, at the same time the congress demonstrated cogently that fits and starts are intolerable here. They could lead to serious economic and social upheavals and start a spiral of galloping inflation, a decline in production, and mass unemployment. But can we allow ourselves to exacerbate the already acute social tension in society? There is only one answer to that question: Renewal through a deliberately created crisis is not our path.

The government program, which is formulated for the first time on the basis of alternative and multiple proposals and calculations, offers another solution. It combines energetic measures to deepen economic reform with realism and considered actions at all levels of management and with society's objective readiness for radical changes. The congress voted for this path, along which milestones mark out clearly the prospects for today and tomorrow in our economy and our prosperity.

In discussing the results of the Second Congress it is necessary to single out an important subject concerning the next stage of political reform. By adopting the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR on Qeustions of the Electoral System, the congress took a resolute step forward to strengthen democracy in the country, and created the prerequisites for the formation of organs of true people's power in the republics, krays, oblasts—in fact, all the localities.

The strengthening of democracy will also be promoted by the Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR adopted by the congress. This is the first time such an institution has been created in our country. Its purpose is to prevent distortions of the democratic content of the USSR Constitution in all salients and to stop all acts, wherever they originate, that could infringe the rights, interests, and freedoms of citizens, and also of peoples and ethnic groups, republics, and autonomous organizations. The USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee that has been set up will be the guarantor of democracy in the country.

The Second Congress adopted very important, truly epochal decisions. It is now a question of implementing them. There is, so to speak, no shortage of work to be done. It is necessary, for instance, not only to accelerate the adoption of a package of fundamental laws to develop the economic reform, but also to formulate a legal mechanism for their introduction and operation. Another urgent matter is the strengthening of discipline and order. After all, any program, even an ideal one, can be hampered by an irresponsible, consumerist attitude to the task. Any laws or intentions will remain on paper unless they are supported on the spot by the entire might of industrial, legal, and intellectual potential. Therefore it is important today to aim for creative, constructive labor and the attainment of unity. It is necessary finally to realize that any departmental, territorial, or national ambitions will retard progress.

The Second Congress of People's Deputies reaffirmed the commitment of the society undergoing renewal to the broadest glasnost and democratization. Who could have imagined, only 2 years ago, that we would openly, publicly give a political and legal assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German nonaggression pact, examine the circumstances connected with the tragic events in Tbilisi, and acknowledge that the sending of Soviet troops into Afghanistan deserves moral and political condemnation? The people's deputies have done so.

But, while upholding the Leninist principles of building a socialist rule-of-law state, it must also be said that political activeness and pluralism must not turn into anarchy, subversion of the fundamentals of social and state order, or separatist aspirations. Everyone remembers the colossal moral and material damage that was done to society and the state by the waves of strikes, the blockades of railroads and highways, and the clashes on ethnic grounds. Such actions, even if packaged in a wrapping of perestroyka slogans, in reality contain a direct threat to perestroyka itself.

The Second Congress of People's Deputies summed up what has been done, outlined actions for the future, and defined strategy and tactics. It is now a question of implementing the plans without delay. Too much in the future of the country and the peoples inhabiting it, as was said at the extraordinary CPSU Central Committee plenum, depends on how we act now.

Opinion Poll on Congress Cited

PM0301162790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by N. Pishchulin (group leader), V. Gerasimov, V. Frolov, and G. Shvets: "Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies: Expectations, Opinions, Assessments"]

[Text] On the eve of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and during its work the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences department of applied sociology and social psychology conducted an all-union public opinion study. During the poll 3,823 people were questioned in the country's 14 main regions. Telephone polls on 15-16 and 20-21 December 1989 covered over 2,500 people. The study of the population's opinion was on questions of the work of the second Congress, people's attitude toward the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the deputy's personality.

What did people expect from the congress? How did they treat its program? What impressions do they have of the work of the congress and the activity of individual deputies? With what do people link their hopes and expectations? These and other questions were put during the poll.

The overwhelming majority noted that they were "interested" or "very interested" (73%) in the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies or that it "aroused their curiosity" (16%). And only 3% reported that this event "did not interest them at all." Some 8% were "rather indifferent" to it.

While awaiting the start of the work of the congress the majority of people experienced hope (67% of those polled), a considerable proportion anxiety and alarm (28%) while 9% experienced distrust and pessimism, 3% indifference and complacency and only 8% confidence and optimism.

Public sentiment on the eve of the Second Congress was characterized not only by interest in this event but also by an awareness of the complexity of the sociopolitical situation in the country and its critical assessment. Some 37% of those polled assess the state of affairs as precrisis, 31% as critical, 26% as diverse, good in some ways and bad in others.

A complex assessment of the situation in the country was reflected in the opinions among the population of the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the period between the First and Second Congresses both as a whole (34% stated that their hopes and expectations had not been justified, 51% that they had been partly justified) and in individual directions.

Despite the Supreme Soviet's considerable efforts to stabilize the socioeconomic situation, up to 60% of those taking part in the poll are dissatisfied with its activity in this direction. At the same time, although foreign policy questions did not occupy a marked place on the agenda

of the Supreme Soviet sessions, they received a positive assessment from 75% of those polled. Some 72% are entirely or partly satisfied with the activity of the supreme legislative organ in developing glasnost and expanding citizens' rights and freedoms.

Of the entire package of draft laws on socioeconomic problems examined at the Supreme Soviet session the law on pension provision was the most positively received:
—38% were satisfied,
—41% were partly satisfied,
—11% were dissatisfied,
—10% found it hard to say.

The law on the lease and the draft laws on the land and on ownership gave rise to contradictory opinions.

	Satisfied	Partly Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Hard To Say
Law on lease (as percentage)	18	37	21	24
Draft law on land (as percentage)	19	35	21	25
Draft law on ownership (as percentage)	15	38	26	21

As the public opinion poll showed, the respondents have varying attitudes toward questions on the agenda of the Second Congress of People's Deputies. IZVESTIYA readers obviously remember that this question caused the fiercest clash of opinions on the eve of the congress and keen debates at its first sitting. Now we can speak of the correctness and precision of the agenda proposed to the congress by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Some 82% of those polled attatch the greatest importance to the struggle against organized crime, 81% to economic recovery measures, and 44% to the discussion of the law on constitutional oversight.

A very keen debate developed at the congress itself on the inclusion on the agenda of the question of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. Many deputies, addressing the congress, asserted that the absolute majority of their voters demands the repeal of this article. How do these claims look in the light of the data received? The precongress poll showed that 35% believe it is necessary to remove Article 6 from the Constitution, 33% are in favor of studying the question further before taking a final decision, 19% are in favor of retaining it, and 13% did not specify their position.

The central figure at the congress was the USSR people's deputy. His position and personal qualities were the constant focus of people's attention. And in that sense it is essential to note that the people's attitude toward their elected representatives is characterized increasingly by an increase in their degree of exactingness. At the First Congress it was enough to mount the rostrum and say a few bold words to win a certain popularity. Now deeds are what are prized. Of those polled 37% are satisfied to one degree or another with the activity of the deputies in the electoral okrugs, 45% are dissatisfied, and 18% did not give their opinion.

How would the voters like to see their representative in the organs of the power of the people? And with what can they compare it in this case? After all only quite recently, under the old USSR Supreme Soviet with its tacit "unanimous approval" it was difficult to count on any assessment at all of the activity of the "voiceless" deputies or of those who spoke according to a text prepared in advance (and not even by themselves).

Today public opinion has given preference (is that not in contrast to former times?) to the deputy's qualities like honesty and decency (63%), political maturity (56%), the ability to see and resolve statewide problems (43%), and organizational abilities (33%). Here honesty and decency are in first place for representatives of the intelligentsia and employees; political maturity comes first for agricultural specialists and party, soviet, economic, and law enforcement organ workers; the ability to see and resolve statewide problems comes first for the scientific and technical intelligentsia and students; while organizational abilities come first for agricultural specialists and collective farm [kolkhoz] members.

In the activity of the USSR people's deputies the population is struck primarily by the ability to analyze in depth the processes taking place in society and to give a competent assessment of the legislative acts which are adopted (47%) and also the ability to set forth their thoughts vividly and convincingly (27%).

An analysis of the results of the study shows that the most important factors which will determine choice when voting for a particular candidate deputy will be: The candidate's personal qualities (62%), his defense of the interests of "his" voters (57%), the attractiveness of his election program (30%), and the fact that he lives in the rayon or city where he is running (28%) and is a representative of the same social group as the voter (22%).

The priorities of the public's choice of candidate local soviet deputies can be seen by looking at the table produced below showing answers to the question of how the voter will vote if the candidate deputies for his electoral okrug include one of the listed leaders of various levels (the table shows what percentage of the representatives of different socioprofessional groups will vote "for"). [In the following table column A represents working people as a whole, column B workers, column C kolkhoz members and state farm workers, column D engineering and technical workers and employees, column E students, and column F pensioners]

	A	B	C	D	E	F
Enterprise or institution leader	42	45	58	35	27	36
Primary party organization secretary	36	35	42	24	13	41
Party rayon committee secretary	29	23	55	16	7	38
Trade union committee chairman	28	30	36	19	12	22
Soviet apparatus worker	19	18	23	11	18	17
Party apparatus worker	16	15	22	6	5	21
All-union Leninist Communist Youth League committee worker	14	12	20	9	14	13

As you can see, preference is given to businesslike people who take decisions directly connected with practical work and practical results.

To understand people's attitude toward the soviets you have to turn to the following figures obtained as a result of the study of public opinion. For all the contradictory nature of the assessments of the activity of the congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet and the effectiveness of the work of the people's deputies, the soviets nonetheless remain the most authoritative institution in public opinion.

Those polled link their hopes for an improvement in the state of affairs in the country with the activity of:
—the soviets of people's deputies 81%,
—the party 59%,
—the trade unions 49%,
—the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] 21%,
—the USSR Supreme Soviet 73%,
—the CPSU Central Committee 52%,
—the USSR Council of Ministers 61%,
—the All-Union Council of Trade Unions 35%,
—the Komsomol Central Committee 18%,
—the law enforcement organs (court, prosecutor's office, militia) 59%,
—the ministries and departments 25%,
—the Congress of People's Deputies 80%,
—the CPSU Congress 60%,
—the trade unions congress 45%,
—the Komsomol congress 20%,
—the informal movements 27%,
—the church 45%.

Thus, as you can see, the authority of the soviets in people's eyes has increased sharply even compared with recent years. Many people link the intensification of their role in the life of our society with new elections and with the arrival of new people in the republican and local organs of power.

Telephone public opinion polls in the period of the work of the Congress of People's Deputies showed that the population's attention is focused on the government program for economic recovery. The majority of respondents (54%) support it. A curious result considering the debates which developed over the government program before the start of the congress and at the congress itself.

The progress of the work of the Congress of People's Deputies was assessed positively by 49% of those polled and negatively by 24% while 28% did not specify their attitude. How does one explain the high percentage of dissatisfaction? The answer to this question cannot be simple.

One reason is the voters' unrealized precongress hopes of the more organized (60%) and more effective (40%) work of the Second Congress compared with the First Congress. But, in assessing its activity as a whole, 49% of those polled consider it more fruitful, 29% consider that the effectiveness and fruitfulness of the First Congress in no way differs from those of the Second Congress, 14% believe that fruitfulness had declined, while 11% found it hard to answer the question.

An analysis of the results of the poll attests that a trend toward balanced positions can be discerned in public opinion. The population's attitude toward the Second Congress of People's Deputies attests to the fact that it is possible to predict a further high level of public expectations which can only be fulfilled if the congress fulfills its role as the harmonizer of public interests.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Asks Kinnock To Postpone Kremlin Visit

LD0401164390 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1609 GMT 4 Jan 90

[By Chris Moncrieff, PRESS ASSOCIATION chief political correspondent]

[Excerpt] Labour Leader Neil Kinnock's Kremlin meeting with President Gorbachev later this month has been postponed.

A Labour Party spokesman today said the meeting had been deferred because the Soviet leader's "personal attention and participation" was required to deal with political events in his country. However, he said Mr Gorbachev had offered a new meeting "to be arranged at a mutually convenient date within the next few months". Mr Gorbachev told Mr Kinnock he is postponing contact with foreign politicians scheduled for this month.

The news will obviously be greeted with sadness by Mr Kinnock who had hoped to discuss the very immediate issues of the cataclysmic events in Eastern Europe, disarmament, and East-West relations generally, during what was to be a "short and businesslike" visit on January 16. Mr Gorbachev's decision was relayed personally to Mr Kinnock by Soviet Ambassador Leonid Zamyatin.

A statement from Mr Kinnock's office said: "This afternoon the Soviet ambassador, Mr Zamyatin, called on Mr Kinnock with a personal message from President Gorbachev, in which Mr Gorbachev stated that political events in the Soviet Union require his personal attention and participation and that with regret he had to ask Mr Kinnock to postpone his visit to Moscow later this month.

"Mr Gorbachev informed Mr Kinnock that he was postponing contact with foreign politicians scheduled for January.

"Mr Kinnock responded that he appreciated the circumstances which had to take priority and that he readily agreed to the postponement.

"Mr Gorbachev expressed the hope that Mr Kinnock would treat the unavoidable decision with understanding and suggested that a new meeting be arranged at a mutually convenient date within the next few months.

"Discussions are now taking place on that basis." [passage omitted]

Gorbachev To Visit Lithuania After 9 Jan

LD0401093290 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 4 Jan 89

[Text] We have learned from journalists in Moscow that Gorbachev's visit will not take place before next Tuesday [9 January] or Wednesday.

Earlier we had an unconfirmed report that Gorbachev's visit was to take place this Saturday and Sunday.

Rumors are circulating among journalists in Vilnius that two Politburo members who represent the opposite point of view on the restructuring process have made a clandestine visit to Vilnius.

I must point out that this news has not been officially confirmed.

Lithuanian Leaders to Meet CPSU Leaders in Moscow

LD0401090690 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] In preparation for the arrival of the Soviet leader to Lithuania for the purpose of attaining a bilateral agreement, a meeting of representatives of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and those of the CPSU Central Committee will take place in Moscow tomorrow.

Algirdas Brazauskas, Vladimiras Beriozovas, Kestutis Glaveckas, and Justas Paleckis, secretaries of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee; Romas Gudaitis, Romualdas Ozolas, Rolandas Pavilionis, and Mindaugas Stakvilevicius, members of the Central Committee; Vladimir Korniyenko, leader of the party rayon organization; Vytautas Astrauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet; and Vytautas Sakalauskas, chairman of the Council of Ministers, have left for Moscow today.

We base this news on an official announcement by ELTA [Lithuanian telegraph agency].

Lithuania 'Naive' To Hope Commission Will Arbitrate

PM0301180090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy report: "Vilnius: Press Conference of the Provisional Central Committee"]

[Text] The press conference lasted more than an hour. The secretaries and Bureau members of the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau answered journalists' questions. The press conference could have lasted twice as long—there were many questions.

To convey the character of the press conference, I will quote a few of the questions. Do you venture to oppose the independent Lithuanian Communist Party? How do you expect to revive the prestige of the CPSU? How do you conceive of Lithuania's independence with a dependent Communist Party? How many Communists can your party unite around the CPSU platform? Will the prestigious delegation of the CPSU Central Committee be your guest, or the guest of the independent Communist Party? What program has been prepared for their visit? And so on....

The provisional Central Committee believes that the "new old party" will unite some 50,000-60,000 people, that is, virtually one-fourth of the formerly united Lithuanian Communist Party. That is not many. But let us face up to the truth—this minority is not favored with much attention or sympathy in the republic.

For all their efforts and intentions, the replies by the leadership of the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee were not and could not always be complete; it was one side's assessment of a split. Probably the tone and results of the press conference would have been different had representatives of both Central Committees answered the questions, especially since the journalists' meeting with one Central Committee took place in the other Central Committee's building.... It goes without saying that every city, enterprise, and collective farm in Lithuania would like to offer hospitality to the prestigious delegation from the CPSU Central Committee and receive the guests' answers to burning questions. Clearly the questions would be different, for instance, in Shalchininkay, where the idea of creating a Polish national rayon is still on the agenda, in Kaunas, which put forward the idea of an extraordinary congress and self-determination for the Lithuanian Communist Party, or in Snechkus, where, according to the boldest predictions, the idea of party federalization will be supported by 5-6 percent of Communists.

It seems to me (although any kind of prediction is risky today) that the hope that a commission will come "and arbitrate between us" is a naive hope. The most likely way of resolving this unusual situation is a mutual quest for paths to mutual understanding and the consolidation of forces. As yet, each side is only talking about the vitally necessary tolerance and readiness for compromise and dialogue.

KGB Holds News Conference on Nakhichevan Events

Britvin Comments

LD0301202190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Jan 89

[Text] A press conference held at the USSR KGB on 3 January was devoted to the situation which has developed in the last few days on the border between the USSR and Iran in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR].

For all intents and purposes, what happened on the territory of the autonomous republic on 31 December began back at the end of November and beginning of December last year, Lieutenant General Britvin, chief of the Political Directorate of the USSR KGB border troops, noted. At that time the People's Front of Azerbaijan asked the command of the border detachment in Nakhichevan and the local authorities about granting residents more favorable conditions for visiting burial sites and engaging in agriculture in the border strip. A meeting on the issue took place. Representatives of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic participated in it. It was decided that the border troops were prepared to transfer their engineering installations and systems to any place, and the expenditure for carrying out the work would be borne by the farms which would use the land there. The border troops permitted simplified crossing procedures and increased the number of groups of soldiers, for the faster checking of documents. In other words, the business was not protracted in any way.

But time passed, and there was no reaction of any kind from the applicants. Instead, the People's Front of Azerbaijan organized mass rallies on the territory of the Nakhichevan ASSR, at the boundary of the engineering installations, on 4 and 12 December. The slogans, "Down With the Russian Empire!" and "We Demand Reunification With Iran!," were heard. That was already a sort of kindling of hysteria, Lt Gen Britvin said. From 19 december tents were erected near the signaling systems at a number of border barriers, and the population, numbering up to 6,000 people each day, began to enter these regions systematically and on a mass scale, and attempts to establish contact with Iranians across the border began.

On 23 December the People's Front of Azerbaijan sent a letter containing an ultimatum to the command of the border detachment, which demanded the removal of the border troops' engineering installations and signaling systems, or else they would be burned down. It set 31 December as the deadline. The border troops were warned that in the event of attempts to impede that or to use arms, retaliatory operations, including armed actions, would follow.

By 27 December more than 300 bottles containing an inflammable mixture were concentrated in those places where people were constantly gathering. There were attempts to stabilize the situation. An appeal was published in the local press by the command and the political department of the Transcaucasian border okrug to the working people of Nakhichevan in which they tried to call the people to their senses. The chief of the border detachment and then the chief of the state legal department of the party oblast committee spoke on local television.

Meanwhile events spilled over into a direct violation of the state border. Because of this a protest was made by the Iranian border commissar to our side. Retired General (Nosirov), a person of great authority who protected the border here for 40 years, talked about it on television.

A meeting was held between deputies of commissions of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan, and local authorities, on questions of using land directly in the vicinity of border regions. Nothing worked, and on 31 December, according to Lt Gen Britvin, a real orgy began. A crowd of people numbering about 7,500 destroyed more than 70 km of signals' systems, 11 observation towers, and communications lines. Hunting weapons were glimpsed in hands. On the night of 2-3 January three searchlights were destroyed. According to preliminary data material losses amount more than R3 million.

In the view of those who spoke at the press conference this action is political, and is seen by the leaders of the People's Front of Azerbaijan as a victory. At a regular meeting in Nakhichevan they announced that the period of 1-7 January is Border Week. In that time they threatened to fully eliminate engineering structures on the state border within the bounds of the Nakhichevan ASSR.

On 2 January the People's Front of Azerbaijan continued in all manner of ways to complicate the situation on the border. Groups of local inhabitants dismantled and removed engineering systems. Individuals from Zhulfinskiy, Ilichevskiy, and Babekskiy Rayons were particularly active. Up to 1,000 Soviet and up to 800 Iranian citizens came out as before to the shores of the border river of Araks. On that day, in the sight of all, (Mametaliyev Gasan Velyagly), born in 1953, foreman of a local road section, crossed to the territory of Iran. Members of the People's Front of Azerbaijan who arrived at a number of border posts stated that if the border guards did not leave those places by 5 January the buildings would be burned down.

For their own safety the border guards' families were transported out of the area, under reliable protection. Reinforcements, Lt Gen Britvin noted, are being deployed to the scene of events. We hope that things will not go as far as direct clashes, but calls are being made for this by the leaders of the People's Front of Azerbaijan, particularly by one (Panakhov). There is no victory without casualties and blood, he stated at a meeting on 1 January in Nakhichevan. We will learn how such calls end.

TASS Report

LD0301171190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1555 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jan (TASS)—TASS correspondent Igor Peskov reports:

The situation at the Nakhichevan section of the USSR state border with Iran, where on 31 December-2 January extremist-minded individuals caused disturbances, is gradually returning to normal. This is what Lieutenant General Nikolay Britvin, head of the Political Directorate of the USSR-KGB Border Troops, said at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists today. According to him, the reinforced protection of the USSR border by increased details including armored troop carriers and motor vehicles is continuing now in order to ensure the security of the USSR border. Nikolay Britvin said that the latest events had been preceded by a number of actions aimed at making the social and political situation in Azerbaijan more complicated. It was precisely in order to aggravate the situation and in an attempt to draw attention to it that the organization of mass illegal actions on the border was chosen.

Since November 1989 the leaders of the Azerbaijan People's Front (APF), at mass meetings in various towns in the republic, have been calling for "opening the border for free communication with Iran," and for the unification of northern and southern Azerbaijan. At the end of December they issued an ultimatum—to remove border guards' engineering installations before 1 January 1990. Otherwise, the extremists threatened to destroy them "by burning." At one of the meetings a "border week" was declared, during which it was planned to eliminate border installations within the Nakhichevan ASSR from 1 to 7 January. In the situation that was arising, Nikolay Britvin noted, the border district command carried out work jointly with local party and soviet bodies on preventing such actions. In particular, an accord was reached with the local authorities and population for creating more favorable conditions for economic activity in the border zone, for the transfer of certain engineering installations, and for the simplification of movement into the zone. But due to the leaders of the APF, it did not prove possible to implement those constructive decisions.

On 31 December 1989 a crowd of some 7,500 people, headed by the leadership of the APF, began destroying alarm systems, observation towers, and communications lines. Thereafter, the participants of the mob went on to the River Araks, where, without violating the border, they held meetings and appealed to Iranians gathered on the other bank to unite. The material damage resulting from these actions, which continued on 1 and 2 January, came to R3 million, according to preliminary data.

The commanding officer of the border guards has stated that in the course of the disturbances one Hasan Mamedaliev, an inhabitant of Verhnyaya Aza village went over to Iran. Probably there were others who crossed the border. But no crossings en masse were registered.

While answering journalists' questions, Nikolay Britvin said that during the disturbances no weapons were used and none of the border guards was injured. According to sources, he said, one person was killed as a result of skirmishes between the participants of the gatherings themselves.

In Nikolay Britvin's opinion, there is no need as yet for any drastic measures, including the dispatch of internal troops units into the region hit by disturbances.

Incidents Called 'Illegal'

PM0301172690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report on interview with Iokubas Petrovas, chief of the USSR KGB Transcaucasus Border District, by IZVESTIYA correspondent R. Ignatyev: "Pogrom on the Soviet-Iranian Border"; date, place of interview not given]

[Text] On 31 December 1989 local inhabitants on the Nakhichevan sector of the Soviet-Iranian border committed outrages. This is what Iokubas Petrovas, chief of the USSR KGB Transcaucasus Border District troops, told IZVESTIYA's correspondent:

A long time before this unprecedented act of barbarity, on 4 December 1989 to be precise, a group of people approached the border and formed a chain. People lit camp fires, held rallies, and, with the help of megaphones, held conversations across the border with inhabitants of Iran. They called for the unification of Southern and Northern Azerbaijan and for joint actions. On that day everything went relatively peacefully. The pickets were warned that they were acting illegally.

However, something similar happened again on 12 December, and 2 weeks later the border guards received an ultimatum from the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] People's Front. It put forward demands for all barriers to be removed from the border by 31 December 1989. Otherwise, everything would be destroyed.

In order to prevent an undesirable incident, the Transcaucasus Border District leadership made concessions. In some sectors of the border the local population were

permitted to leave in order to carry out economic activity. At the sites of cemeteries we removed the barriers.

On 30 December the leaders of the Nakhichevan border detachment spoke on local television and radio. The district command met with representatives of the People's Front. However, the talks led nowhere. The extremists were preparing, in full view of everyone, for an illegal act: Fuel was being procured, equipment was being brought up to particular sites, agitation was taking place among the population....

The action began in the morning of 31 December. Large groups of people approached the border. They began destroying the electric alarm system that gives a warning if the prohibited zone is crossed. Watchtowers and border signs were destroyed....

Border post details called on the extremists to stop their illegal actions, but no one listened to them. During the day some 4,000 people gathered. The crowd was making threats of physical violence against the border guards. Extremists were threatening to set fire to the border posts. Some people were armed with pistols and hunting rifles. The outrages continued on subsequent days.

Because of these disturbances border protection was virtually paralyzed in the Nakhichevan ASSR sector, over a distance of 164 km. In some places the rampaging crowd managed to reach the actual line of the border. Iranian border troops were urgently placed on combat readiness. Their subunits took up defensive positions. The Iranian border commissars lodged a protest, pointing out that the Soviet side is violating the 14 May 1957 treaty between the USSR and Iran on the Soviet-Iranian border regime.

We are taking every step to defuse the situation on the border, I. Petrovas continued. Our subunits are acting tactfully, realizing that it is extremely undesirable to use arms in this situation. On 3 January the illegal actions by the local population continued. it was necessary to strengthen the border protection and send reserves to the region in question.

As a result of the barbarous action, great material damage was done. According to preliminary estimates, it amounts to more than R5 million. Restoration work is now planned on the Soviet-Iranian border sector, communications lines are being established, and technical installations will be rebuilt.

We are receiving information that similar disturbances are occuring in Zangelanskiy, Pushkinskiy, and other rayons, I. Petrovas said in conclusion. There are warning signals from Lenkoran. That means that a complex situation is taking shape along virtually the entire border with Iran in the Azerbaijan sector. That is about 790 km on land. The situation could deteriorate. The extremists are demanding the complete removal of a number of border posts, and are provoking the border guards. We are trying to restore order on the border.

5,000 Protest TASS Report on Nakhichevan Events

PM0301194390 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 1

[Untitled item from roundup signed "RT News Department," under the general heading "Critical Situation: Who Benefits From This?"]

[Text] In the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] city of Ilichevsk yesterday around 5,000 people held a rally lasting several hours in the central square to protest a TASS report on the border conflict. They claimed that the TASS report that people high on alcohol and drugs had participated in the events was mistaken.

One Drowned Trying to Swim River to Iran

LD0401171790 Tehran Television Service in Persian 1600 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] According to a report by our correspondent from Tabriz, five young men from Soviet Azarbaijan yesterday threw themselves in the Aras River, intending to swim to Iranian soil. Four of them crossed the water and reached this side of the border, and one of them drowned.

According to a report by the Soviet news agency TASS, these unrests have spread to other parts of Soviet Azarbaijan, including Nakhijavan. A Soviet military source today said that following a few days of unrest in Nakhijavan region in the south of the Soviet Union, the situation is getting back to normal.

Azerbaijani Nationals Attacked in NKAO Incidents

PM0301172890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[F. Ivanov report: "Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast: Tension Persists"]

[Text] The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh remains explosive in the new year. The conflicts on the basis of nationality continue, including those using weapons.

The editorial office was informed by the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Special Administration Committee that in the afternoon of 2 January there was an attack on a convoy of five buses which was on its way from Agdam to Shusha via Stepanakert, escorted by a ZIL-131 army truck and an armored carrier. Not far from the city market, stones were thrown at the buses, which were carrying citizens of Azerbaijani nationality, and shots were fired. The tires of the ZIL were burst and windows on the buses were broken. During the conflict the servicemen escorting the convoy returned fire. As a result three of the attackers were injured, and one of them died in a hospital.

The bus convoy was dispersed. The ZIL, in which were several citizens of Azerbaijani nationality and servicemen, remained on the site of the firefight. Until help

arrived, the attackers were trying to set fire to the vehicle. The two armored carriers that hastened to the scene took the ZIL in tow and set off for the military unit's station. Three kilometers further on, near the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate post in Stepanakert, shots were fired again: People were shooting at the truck and at the post itself. Once again the servicemen had to return fire. Two cadets and one of the attackers were injured.

All the citizens of Azerbaijani nationality were transferred from the damaged truck to an armored carrier and taken to the military unit. Soon after, the crowd set fire to the truck.

As soon as some of the buses arrived in Shusha, some 5,000 people assembled there. They intended to set off for Stepanakert. Only the intervention of servicemen averted a tragedy.

Once again the situation deteriorated with the arrival of the curfew. In the Stepanakert suburb of Kirkidzhan, an intensive but disorderly firefight began, with hunting weapons and rifles. Once again the troops had to intervene. This time there were no casualties. In the morning of 3 January the situation on the oblast's roads remained tense. Citizens of Azerbaijani nationality were throwing stones at any Armenian vehicle.

Armenian television broadcasts have been blocked since 2 January, by means of a retransmitter located in Shusha.

A criminal case has begun with a view to investigating what happened; it is to clarify the picture concerning the clashes and name the culprits. However, it is obvious that the new conflict is only exacerbating the critical situation that has developed in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. In 1989 more than 30 acts of subversion were committed in the oblast and some 350 vehicle convoys and about 900 troop details came under attack. Weapons and ammunition continue to arrive. The confiscated weapons alone—both firearms and other weapons—total more than 2,500 items, while there are nearly 100,000 items of confiscated ammunition.

Azerbaijanis Reportedly Chant Islamic Slogans

LD0401114390 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] According to a Central News Unit report, during the past several days, numerous groups of people of Soviet Azerbaijan, after cutting barbed wire and passing by border watchtowers, gathered in different areas of the northern banks of the Aras River and chanted Islamic slogans. The official Soviet news agency yesterday reported that unrest has extended to other parts of Soviet Azerbaijan, including Nakhchivan.

A Soviet military source said today that following several days of unrest in the Nakhchivan region, the situation is returning to normal.

Lithuanian Communists Against Break With Moscow

LD0301162890 Moscow TASS in English 1600 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Vilnius January 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila:

Perestroyka requires unity and cohesion of the party's ranks, said Mikolas Burokiavicius, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, at a news conference in Vilnius. He represents Communists who want the Lithuanian Communist Party to remain within the Soviet Communist Party.

He believes that what is taking place in the Lithuanian Communist Party might have a negative effect on other party organisations and weaken the stand of the Soviet Communist Party as the initiator and organiser of perestroyka.

Burokiavicius said that Lithuania and its people can successfully develop as part of the Soviet Union and that the Lithuanian Communist Party, on the basis of the Soviet Communist Party's platform, could determine independently its social, national and personnel policies and decide questions of cultural development.

Burokiavicius along with the six other participants in the news conference—secretaries, members of the Bureau and the Provisional Central Committee—emphasised that confrontation should be avoided.

"By splitting from the Soviet Communist Party we shall not do our people any good," said secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party Juozas Kuolialis.

The participants in the news conference said that their communist party and the Lithuanian Communist Party, which declared for organisational and political separation from the Soviet Communist Party, have the common goals: To create a humane, socialist rule-of-law state. Only the roads and tactics differ.

As was stressed in the report of General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev to the plenum of the Central Committee of the party, lessons should be drawn from what is taking place in the republic.

It is important to enable every communist to make decisions freely and to avoid confrontation. This was said also at a conference of first secretaries of city and district committees of the party that was held in the Central Committee of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party.

But the process of separation continues. A meeting of party activists of the Oktyabrsky District of Vilnius was held. Its participants decided to convene a district party conference. Since First Secretary of the District Committee Vladislav Shved was elected secretary of the

Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, it has been decided not to recognise his authority as first secretary of the district committee.

Lithuania To Vote on Soviet Military Election Role

LD0301121290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] The Sajudis News Agency has announced that the upcoming Lithuanian Supreme Soviet will announce a referendum in which the people will express their opinion on the participation of servicemen of the USSR Armed Forces in the elections of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. It is thought that the session will take place immediately after the visit to Lithuania by the commission lead by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

A commission of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet which recently verified the repeatedly collected signatures by the People's Initiative Group has already issued a special document confirming that more than 300,000 signatures are valid.

Lithuanian Radio Begins Program for Tatars

LD0301162190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Summary] A 30-minute radio program for Lithuanian Tatars has been started by Lithuanian radio's second program.

There are about 20,000 Tatars in Lithuania, Belorussia, and Poland. Although the Lithuanian Tatars lost their language in the 16th Century, the present generation of Lithuanian Tatars is determined to revive the Crimean-Tatar language among the remaining Tatars in Lithuania.

Brazauskas Responds to Gorbachev Statement

90UN0498C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 2 Dec 89 pp 1, 2

[Report by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, at Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee 22d Plenum on 1 December: "Appeal of M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of CPSU Central Committee, to Communists of Lithuania and Discussion of Situation in Lithuanian Communist Party at Meeting of CPSU Central Committee Politburo"]

[Text] Dear Comrades, plenum participants! Less than 3 weeks remain to the special Lithuanian Communist Party 20th Congress. They will be filled with intensive creative work, debate, and meetings with delegates. Each day that is left must be used as substantively as possible for preparations for the congress and for perfecting the program documents of the Lithuanian Communist Party, about which various, at times diametrically opposite, views may be heard today. A particular burden falls, now and in the future, to the congress delegates. The future of the Communist Party will depend to a considerable extent on their political perspicacity, wisdom, and resolve to move toward the charted goal.

Dear Communists, plenum participants!

We have just listened closely to the letter from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the Communists of Lithuania. It analyzes in depth the situation in which perestroyka, its initiators, the CPSU, and the Lithuanian Communist Party have found themselves.

We need to say openly to ourselves and others: This document is the first such in the history of the Lithuanian Communist Party. An appeal is made to us, inviting us to ascertain together the fundamentally new political situation and to act prudently, as the conscience and interests of the inhabitants of Lithuania demand. This attunes us to further creative search for noncliched solutions in keeping with the spirit of perestroyka.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Mikhail Sergeyevich are, as we can see, particularly disturbed by the position of Lithuania's Communists and the upcoming 20th Congress, for which he wished success and in respect of which expressed confidence that it would be a substantial contribution to the concept of the party's restructuring. It must be recognized that Lithuania's Communists—such being history's wish—have found themselves in a field of particular responsibility and self-determination. The tension of this field has turned some people's heads and is intimidating some people, and for this reason only the maximum concentration of the intellect may contribute to the adoption of the correct decisions.

It needs to be noted primarily that the aims of Lithuania's Communists and the progressive part of the CPSU aspiring to reforms coincide. The development of democracy, public self-management, the creation of a state based on the rule of law, social justice—these are the flags of Lithuania's Communists also.

Second, we all understand that the logic of the restructuring processes dictates a certain synchronicity and that our surge ahead could upset it, causing regressive consequences.

Third, it is important for us that the CPSU Central Committee leadership supports and understands the creative search of Lithuania's Communists and also the need for "noncliched" solutions.

Fourth, it is undoubtedly not a matter of indifference to us which path the 28th CPSU Congress takes and what kind of documents are adopted there. Geared toward change, the progressive part of the CPSU will, of course, take the path of broad intraparty democracy. For this reason, the aspiration of Lithuania's Communists to independence is an objective necessity ensuing from the said historical and internal conditions.

Fifth, the following situation is thus taking shape: we will keep a close watch on and participate with all forces in the restructuring of the CPSU and have submitted and will continue to submit our proposals. This was how we acted in the course of the preparations for the CPSU Central Committee plenum on the nationality issue, but it still has to be admitted that far from all our proposals received attention. While understanding the aspiration and interests of the CPSU Central Committee leadership in defending perestroyka and helping it progress, we are obliged with all due responsibility to discuss the situation which has taken shape and make preparations for the congress in this direction.

As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's letter proposes, it is necessary to weigh possible decisions, envisage their consequences, and adopt a firm position on the question of the Lithuanian Communist Party and its prospects and the prospects of the republic as a whole. This is not a new problem for us. We have discussed it in detail repeatedly both at Central Committee plenums and at other forums. But this problem is not only multifaceted but vitally important. Fateful, I would say. For this reason, we are obliged to probe it in depth time and again.

It may be said without exaggeration that the Lithuanian Communist Party 20th Congress will have great repercussions and will evidently influence the whole of the CPSU also. The attention being accorded us currently in Moscow is therefore understandable. It is in this context that we need to evaluate also the recent meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, to which the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau was invited. This was the first such meeting in our party's history. Despite the contradictions, particularly at the start of the meeting, a great deal of mutual understanding was subsequently reached. However, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo resolution passed as the result of these discussions makes a scrupulous evaluation of the development of party life in Lithuania and contains critical statements about the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and its Bureau at this crucial stage of perestroyka. A result of this discussion is the participation in the work of our plenum of V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and a group of senior officials of the Central Committee.

This testifies once again to the need to explain to the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee which causes and which factors dictate to us the content of the decisions we adopt and why we, the Central Committee, have decided to convene a Lithuanian Communist Party congress this year.

The aspiration to radical change in the party and agonizing quest and discoveries have been characteristic of Lithuania's Communists and the path they have trodden in this period. There have been fuss and bustle and an unwarranted desire to emerge from the crisis situation hastily and simply. But the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee 16th Plenum, which adopted the "Appeal to the Communists, Working People and All Voters of the Republic," determined the immediate goal to which Lithuania's Communists aspire: the party's independence. This plenum, like subsequent ones also, expressed in summary fashion the mood of the majority of Communists and primary party organizations which had already begun to prevail in these years of radical restructuring.

Independence is simultaneously an end and a means for only by the new status of party independence is it possible to seek the implementation of a policy corresponding to Lithuania's conditions and only thus is it possible to become firmly established as a real political force in the republic. The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee 17th Plenum, although evaluated very contradictorily, showed that the party, which aspires to the consolidation of society for the accomplishment of the tasks of perestroyka, needs flexibility, farsightedness, and the capacity for taking the difficult path of compromise without crossing the "red line." We had to negotiate the crossroads of self-determination and come through a difficult struggle of opinions, in which the image of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee 20th Congress took shape.

The resolution passed at the CPSU [as published] Central Committee 18th Plenum on the convening of a congress was greeted with satisfaction in the majority of party organizations. It noticeably reduced tension where there had been long-standing demands for the holding of a congress and it brought the Central Committee closer to the republic's Communist rank and file and their concerns and cherished aspirations. Following this decision, we have sensed the increased creative initiative and political energy of the Communists. There has thereby been a halt to the reduction in the party ranks, and the party's authority in society has grown. This testifies that we are on the right road. The need for the convening of the Lithuanian Communist Party congress is understood by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo also.

New ideas in the party are being engendered at the intersection of opinions, which is a normal phenomenon in a democratizing society. At the same time, this is a prerequisite of a policy of the Lithuanian Communist Party taking shape in the course of these processes which, while rejecting extremes, holds to its own priorities. This policy is being supported increasingly by the inhabitants of the republic, who see the Lithuanian Communist Party as the main political force of the present day, without which the actual realization of economic independence and the solution of other questions which are urgent for the republic are impossible. We are faced with a great deal of work since the law enacted in the USSR Supreme Soviet is a real, bold step in a restructuring of the principles of management in the state. The time for its implementation is near. A great deal of work will have to be done primarily in the center on the handover of enterprises and organizations and material and financial resources. This will have to be

done by the Lithuanian Communist Party leadership, the Council of Ministers, and department leaders. Of course, economic independence will extend the range of the republic's political independence also, suffusing it primarily with more practical content. On the other hand, it is perfectly understandable that implementation of the concept of economic independence does not end with the enactment of a law. Its realization will be a difficult path, which will require great efforts, particularly from Lithuania's Communists. Many people understand, evidently, that the Lithuanian Communist Party has a special role in this and that it has the greatest possibilities here. But all this will be possible only if sound practical relations are maintained with the country's central economic departments and other republics.

Many Communists have of late been worried by the main question of the party's authority and the decline in its ranks. There has been a tenfold increase in the numbers of Communists who have renounced their membership. At the same time, we are gratified that new people, active supporters of perestroyka, are joining the party—there have been over 800 of them in the present year. We are now 203,000.

Some people are maintaining that people are disenchanted with our organization. I shall not argue that there have been such for not all who joined our ranks were driven by high goals and Lithuania's future. Not everyone was able to withstand the concentrated anti-party pressure. But I believe that those for whom the party is a form of political self-expression, and not a refuge or cover, have remained in our ranks. We can confirm today that, despite the congress' decisions and the actual wording, the party will continue to be an organization of like-minded persons who have associated voluntarily.

The election of delegates to the congress has been a lesson in democracy. The majority of them have been elected, as a rule, from several candidacies, frequently, in several rounds. Almost 1,040 delegates have already been elected, and I must say that compared with the delegates to preceding congresses there is a marked difference in both the social position of the elected Communists and their occupation, beliefs, and other characteristics.

What brought about the need for the convening of the present, 20th, party congress? It is necessary once again today to give a cogent answer to this question. It was put to us at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo also. We explained.

It signifies primarily, as already said, the wishes of the majority of Lithuania's Communists born of a desire for renewal and dissociation from the past, which is no adornment to the party, and the repression and crimes of Stalinism. This means that it will be necessary at the congress to evaluate the events of our contradictory and tragic past.

Second, it is an attempt to switch from the status of a strictly centralized, state institution in fact to that of a democratic political party. The entire set of problems of democratization of Lithuania's political system and, what is most important, the establishment of political pluralism are connected with this transition. Although it was the party which began perestroyka, it itself is lagging considerably behind the processes of national revival. It has to be acknowledged that the Lithuanian Communist Party also is changing currently. Relationships and the "center-to-republic" style of party work are changing fundamentally. This needs to be legalized.

Third, we will not succeed in effectively overcoming the profound consequences of the socioeconomic crisis if the party's status is contrary to the concept of the republic's economic independence, which, as I have already said, has been officially approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is essential to consolidate the Lithuanian Communist Party's independence, which will ensure proper and equal participation in the first truly democratic elections since the war to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the local soviets, that is, to win a place in the legislature and executive by the democratic path. I believe that the realization of economic independence in the republic will require efforts from all of us Communists of all nationalities and will moderate the ardor of at times fruitless political debate since all inhabitants of Lithuania have an interest in a rise in the socioeconomic level.

Fourth, it is essential to renew the Central Committee and change appreciably the methods of work and relationships between Communists in the party itself.

Fifth. The congress must determine the role and place of the party in the course of perestroyka and in our unfolding political system.

True, the fact that the demand for independence for the Lithuanian Communist Party is being raised at a time when the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] is merely at the start of its difficult path toward realization of genuine sovereignty seems somewhat incomprehensible at first glance. But this is natural if it is borne in mind that the Lithuanian Communist Party, as a political party, must be at the front of the processes of perestroyka, and not drag along in the rear.

The upcoming congress has to take place for today only the collective wisdom of the predominant political factor in society can decide questions of the fate of perestroyka. Whereas approximately 5 years ago an understanding that living as before was impossible and that the in-depth reform of society was essential had matured in society, the time has now come for an answer to the questions of what has been done, how to act in the future, in the name of what goal are we implementing perestroyka, how we understand this goal and what lies ahead for us en route thereto.

A most acute problem, which has not been fully resolved as yet, is a possible split in the party. We are being

accused of the fact that the possibility of this has increased noticeably following the publication of the draft program documents. We believe that the problem is on the one hand being stimulated and, on the other, that attempts are being made not to see it. Neither path is acceptable to us. All the more inappropriate is it to talk about a split along national lines. Yes, there is a diversity of opinions in the party, and many Communists are experiencing the drama of self-reevaluation brought about by the restructuring processes.

I believe that it is the purpose of a congress to reveal different opinions, positions, and tendencies. While dissociating ourselves from extremes, we are obliged to find a platform which brings the party together and helps it rid itself of the alienation between the local party components and its leadership and between the Communists of different nationalities. Understandably, there will be those to whom the ideas of independence and democratization are unacceptable, but they will be in a minority. Ideas whose time has passed will hardly find extensive support in the republic. All of us, Communists of all nationalities, are inhabitants of Lithuania. We live and work in a single republic and are doing everything to ensure that it be economically strong, spiritually healthy, and democratic. It is this which is the foundation which is not contrary to humanity and human rights and is in keeping with the interests of all the peoples living in Lithuania. Communists must understand that the party will be working under the new conditions, when unity is a principal factor in the political competitive struggle with other forces.

It is time to restore the credit of trust issued in the name of the instigator of perestroyka—the CPSU. The time has come to share responsibility. Life suggests just one solution—the concepts of social development and the organizations representing them which are able to offer an action program for a surmounting of the crisis maximally in keeping with local conditions and which persuade the public of its feasibility remain durable.

We shall not be forgiven if the numerous slogans, declarations, and calls for action are not followed by our active participation in perestroyka and if we fail to achieve specific results.

The upcoming congress will be a step toward ensuring the sovereignty of the republic and a threshold beyond which lies a society of free citizens and humane socialism.

The policy of new political thinking proclaimed and implemented by M.S. Gorbachev is clearly oriented toward a transition from class confrontation toward the priorities of values common to all mankind. Faced with global problems, the threat of nuclear war and self-annihilation, such a change was inevitable. Even today this policy has produced positive results in the international arena—it has reduced tension and increased cooperation and rapprochement between peoples. This policy has been reflected in the USSR also, having made itself felt in broad democratic citizens' movements and the growth of the self-awareness of the peoples of the union. Glasnost and the start of democratization in the country were the catalyst of these processes which has in a short time shaped new guidelines and a different hierarchy of values which has undermined the foundations of totalitarian ideology. Today everything in Lithuania is being termed a rebirth which has affected not only Lithuanians but also Russians, Poles, Jews, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Karaimy, and other peoples living in Lithuania. We evaluate these processes positively, considering this a manifestation of the true, and not facade-like, friendship and cultural coexistence of the peoples and the inception of a new internationalism. On the other hand, substantial work has to be performed even prior to the congress to integrate most positively in the aspirations of Lithuania's Communists those who have not fully recognized our aims.

"It is important to renew socialism practically," M.S. Gorbachev writes in the article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroyka," "creating socioeconomic and political structures which are the means, and man, the end, which in practice secure a turnabout of the entire social system to face man." We are sure that both the program documents of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the priority action program are geared precisely to this.

The actual political situation in Lithuania, which has embarked on the path of democratization, is such that the Lithuanian Communist Party may acquire real authority in society and target its development toward the creation of a sovereign socialist democratic state only by having become an independent political party. Such is the truth, which cannot be ignored, however impartial it may be.

It cannot be ignored for the added reason that elections to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets will be held shortly. With a change in the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party we might not yet be too late, but if we procrastinate, it may be forecast that as a result of the upcoming elections the possibility of the Lithuanian Communist Party implementing its program goals in the republic's parliamentary activity will have diminished.

We are sure that only as an independent party can the Lithuanian Communist Party play an important political part in the contemporary life of Lithuania. The point being that only then will it be able to act with regard for the historical traditions of the Lithuanian people and their culture and Lithuania's spiritual and material potential. In other words, only as an independent party may the Lithuanian Communist Party be a political organization expressing and representing the aspirations of the republic's inhabitants. The independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party means a new form of relations with the CPSU in keeping with the spirit of perestroyka and the aspirations of the majority of Lithuania's Communists, which on the basis of the ideas

of perestroyka corresponds to the democratic and humanitarian, and not bureaucratic centralist, orientation of the building of socialism.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo resolution observes that we are inclining toward party federalism. In refutation of such a possibility reference is made more often than not to V.I. Lenin. I asked specialists to clarify, and they answered as follows: Lenin was speaking on these matters in 1913, 1914, and 1919 and his thoughts were conditioned by the situation at that time. This is the first thing.

Second, it was a question of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, and not of the CPSU, which did not exist at that time.

Third, Lenin opposed a federation of parties united on a national basis. The Lithuanian Communist Party has no intention of becoming a Communist Party solely for Lithuanians, although some people are constantly attempting to foist on us the idea of a split precisely along national lines. This does not correspond to reality since the Lithuanian Communist Party remains in its principles a party open to the representatives of all peoples.

Fourth, Lenin was opposed to a federation of parties representing different political currents and tendencies. The Lithuanian Communist Party supports the policy of perestroyka and will cooperate on this basis with the CPSU and the Communist Parties of the other republics, which in the course of the development of the restructuring processes will be able, in our view, to devise a structure corresponding to the concept of the USSR as a union of sovereign states.

Fifth, it has to be noted that Lenin did not entirely reject the idea of the party's federalization and understood it as a synonym for and the possibility of equality. Anyone who wishes to see for himself that what has been said is correct may do so by turning to Volumes 23 and 25 of the complete works of Vladimir Ilich Lenin.

We do not claim that our opinion is final and incontestable. I am sure that it is necessary to continue to closely study the historical legacy and objectively analyze contemporary development, which is what our scholars are doing.

I believe that a Lithuanian Communist Party in renewal may proceed from certain ideas stimulating social progress which are proclaimed by the present-day social democrats. It is known that this is in fact acknowledged today in the actual policy of the CPSU. This was expounded concisely in M.S. Gorbachev's article which we have already quoted. For this reason we hardly need consider this a betrayal of the aims of the Communists (precisely this was the attitude toward such a rapprochement both in the Stalin times and in the period of stagnation).

Primarily because, as is well known, the Russian Bolsheviks and the Lithuanian Communist Party were the creation of social democracy and, consequently, are not without certain points of contact with this movement. In our view, an insurmountable wall between Communist and social democratic parties appears only when the essence of Marxism is imprecisely understood.

In the name of progress we should borrow the positive experience of other parties. This is an elementary axiom of Marxism. The proposition of the classics of Marxism that any, even the most attractive, social ideas are significant to the extent that they are effective in practice and to the extent that they express the sentiments of the masses and are capable of channeling their activity toward realization of the material and spiritual well-being of society and social justice is well known. Without this, even the most attractive idea is hollow and devoid of social meaning.

The prerequisites of political pluralism and the exercise of Communist Party independence in individual republics are various. It would hardly be correct not to see this and stubbornly direct all republics toward a single model of the structure of a political party. Recognizing this, Lithuania's Communists wish themselves to take the step corresponding to the spirit of perestroyka and Lithuania's sociopolitical situation. After all, we are in reality in Lithuania today already living under the conditions of political pluralism. Such is the reality.

Up to now there has been keen discussion of the program documents of the Lithuanian Communist Party and their basic propositions. But today, at the current stage of the restructuring of the Lithuanian Communist Party, tremendous significance is attached to the party's priority action program, which could be the basis of the Communists' election platform. It has been distributed to the plenum participants. It is here that an answer to the questions troubling the inhabitants of Lithuania in both the political and economic and social spheres may be found. The more so in that it is the Lithuanian Communist Party which is the real political force whose power is determined by the fact that today it not only recognizes its responsibility for but is capable of leading the way out of the socioeconomic crisis in which our republic has found itself. Yes, it bears the responsibility for the mistakes that have been made, but at the same time it has a rare historic opportunity to prove its capacity for rectifying them.

And a main one is restoration of Lithuania's statehood. As observed in the platform adopted at the CPSU Central Committee September Plenum, "The union republics possess all the rights corresponding to their status as sovereign socialist states which are members of a federation." As this document observes, they "are empowered to decide all questions of state and social life except for those which they have voluntarily transferred to the jurisdiction of the union." The path toward this is a complex process which could lead the whole country from the status of unitary state and which has its own

order of priority and strategy. Regardless of the order of priority of the process and political and economic reality and in calling for the solution of all problems at once we would be jeopardizing people's future and that which has been achieved with such difficulty.

The path which we proposed back at the Lithuanian Communist Party 18th Plenum—the peaceful, parliamentary path based on good will and consent and attentiveness to the interests of others—has been supported by the progressive citizens' movements and certain parties which are being formed here. Only in such a Lithuania will each inhabitant thereof, regardless of nationality and beliefs, feel free and secure.

In the process of restoration of statehood, we must practically anticipate certain stages. Even today we can achieve equal and mutually profitable cooperation with other republics and the central departments on a contractual basis. Our goal at this stage, with regard for current economic and political conditions, is a sovereign Lithuanian state in a new alliance of free republics. In this period, we must create a firm and stable economy and consolidate political pluralism and parliamentary democracy.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo resolution says that we are not consistently abiding by the policy advanced by the CPSU Central Committee September Plenum. The CPSU Central Committee platform on the nationality issue contains many positive changes in the field of nationality policy. But its decisions noticeably lag behind the restructuring processes occurring in our and certain other republics.

Much has already been done in Lithuania in the business of solution of problems of national relations. The National Minorities Act was prepared and adopted at the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet session, and the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers Committee for Nationality Affairs is beginning to operate. Measures are being adopted to solve problems of the Vilnius area, and the activity of national-cultural societies is being supported. But all these are only the first steps. Nationality policy is a permanent creative process. We must be able to opportunely take into consideration the problems arising in relations between peoples.

The most crucial time in the course of preparation for the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress has arrived. This requires of all Communists, the present members of the Central Committee primarily, intensive work, responsibility, and initiative. It is essential in the time remaining to finally prepare all program documents and all projects and to create the conditions for constructive work. The delegates must actively meet with the Communists and party organizations in order to represent at the congress the collective opinion.

A decisive time has come for Lithuania's Communists. We are all aware of the historic importance of the moment. An independent Lithuanian Communist Party is the demand of the day prompted by the logic of life and the Communists' recognized need to continue to be at the epicenter of historic events. The aspiration to independence is not, however, a desire for isolation. As Lithuania, acquiring economic independence, is interested to the highest degree in the continued development of relations with the union republics, so will an independent Lithuanian Communist Party continue to act according to the principles of perestroyka in close cooperation with the CPSU and all the Communist Parties. Our aim is constructive dialogue in the solution on an equal basis of present-day problems, which no one party can solve separately.

Thank you for your attention!

1 Dec Lithuanian CP Plenum Proceedings Reported

90UN0498B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 2 Dec 89 p 1

[Text] The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee 22d Plenum was held in Vilnius on 1 December.

Lithuanian Communist Party gorkom and raykom [city and rayon party committee] first secretaries, chairmen of executive committees of soviets of people's deputies who are not members of the Central Committee, executives of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Council of Ministers and ministries and departments, leaders of the mass media, members of the commissions which prepared the program documents of the Lithuanian Communist Party and other party activists were invited to the plenum. The opening remarks at the plenum were delivered by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

The plenum confirmed the following agenda:

1. The appeal of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Communists of Lithuania and discussion of the situation in the Lithuanian Communist Party at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

2. Nomination of representatives from the Lithuanian Communist Party for the republic electoral commission for elections to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The appeal of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the Communists of Lithuania was read out by Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The report on the first item was delivered by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

The following spoke in the debate: Yanina Gagilene, secretary of Vilnius's Leninskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee] and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Pyatras Mikelenis, first secretary of the Kaunasskiy Raykom and member of the

Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Yuozas Nekroshyus, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and Book Trade and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Edvardas Titishkis, first deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR People's Control Committee and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; personal pensioner Antanas Barkauskas; Vladas Sturis, first secretary of the Shilyutskiy Raykom; Stasis Apanavichyus, chairman of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Party Control Commission and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Romas Gudaytis, secretary of the party organization of the Lithuanian Writers Union; Vitautas Skripkauskas, first secretary of Shyaulyayskiy Raykom and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; officer Valeriy Shurupov; Povilas Gilis, deputy secretary of the party committee of Vilnius University; Lenginas Shepetis, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Osvaldas Sharmavichyus, first secretary of the Shilalskiy Raykom; Zofiya Rimpo, head of the livestock section of Shalchininkskiy Rayon's "Za Rodinu" Kolkhoz [Collective Farm] and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Alfonsas Matsaytis, first secretary of the Lithuanian KSM [Communist Youth League] Central Committee; Yuras Pozhela, president of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau; Romanas Songayla, first secretary of the Mazheykskiy Raykom; Vitautas Statulyavichyus, vice president of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Kyastutis Ashmonas, leader of a brigade of the Klaypeda "Baltiya" Shipyard and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Genrikas Zabulis, minister of public education of the Lithuanian SSR and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Vladislav Shved, first secretary of Vilnius' Oktyabrskiy Raykom; Sigizmundas Shimkus, dean of the Vilnius Higher Party School and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Ionas Guretskas, personal pensioner and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Pyatras Stashkunas, chairman of the executive committee of the Kaunas City Soviet of People's Deputies; Ivan Mikhalkevich, first secretary of the Vilnyusskiy Raykom and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Valeriyonas Kubilyus, first secretary of the Kretingskiy Raykom and member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Algimantas Stankyavichyus, editor of the newspaper MUSU RUPESCHYAY and candidate of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; and Vladas Butenas, member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, delivered a speech at the plenum.

The plenum passed a resolution.

The plenum nominated for the republic electoral commission for the election of deputies to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet the following representatives of the Lithuanian Communist Party: Vatslovas Litvinas, first secretary of the Kayshyadorskiy Raykom, and Vladas Nikitinas, first deputy minister of justice of the Lithuanian SSR.

An appeal of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee to all voters, party and public organizations, movements, and the work force was adopted.

Vladimir Babichev, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department; Aleksandr Degtyarev, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Ideology Department; and Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee National Relations Department, took part in the plenum.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee 22d Plenum concluded.

Komsomol Secretary on Congress, Draft Statute

90UN0209A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 89 p 2

[Address of Komsomol Central Committee Secretary V. Zyukin: "On the Convocation of the 21st Komsomol Congress, Principles of Forming the Komsomol Central Organs, and the Draft Komsomol Statutes"; date and place not given]

[Text] You recall at the preceding plenum of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee that a decision was made on the necessity to conduct the 21st Komsomol Congress during the spring of 1990, and the plenum also charged the Central Committee Bureau with the development of new procedures for electing congress delegates.

Allow me to express the views of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau on this question.

First, regarding convocation of the 21st Komsomol Congress. The proposal is being introduced that it be convened on 11 April 1990 in Moscow. What are the reasons for this particular time? We know that an extremely important campaign in the sociopolitical life of our country—the elections of people's deputies of union and autonomous republics, and of deputies of local soviets—will have been completed by that time.

Naturally it would be incorrect to convene a Komsomol [All- Union Leninist Communist Youth League] congress at a time when the efforts of Komsomol committees and Komsomol organizations will be directed toward nominating and electing their Komsomol and youth representatives to the bodies of soviets. It is proposed that the congress be conducted in the State Central Concert Hall.

Located in the Rossiya Hotel complex, this is one of the largest assembly halls in Moscow and can seat about 2,500. Naturally the question arises in the minds of many—why not in the Kremlin Palace? I wish to inform you that we delved into this matter but unfortunately the main assembly hall in the country—and this was reported over central television—will go into refurbishing in early 1990, primarily to be equipped with a modern balloting system. This work will continue until summer of the following year. In our view, the Central Concert Hall is even more suited for holding the congress by virtue of the fact that we propose to accommodate the delegates in the Rossiya Hotel.

Regarding the agenda for the 21st Komsomol Congress. The Bureau of the Central Committee proposes that the following main agenda issues be introduced for examination by the congress:

1. Report of the Komsomol Central Committee.
2. Report of the Komsomol Central Auditing Commission.
3. The Komsomol Program.
4. The Komsomol Statutes.
5. Komsomol central organs.

Congress delegates retain the right, naturally, to include other matters in the agenda which the congress deems advisable to examine. Considering the location of the congress, we believe we can establish the representational norm as one delegate per 16,000 Komsomol members. In support of the proposals on electing delegates, about which more will be said a bit later, the figures for Komsomol strength as of 1 October 1989—32,150,148 Komsomol members—lead us to propose that on the order of 2,000 delegates be elected to the congress. Complying with the instructions of the Eighth Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee, we believe it is possible by decision of the current plenum to establish a number of new procedural norms for electing delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress and expanding intra-league democracy, and to provide for guaranteed representation at the congress of Komsomol organizations of the country's autonomous entities. We propose to stipulate that delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress be elected by secret ballot, based on consideration of the views of the primary Komsomol organizations.

We propose to establish that Komsomol organizations of autonomous okrugs, oblasts, and republics directly elect delegates to the Komsomol congress; in this regard, organizations of autonomous okrugs whose membership is less than the representational norm will elect one delegate each. Of course, in these instances the membership of such Komsomol organizations directly electing delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress should not be included in determining the number of delegates from the membership of appropriate kray, oblast, and republic Komsomol organizations.

It is thus proposed to elect delegates based on a single representational norm of organization strength, as well as from Komsomol organizations of autonomous entities. Other exceptions are not envisioned.

In other respects, it is proposed that the right of determining election procedures be extended to the central committees of the LKSM's [Leninist Communist Youth Leagues] of the union republics, Komsomol kraykoms [kray committee] and obkoms [oblast committee], the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, political directorates of USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops, and USSR KGB border troops, and other military formations. But here it is the view of the Bureau of the Komsomol Central Committee that it would hardly be democratic to elect delegates to the Komsomol congress at meetings of bureaus, secretariats, or plenums of okrug, oblast, and kray Komsomol committees, and the central committees of LKSM union republics.

We must ensure democratic election procedures to the maximum degree possible.

In the Komsomol organizations of union republics having oblast divisions, election of delegates could be conducted at reports and election conferences of the oblast Komsomol organizations; in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]—at conferences of oblast, kray, and okrug organizations. In union republics not having oblast divisions, elections could be conducted at conferences of city and rayon Komsomol organizations and interrayon conferences, or at LKSM congresses and conferences of republic organizations—at the discretion, naturally, of the LKSM central committees of the union republics.

In union republics with mixed administrative divisions, this could be done at conferences of oblast, city, and rayon organizations, at interrayon conferences, or LKSM congresses, and at conferences of republic organizations, also at the discretion of the LKSM central committees of the union republics.

In the Komsomol organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy, internal troops of the USSR MVD, border troops of the USSR KGB, and other military formations—at conferences of Komsomol organizations of the services and branches of service of the Armed Forces, military and border districts, groups of forces, naval groups, appropriate troop formations.

We also do not exclude the possibility of electing delegates by so-called electoral okrugs, when all the Komsomol members of a rayon, city, oblast, kray, or republic participate in the voting.

We consider it permissible in certain instances to elect delegates at expanded plenums. In our view, this could apply to the plenums of LKSM central committees of union republics where there are no plans for convening a Komsomol congress prior to the 21st Komsomol Congress. But it is felt that such expanded plenums could be conducted with the participation of representational delegations of rayon and city organizations.

In concluding my treatment of this topic I stress once again that the procedure for electing delegates is the prerogative of the LKSM central committees of the union republics, Komsomol kraykoms and obkoms, and corresponding organs of the Army Komsomol.

It is proposed that on the order of 400 individuals be invited to participate in the work of the congress—including party and government leaders, the leaders of a number of committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, ministries and departments, all-union social organizations. In view of the fact that the congress will hear the reports of the Komsomol Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, we believe it would be possible to have members of the central electoral organs invited to the congress. Naturally this does not exclude the possibility of their being nominated or elected as congress delegates in local Komsomol organizations.

I will now address formation of the central electoral organs of the Komsomol.

We currently have a proposal for two variations of forming the central electoral organs. One of these is the traditional variant, where the delegates themselves formulate the proposal on the election of central electoral organs, and the electoral organs are elected from among their number. This is the way it has been and the way it is according to the present statutes. But in the process of working through these issues and drawing up the new draft Komsomol statutes, the view has begun to predominate that formation of the central electoral organs should involve the introduction of direct delegate selection from local Komsomol organizations to the central electoral organs. And, naturally, you and I cannot now determine conclusively which of the variants will be adopted by the congress. But we can develop procedures in our work preparatory to the congress that will enable the Komsomol congress itself to adopt either one variant or the other.

It is proposed that the new composition of the Komsomol Central Committee be formed to comprise 270 individuals, and the new composition of the Komsomol Central Control Organ—up to 70. In this regard, it is proposed that the institution of candidate membership in the Komsomol Central Committee be abolished.

We propose to elect the new composition of the Komsomol Central Committee by direct delegate selection based on representation from each union republic LKSM of three Central Committee members, and from each Komsomol organization of autonomous republic, autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrug, as well as from each kray and oblast Komsomol organization of the RSFSR and the Moscow city Komsomol organization—one Central Committee member. Three central committee members will be elected from the Komsomol organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy. In this manner, all republic, kray, oblast, and okrug Komsomol organizations, as well as the army and navy organizations, will be able to have guaranteed representation in the Komsomol Central Committee according to these quotas regardless of their strength.

Additionally it is proposed that a portion of the Komsomol Central Committee membership also be elected by direct delegate selection, taking into account the LKSM strength of union republics, kray and oblast Komsomol organizations of the RSFSR, and Komsomol organizations of the armed forces, in accordance with the representational norm of one central committee member per 200,000 Komsomol members. In this regard, the strength of the Komsomol organizations of autonomous entities which comprise part of republic, kray, and oblast organizations is not included in determining the number of persons recommended for membership in the Komsomol Central Committee from the corresponding republic, kray, and oblast organization.

I will now address formation of the Central Control Organ of the Komsomol.

The Bureau of the Central Committee believes that in view of its proposed functions and authority, it could be formed not on the basis of direct delegate selection, but be elected at the Komsomol congress itself. Candidates could be nominated to this organ by republic, kray, and oblast Komsomol organizations. It is also proposed that the right of determining procedures for electing candidates to the Komsomol Central Committee be extended to the LKSM central committees of the union republics, to Komsomol kraykoms, obkoms, and okruzhkoms [okrug committee].

We consider it unacceptable, just as I stated earlier, that candidates be recommended by decision of secretariats, bureaus, and plenums of Komsomol committees.

Since the Komsomol statutes presently in effect do not provide for the conduct of direct elections of Komsomol Central Committee members, a final decision on their authority—I repeat once again—can be made only by the Komsomol congress. If the congress declines to apply this principle of direct delegate selection, then the Central Committee can be elected based on candidate recommendations from the Komsomol organizations.

I will now address the matter of drawing up the new draft wording of the Komsomol statutes.

At the last plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee, together we determined the basic orientation for developing the new version of Komsomol statutes. This became the starting point for the commission in drawing up three versions of the statutes. The theses here contained were published at the beginning of September in the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

I would like to inform you that 26 sets of draft statutes were submitted to the commission, including both individual and collective efforts. Over 800 proposals and

commentaries were received from Komsomol organizations, Komsomol members, and young people pertaining to the current statutes and published drafts. Analysis reveals that the issues subject to the greatest debate were those concerning the aims and substance of Komsomol activity, its functions, structural models, mutual relationship between center and locality, membership in the Komsomol, procedures governing the formation and functioning of electoral organs, and determination of Komsomol ownership.

Working groups set about taking all these proposals into account in working through their draft versions.

The document which has been presented to you is an attempt to summarize all the points of view we have available up through today regarding the renovation of our league.

Unfortunately it would be impossible to name all those who sent in proposals, and who are in fact coauthors of the draft presently under examination.

We plan to meet with the authors following the plenum and invite them to take part in further work on the Komsomol draft statutes.

The unity we have already achieved today in the understanding of a whole number of statute theses enables us to look rather optimistically at what lies ahead in our work on the draft. The authors of the three proposed variations reached agreement in their understanding of such important questions as the main goal of the Komsomol, the place and role of the Komsomol in society, in the country's political system, and in the youth movement, the relationship of the league with the CPSU and with the All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin, the rights and obligations of Komsomol members in primary Komsomol organizations, the exclusive competence of the youth leagues, and the majority of positions with respect to determination of the norms and principles of membership in the Komsomol, and the formation and activity of Komsomol central organs, as well as a number of other issues.

In consideration of this, and having examined the working group proposals, the commission of the Komsomol Central Committee has decided to present before the Ninth Central Committee Plenum one draft version of the Komsomol statutes, which includes both unified approaches as well as proposals for which there are various points of view, designating these as alternatives.

The commission believes that following discussion of the draft statutes with alternatives at the current plenum, taking observations and proposals into account, they can be published in the youth press for discussion in the country's Komsomol organizations.

Laanem Addresses Estonian Komsomol Congress

90UN0509A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 25 Nov 89 pp 1, 2

[Speech by First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia Urmas Laanem at its 21st Congress]

[Text]

Communique

Yesterday, the 21st Congress of the LKSME [Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia] began its proceedings at the House of Political Education of the CPE [Communist Party of Estonia] Central Committee. The following issues are on the agenda:

1. On the path of development traveled by the VLKSM [All- Union Leninist Communist Youth League] of Estonia and the activities of the LKSME Central Committee in the period between the congresses.
2. A report of the audit commission of the LKSME.
3. On the existence of the LKSME.
4. On the further potential of the LKSME.

First Secretary of the LKSME Urmas Laanem made a report speech.

Chairman of the Audit Commission Aleksandr Katayev made a report on its activities.

A sharp and prolonged discussion developed concerning the resolutions, three of which were adopted by a majority vote. These are the resolution on decisions about the Communist Youth Union and on youth organizations active in Estonia prior to 1940 (433 delegates voted in favor, five were opposed, and 15 abstained), the resolution of the 21st LKSME Congress on evaluating the unification of the KSME [Communist Youth League of Estonia] and the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] (347 delegates voted in favor, 115 voted against, and 18 abstained), the resolution of the 21st LKSME Congress on Articles 6 and 7 of the ESSR [Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution (436 delegates voted in favor, seven were opposed, and 25 abstained). The texts will be published in the next issue.

In the evening, the delegates embarked on discussing the draft resolution of the 21st LKSME Congress on the independence of the LKSME which was adopted (427 votes in favor, two votes against, and 18 abstentions).

The following took part in the proceedings of the congress: First Secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee V. Mironenko, CPE Central Committee Secretaries, Members of the CPE Central Committee Bureau N. Ganyushov and M. Titma, First Secretary of the Tallinn City CPE Committee, member of the CPE Central Committee Bureau E.-A. Sillari, First Deputy Chairman of the ESSR Council of Ministers A. Soydla, Secretary of the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet A. Almann, as well as guests of the congress—First Secretary of the

Central Committee of the Leninist Communist Youth League of Latvia I. Prieditis, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of Lithuania R. Shivis, and a delegation of the Free Youth League from Schwerin District in the GDR.

The proceedings of the congress will continue today.

Speech by First Secretary of the Estonian LKSM Central Committee Urmas Laanem

Dear fellow league members!

Our congress is beginning its proceedings on a day which is very significant for Estonia. The IME [Self-Managing Estonia] program which is very significant for us is being discussed in the USSR Supreme Soviet today.

This LKSME Congress should become a turning point in restoring the natural course of development of the youth movement in Estonia.

One cycle in the spiral of historic development of the Estonian Komsomol has come to an end. Being at a crossroads, we should acknowledge that acting in keeping with the dogmas existing in our society has taken our organization into a dead end.

The young people, and among others the Komsomol, are a segment of society. For many years, citizens of the Soviet Union were a toy in the hands of leaders who spouted utopian and indefinite slogans. They subjected the Komsomol, actually the youth organization of the party, to their careful supervision and dictate. The party which led, commanded, and guided us never seriously reckoned with the young people, and with the Komsomol in particular.

In reviewing the activities of the LKSME to this day and evaluating them, we will try to analyze soberly the path traveled, the mistakes, and the accomplishments.

What were our beginnings?

In 1917 and 1918, in the environment of the spreading ideology of the revolutionary movement, several societies and clubs of a social-democratic persuasion began activities in Estonia.

A subsequent German occupation and hostilities interrupted their active work. In 1920, after the Peace Treaty of Tartu was signed, the CPE which was operating in the underground began to set up a youth union. It succeeded in rallying a large segment of the young people who adhered to socialist ideals. In this manner, the movement lost its independence and the element of creativity. Under the leadership of the party, they prepared for just one thing—the overthrow of the existing state system. After an unsuccessful coup attempt on 1 December 1924 the activities of the KSME were curtailed. We may say that from 1932 on there was no Communist Youth League in Estonia.

In the summer of 1940, the Soviet Union resorted to aggression, occupation of the Estonian Republic and its annexation. A new state system was established. The young people, as well as the entire people, had mixed views of what was happening. Many people viewed with mistrust and hostility the elimination of the Estonian Republic which followed soon after the incorporation of Estonia into the USSR. However, there were representatives of the young people who regarded the socialist ideals as their goal; in an effort to fulfill their aspirations, they began to search for ways to create their organization. As early as July, the CPE established its control over the youth movement of Estonia. A decree dated 31 July eliminated all student organizations. At the same time, the activities of rural youth organizations were discontinued. On 16 August, the newspaper KOMMUNIST wrote about the work of various youth organizations in the past tense, and appealed to young people to rally in an integral organization, "to organize all the disunited young people of Estonia" were published. The decision to restore (actually, to create anew) the KSME channeled all the activities of organized young people into the same mold as that of the CPE.

The KSME was created strictly from the top, and in the course of this its dependence on the Communist Party was emphasized, as well as activities under the guidance of the CPE exclusively on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist view of the world.

Many young people joined the Komsomol because a large segment of them could not conceive of what forthcoming Stalinist socialism would be like.

The events developed in a manner typical of this time. On 8 October 1940, the CPE was admitted to the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]. On 18 October, the KSME was admitted to the VLKSM together with the communist youth unions. The elimination of a legally separate organization occurred. This was done in violation of both the legal and organizational rules. Thus, the KSME was admitted to the VLKSM in the capacity of a collective member which was not envisaged by the VLKSM Statute. This was not discussed with rank-and-file KSME members prior to the change in the affiliation of the organization. Moreover, to this day a petition by the Estonian Komsomol to join the VLKSM has not been found in the archives. A communique on the decision made on 18 October was published in the newspapers only on 23 November. What was this time needed for? Was this quite important step discussed in organizations? No, they waited for the endorsement of the decision by the VKP(b) Central Committee. After komsomol members found out that they had been members of another organization for more than a month, individual admissions to the VLKSM by way of an exchange of membership cards began.

Certainly, these events need to be viewed in the context of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the events which followed them. The admission of the KSME to the VLKSM was treated so lightly that they

did not even try to endow it with even a semblance of legality. During the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union, such an attempt was made, after all.

Thus, the Communist Party deprived the young people twice of an opportunity to act independently. In essence, the Komsomol has always been the youth organization of the party but actually the party did not need it, and the young people themselves do not need it and do not take it seriously.

During various periods of history the LKSME was used as a tool for implementing first Stalinist and subsequently stagnation ideology and policies. What has been done frequently not on the initiative of the LKSME has greatly blemished the league, and this is unavoidably associated with the present-day LKSME.

The causes which have led the organization into its present-day quandary date decades back in many cases. It may be that a key to overcoming the current situation can also be found there.

Respected delegates! About 3 years ago, the 20th LKSME Congress was held in this very auditorium. The third year of perestroyka was beginning, but Estonia had not yet awakened. The plenum of the creative arts union had not been held yet; neither the People's Front nor other social movements existed yet. The issue of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the evaluation of the 1940 events had not yet been brought to the attention of the public.

The association of the Komsomol with all social structures did not allow the Komsomol members and young people to break out of the limits circumscribed for them and embark on the path of radical changes. Past decades and the state command and control mechanism have clearly defined the position of the LKSME in the system of social relations. The fact that the Komsomol is referred to as the trailer in matters of social renewal is not an accusation but a confirmation of the truth.

We are in a situation when we can no longer refer to a decline in the authority of the Komsomol. It is clear that a profound crisis has occurred. At the last congress, a critical tone was felt but the criticism was accompanied by statements that with a different approach everything can be changed. By now, many of the problems of that time are no more, and not because we have solved them, or they have disappeared. In a certain sense, life itself has helped us extricate ourselves from trouble.

We had to handle a tremendous amount of work which actually is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, the Committee for Physical Culture and Sports, the Ministry of Culture, the DOSAAF [All-Union Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and the Navy], and even the Ministry of Construction. If the so-called central organs had accomplished the tasks entrusted to them the Komsomol would not have had the least opportunity to join in this. Unfortunately, the entire society was designed with the existence of the Komsomol in view. Insofar as activities in some sphere affected young people they were automatically transferred to the jurisdiction of the Komsomol. This is how many measures were doomed to neglect from the very beginning.

The orientation toward Komsomol activities in all spheres actually amounted to the orientation toward depoliticizing the activities of the Youth League.

The Estonian Student Brigade, the league of school students, and the Sputnik Tourist Bureau set themselves up and operated under the auspices of the LKSME because for a while no initiative of the young people was conceived outside the Komsomol. At present, they have constituted or are constituting themselves as independent small enterprises.

Since the 20th VLKSM Congress in 1987, the Komsomol is no longer considered a mass organization. Nonetheless, concern is expressed about a decline in membership. Hardly anyone can say where the decline in membership will stop. Before 1986, the number of members in the VLKSM in Estonia increased. By the last congress, in early 1987, approximately 166,000 people were on the rolls; at present, there are approximately 100,000. The statistics do not reflect well the real number of Komsomol members and the actual condition of the organization. It is still unknown how many young people belong to the Komsomol exactly because they want to belong to this organization and how many of them retain their membership perfunctorily. According to the results of a Maynor public opinion survey, more than four percent of those polled support the Komsomol in Estonia. Therefore, we are the least popular and accepted organization in Estonia. Perhaps, most of those present in this auditorium have experienced this themselves.

Naturally, the failure to pay membership dues is directly associated with the above. Arrangements for the payment of membership dues only work if they are withheld from wages or in cases where the sense of duty still survives. On the whole, it is not believed that it is necessary to support an organization the activities of which are, putting it mildly, obscure for many people.

Reductions in the number of members and the funds taken in as membership dues have determined the size of the Komsomol apparatus. The staff of the Komsomol apparatus in city and rayon committees has been considerably reduced. The apparatus of the LKSME Central Committee was reduced by one-half early this year. At present, its staff is smaller still. Due to this, the channel through which control was exercised and the command mechanism operated between the Central Committee and the city and rayon committees, as well as at the rayon level, has become narrower. The discontinuation of pressure from above has created prerequisites for the free self-determination of the young people. Thus far, the appearance of new youth organizations and the admission of young people to them are not registered despite our having acknowledged that we are one of several

youth organizations and our having renounced our claim to the monopoly representation of the interests of the young people by the Komsomol. Total organization has erased the personality of young people. Apparently, they will need time in order to awaken.

As recently as several years ago, the critics of the Komsomol demanded the right to freely leave the organization and took issue with particular avenues of Komsomol activities and its principles whereas at now silence prevails in this sphere, and not at all because these shortcomings have been eliminated or because the young people have resigned themselves to this situation. One cannot try endlessly to run his head through the wall. There is a limit at some point, and beyond it there is indifference. We have already crossed this line. When at the May plenum of the Central Committee this year we allowed all those who wished to officially leave the Komsomol, a flare-up in self-expulsions did not follow. Obviously, those to whom belonging to the Komsomol still had some significance were the ones to write up statements on leaving the Komsomol. The main segment [of members] just gave it up. Certainly, considerations in favor of their staying in the VLKSM are many but their silence and indifference are indication enough. A considerable segment of those who are technically members of the LKSME have not felt bound by their league affiliation for a long time now.

We have to fully grasp old things in order to discuss new things. What has brought about the present situation of the Komsomol? Of course, the reasons for the crisis are not only in the Komsomol itself.

We have come to understand that ideals thus far constituting the foundation of a socialist society have turned out to be too abstract and cannot provide inspiration in daily life. We acknowledge that a serious improvement in the situation in our country is possible only if serious changes occur in all spheres of public life. To this end, it is necessary first of all to renounce a number of political and ideological myths and fictions which themselves are doomed to be destroyed. We should proceed from objective laws of social development, we should think soberly, logically, and analytically.

Apparently, the young people are presently considering which principles lie closest to their hearts, and whether they want to belong to a particular organization at all. We should also duly acknowledge the fact that at present, at the current stage of history, it is very complicated to substantiate the desire to belong precisely to the Communist Youth League. There is no confidence in accomplishing the goals set forth in the name and statute of the organization, to say nothing about the fact that even the brightest theoreticians cannot link the original principles to reality. Under such circumstances, the motivation for being active in the ranks of the Komsomol is quite weak or altogether absent. The young people find an outlet for their activities and self-expression in the organizations and movements which have appeared in Estonia under contemporary conditions. Their novelty is significant because they have not yet been spoiled organizationally.

The communist ideals have not been changed in our country since the beginning of the century. Their interpretation has changed, but there has been no way for them to develop. They were the guiding directive both for the party and the youth league. Dialectical development of the theory was sidestepped; directives for a particular period were accepted as dogmas not open to criticism. Their strength depended on the strength of the operating state (and simultaneously party) mechanism of control.

Everything developed smoothly and without problems for as long as a system hampering any reflections on the foundations of our society prevailed. The school, the October, pioneer, and komsomol organizations, and the state propaganda machine brought up a young man in such a way that he thought only in one direction, proceeded toward communism, and did not doubt the main postulates. Thus, until very recently the party and the Komsomol were infallible apostles. This was merely for show. Double standards reigned supreme, and words and deeds were two separate things. The LKSME which followed the course of the party and the Komsomol could not itself have become a leader even if it had had sufficient potential. Here is one of the phrases uttered at the last congress: If you run in front of a steam locomotive you may end up under its wheels. This was very eloquent testimony to our place and dependence on the Big System.

Following the closure of all other youth organizations in 1940, the Estonian Komsomol became the representative of all young people. All work done with the young people was entrusted without hesitation to the Komsomol which became sort of a ministry for youth affairs. In the course of this, the Komsomol had to handle it all having limited rights, only retained dues, and unprofessional cadres. It is no surprise that many initiatives remained just that.

A note: The lack of professionalism of the Komsomol cadres is not the greatest problem. If the level of professionalism among Komsomol functionaries were the same as that of party bureaucrats the degree of suppression of Komsomol members would be higher. Changing functionaries brought with them non-bureaucratized trends.

Under the conditions of instability (I mean the economic recession), the young people who do not have long years of accumulated experience and financial assets are particularly vulnerable. This is also the case with the thus far absent state youth policy. For decades, our society denied the increase in the social and economic inequality of young people compared to other social groups and their peculiarities.

In a normal society, all institutes should take into account the interests of the entire population, including young people. In this manner, the need for some kind of

a department which fills the vacuum and operates like a fire brigade eliminating the outbreaks of fire caused by the carelessness or indifference of others would be eliminated. Unfortunately, our society is far from ideal. Unless we urge it nobody is going to take the interests of young people into account.

No matter how hard the LKSME tried most of its proposals were essentially not given support in the executive organs of power. There is no efficient mechanism for the participation by Komsomol members and the Komsomol as a whole in the socio-political life of the republic.

This is why we should consider necessary the existence of a state youth organ which would be in charge of youth problems regardless of anyone's interests. A draft new structure of the government of Estonia has a youth department, among others. This department is to receive the information which it needs for its operation from the new youth chamber which will soon open at the parliament and which should receive all the thoughts and wishes of the young people.

In the ESSR Constitution, the Komsomol needs to be replaced in the political system by actually operating youth organizations which in keeping with their statutes participate in governing society. The youth department should become a part of this mechanism which ensures at the state level equal rights for aspirations regardless of ideological convictions and affiliation with a particular organization.

The Komsomol lacks independence to a considerable degree, despite having at its disposal an independent developed structure at all levels. This is set forth in the Komsomol Statute—the Komsomol considers implementing the CPSU Program to be its goal.

The independence of the LKSME was restricted by the need to coordinate its activities with the party on the one hand, and with the Komsomol Central Committee on the other hand. Relations between the party and the VLKSM are explained in the title of the 1984 resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of the Party Guidance of VLKSM and Enhancement of Its Role in the Communist Education of Young People." Despite the implementation of this resolution having been another campaign, the title speaks for itself. The resolution signed by K. Chernenko turned out to be the last attempt to unilaterally determine the relationship between the party and the Komsomol.

It was enough to look into history to determine the role of the party in the creation of the Komsomol. From the very beginning, the Komsomol was the bearer of the Communist ideology and its apologist among the young people; it acted as an integral part of the totalitarian system. In the process, the prestige, role, and significance of the Komsomol were closely tied to the leading role of the Communist Party in our society. History indicates that this role was based on fear and force to a great degree.

In light of everything said above, the Komsomol was not able to become an organization which united the advanced segment of the young people. This definition in the statute was utopian and unrealistic from the very beginning because a large share of the young people cannot be considered a vanguard, as was the case for many years.

Another plank of the statute also turned out to be declarative: The Komsomol is an active assistant and reserve of the party. The Komsomol was an assistant primarily on the order and instructions of the party rather than on the initiative of the young people themselves. Probably, very few young people considered themselves the reserve of the party when they joined the Komsomol. Party statistics as well testify to the reduction in admissions to the party through the Komsomol. Here again, mistakes cannot be sought only in the activities of the Komsomol. In keeping with the overall system, a rigid, centralized system of management, as well as a departure from the Leninist principles of leading a youth organization, entailed gross mistakes in work, proclaiming and forgetting initiatives in the Komsomol. With a view to avoiding doubts and dissent, all actions were accompanied by a propaganda racket which influenced the consciousness of people.

The ideological and indoctrination role of the Komsomol in the environment of the pressure policy has virtually been brought to naught by now. Older people and former members of the Komsomol remember it, and this is exactly why it is being criticized now by the present-day LKSME.

For decades now, values as important for the development of a society as culture, education, and science took a back seat on the scale of values of Soviet man. They were treated lopsidedly, without understanding that it was on them rather than political indoctrination work that the future of our society depended.

It was exactly the ethical aspect of social life that deteriorated profoundly despite loud discourses on the Moral Code of the Builder of Communism. Together with the power of Stalin, first repressions against innocent people came to Estonia. In other forms, the process went on in the 1960's and 1970's, and young people's values were affected by the doublethink, mendacity, self-seeking, corruption, and the cult of personality and of power which prevailed in the upper echelons of society.

During this, the young people as a segment of the social system were an object of state and party policy, especially the LKSME. We have yet to become a subject of social development.

With reference to the causes of the crisis following from the activities of the LKSME itself and its status, we

should name as the foremost of them the status of the LKSME as a territorial unit of the VLKSM which did not have the rights of a separate organization.

In intra-organization work, members of the Komsomol were treated as a homogenous mass devoid of personality, age, and sex differences. The Komsomol transmitted the same instructions to all regions without taking into account that locally they should have found their own methods and forms of work, and in many cases, their own content. Ignoring the cultural and ethnic context and local traditions brought about the situation when an initiative originated somewhere was to include everyone mandatorily.

It became a habit to act on instructions from above which unavoidably hampered local initiative and freedom of action in the field. Reporting from the bottom up turned into a mere formality and satisfied the needs of bureaucrats alone. They strove to copy corresponding procedures in the party as completely as possible as far as paper-pushing and reporting were concerned.

When they recently started demanding a greater youth orientation from the Komsomol in the most significant party forums, we wanted to respond by noting that the Komsomol did not become non-youth of its own will.

It is possible that not all of the aforementioned deformations fully affected each Komsomol member. Komsomol functionaries played the role of a filter in many cases.

There are few specially trained Komsomol functionaries; therefore, we frequently had to jump into the water at an unknown spot. As a rule, Komsomol functionaries did not stay in the apparatus for a long time. Hence the fortuity in cadre recruitment and lack of professionalism. Only now do we begin to understand that the Komsomol also has a field for real political activities which calls for appropriate expertise and political experience, or at least such disposition. It was mainly the people viewing Komsomol work as a way to apply their resources and energy who got involved in such work because for many decades the Komsomol was the only opportunity for the legal socio- political self-expression for the young people. Thus, many young people tried to change the situation they found themselves in. We would hardly be discussing such issues at the current congress if there were no such Komsomol functionaries. It is no secret that the school of Komsomol work graduated young people who did not just gain the experience of socio-political work but who also acquired quite a few negatives. They attempted to handle the impracticable: To make something out of nothing, to ensure the impossible. Naturally, a young man could not avoid the influence of the system within which he worked. Bureaucracy, formalism, and a lopsided approach to issues obviously were an influence on many Komsomol functionaries.

All of the above suggests that the LKSME is in a situation which cannot be overcome by eliminating some specific shortcomings. An entire string of comprehensive problems is obvious, and they may be solved only by principled measures. While analyzing the entire course of LKSME activities, its association with all structures of society, we arrive at the conclusion that the quandary in which the Komsomol of Estonia has found itself is legitimate. Demands to unconditionally dissolve the LKSME are heard in some quarters. At first sight, this indeed might seem to be a way out. However, these are still naive demands which assume that, supposedly, all LKSME members agree. Our time calls for an approach which takes reality into account. We should acknowledge that the young people interested in a communist league are not that few, and that most of them advocate restructuring the current LKSME.

By now, conferences have been held in cities and rayons at which points of view have been stated on the future of both the local organizations and the republic organization as a whole. Not one conference has expressed satisfaction with the current state of affairs in the LKSME.

Fifteen conferences out of 27 have recognized the activities of the LKSME to be exhausted, and the decision has been made to discontinue their existence following the completion of a period of transition.

The congress will draw its conclusions based on this and evaluate LKSME activities.

Several platforms submitted to the congress include demands to discontinue LKSME activities. If we look into the situation which has emerged in Estonia we can conclude that the LKSME operating along old lines has already ceased to exist. All we have to do is to discuss how to proceed.

We see in the future an independent organization with its own statute and program. The delegates at 10 conferences stated the need to have rayon organizations with their statutes and programs. In some of the organizations, drafts of the main documents are already being developed, and the formation of independent rayon organizations has already begun.

Mutual relations between the Estonian Komsomol and the Komsomol existing to date have been viewed as unnecessary at an absolute majority of conferences. The variant of belonging to the Komsomol in the capacity of an independent organization—a member of the Union of Komsomol Organizations is considered logical.

"An independent organization" was one of the phrases characteristic of the conferences. Independence does not mean secession or self-imposed isolation.

For now, there is no unity in the matter of original principles for the independent organization. Some support the concept of the Communist Youth League, others, taking our time into account, lean toward the

principle of a youth organization operating on a general democratic basis. Solving this problem calls for a very serious approach by the delegates.

What is to be done next?

The implementation of the IME calls for qualitative changes. Therefore, the youth organization also has to change; it is to become an association of young people thinking along the lines of economic accountability.

We may lay the groundwork for a qualitatively new organization. The fact that the organization operating to date has exhausted its own development potential is the prerequisite for this. Objective conditions for the emergence of the new organization are obvious. They include the young people themselves, current members of the LKSME, and the traditions of the Komsomol.

The most important point is that the organization, or several organizations, which appear in the future should be firmly established and should take into account the interests of Estonia and of the young people belonging to this organization first of all.

Proceeding from the resolutions adopted at the conferences, the new organization should be independent and should have its own program.

However, with reference to the new youth league we should understand that it cannot be created by our congress. It will be created by the young people themselves, by those who need this league. Time will tell what the readiness, the need for it, and the results are going to be.

Estonian Komsomol Congress Resolutions

90UN0507A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 29 Nov 89 p 1

[Text]

Resolution of the 21st Estonian LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League] "On the Independence of the Estonian LKSM"

The Estonian Leninist Communist Youth League was formed in 1940 by a decision of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee Bureau, by which the KSME [Estonian Communist Youth League] was incorporated in the VLKSM. Since the time it was formed the LKSME [Estonian Leninist Communist Youth League] has been a territorial part of the VLKSM—the sole youth organization legalized in the USSR Constitution.

Centralized and administrative policy has led all of Soviet society into a state of profound crisis, which has encompassed the VLKSM also. The LKSME, as a territorial part of the VLKSM and obedient assistant and reserve of the CPSU, has been a conduit of this policy in the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

The lack of trust between the organization and its members, the loss of influence and authority in society and the crisis of ideology and also the deadlocked economic situation—these are the signs currently characterizing the LKSME.

Organizations are demanding fundamental changes in the aims of activity, the criteria of evaluation of this activity, structure and membership.

The ESSR Supreme Soviet declaration "Sovereignty of the ESSR" of 16 November 1988 was a turning point in the development of the republic's political system. This requires the independence of all democratic institutions of society progressing toward sovereignty, the LKSME included.

The right of ultimate decision on questions of the further outlook and strategy of development of the LKSME belongs to the LKSME itself.

Taking as a basis the wishes of the members of the league expressed in the decisions of the conferences of rayon and city organizations and the decision of the 21st LKSME Congress "Evaluation of the Amalgamation of the KSME with the VLKSM" and not waiting for the 21st VLKSM Congress, the 21st LKSME Congress resolves:

1. To declare the LKSME independent.

2. From the time of adoption of this decision to consider as members of the LKSME all members of the VLKSM registered in LKSME organizations.

3. To emphasize particularly that this decree guarantees each member of the LKSME the right to freely determine his attitude toward the LKSME, the VLKSM and other organizations.

Resolution of the 21st LKSME Congress on Articles 6 and 7 of the ESSR Constitution

Considering the need to specify equal opportunities for all public organizations and movements for participation in Estonia's sociopolitical system, the 21st LKSME Congress supports the proposals concerning the exclusion of Article 6 from the ESSR Constitution.

The congress proposes replacement of the VLKSM in the political system of the ESSR Constitution (Articles 7 and 89) with all youth organizations which participate, in accordance with their statutory assignments, in leadership of the state and society and also in the solution of political, economic, social and cultural questions.

The 21st LKSME Congress will submit the above proposals at the next ESSR Supreme Soviet session by way of a legislative initiative.

Resolution of the 21st LKSME Congress on Decisions on the KSME and on the Youth Organizations Which Operated in Estonia up to 1940

Taking as the basis what is presented in the report of the commission formed by the LKSME Central Committee for historical evaluation of the creation and activity of the KSME, the 21st LKSME Congress affirms that:

1) The KSME came to be formed anew in July 1940 on the initiative of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. The youth organizations of the times of the Estonian Republic, regardless of their thrust and principles of activity, were liquidated on the basis of legal provisions and decisions adopted subsequently.

2) By a decision of the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau of 18 October 1940 "Questions of the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] Organizations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia" the KSME was accepted as a republic organization in the VLKSM. This ended the activity of the KSME as an independent youth organization, and the LKSME—the territorial organization of the VLKSM in the ESSR—was formed from its existing members.

Taking as a basis the ESSR Supreme Soviet decree "Historical-Legal Evaluation of the Events Which Occurred in Estonia in 1940," the 21st LKSME Congress deems it necessary to revise all the legal provisions and decisions adopted in 1940 pertaining to the activity and liquidation of the youth organizations.

To entrust revision of the legal provisions and decisions to a body created at the congress. To submit the findings to the ESSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for a historicl and legal evaluation of the liquidation of the youth organizations.

Decision of the 21st LKSME Congress "Evaluation of the KSME's Amalgamation With the VLKSM"

Based on the decision of the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau "Questions of the Komsomol Organizations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia," on 18 October 1940 the KSME was accepted into the VLKSM. Upon the adoption of this decision:

1) The KSME was accepted into the VLKSM as the youth organization of the union republic. The decision of the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau was not in keeping with the rule adopted at the 10th VLKSM Congress (21 April 1936), which made no provision for the admittance of collective members (Komsomol organizations) to the VLKSM.

2) Wishes concerning the incorporation of the KSME in the VLKSM and also the corresponding wishes of members of the KSME formulated by an appropriate decision of the highest body of the KSME were lacking. The KSME Central Committee and its leadership lacked the authority from members of the organization for a decision on the question of the KSME's entry into the VLKSM.

From what has been adduced above and taking as a basis the ESSR Supreme Soviet decision of 12 November 1989 "Historical-Legal Evaluation of the Events Which Occurred in Estonia in 1940," the 21st LKSME Congress resolves: To recognize as invalid the KSME's amalgamation with the VLKSM—effected without the expression of the wishes and decisions of the members of the KSME and the highest collegial bodies.

Estonian Komsomol Dissolution Plans Viewed

90UN0501A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by G. Sapozhnikova, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent, Tallinn: "A Transitional Age? Epilogue to the Congress of the Komsomol of Estonia"]

[Text] And the next morning, when the ardor of 2 days of work of the republic's Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] congress subsided, it was found that it is no longer necessary to pay dues. That is, you can, and, of course, no one will stop you. But you are not obligated either. Because the Komsomol, in the old sense of the word, no longer exists. There is a temporary executive secretariat, which was established basically in order to "dissolve" properly. There is a period, called transitional, to 1 March 1990...

In principle, it is not a matter of dues, because practically none were now coming into the republic Komsomol treasury. Also, everyone has already gotten accustomed to the idea that the organization is living its last days, and no one expects a recovery. But suddenly it became sorrowful for some reason, like the sorrow of leaving home, where a childhood was spent.

Apparently, similar feelings also visited a part of the "non-union" youth, whom no one recently tried to persuade to join the Komsomol. Otherwise then, according to statements of the secretaries of Tallinn raykoms [rayon party committee], why did the pupils of the Russian language schools flock to the Komsomol? From a feeling of defiance? And if the congress adopted still another provision in the decree—to stop enrollment in the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]—an explosion would have occurred here, and the youth, recalling revolutionary songs, would have moved under a red banner to establish communist cells...

But, thanks to collective wisdom, the decree adopted by the 21st congress of the LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League] of Estonia, in addition to a guaranteed end, did not reject variants either. If by 1 March, organizations are assembled that are formed from the LKSME, who held a constituent assembly and also submitted a constituent document, perhaps they will become the legal successors of today's LKSME. If not, then other successors will be found for the machines, tables, minds, and other property.

After just a day, recovering from the congressional hypnosis (voting, re-voting, discussions of commas and

periods in documents for hours at a time: "Down with the editorial commission and the presidium at one time, we will do it ourselves, ourselves, ourselves...") both the "right" and the "left" understood in the end what a brilliant centrist formulation they had adopted. Brilliant, because everyone understands it in his own way: "To declare a transitional period in the LKSME to 1 March 1990, after whose expiration consider the activity of the LKSME ended, based on the regulations currently in force." To put it briefly, the wolves are sated, and the sheep are whole. On the one hand, they demonstrated their independence and, on the other hand, all that has to be done is to change the form of the regulations currently in force—and the union is alive!

Alar Pandis, secretary of the Komsomol committee of Tartu University, at the 24th minute of the congress, and to the applause of his countrymen, was the first to raise the question of the existence of the LKSME; Sergey Nemets director of one of the enterprises, reproached the secretariat of the Central Committee for the lack of a clear program of action in the period between congresses, and he unexpectedly interceded for the secretaries of the Central Committee, reminding the congress that a year ago they were prepared for changes, and very radical ones, but the different level of democratic emancipation of members of the Central Committee of the LKSME did not permit them to act boldly.

The congress was not declared extraordinary, although that is what it was—in its essence, intensity, rhythm, and illogic. Well, where, tell me, is the logic here: We work the entire first day "at full throttle," and we argue until we are exhausted. We adopt three very important resolutions and one decree. Thus we are now completely independent, and our entry in 1940 into the VLKSM was incompetent; moreover, we are proposing to change the seventh article of the constitution and are even looking into the sixth... That is, we are thinking about the future of the LKSME, is that right? It turns out that everything is otherwise: It was necessary to win independence not in order to live independently, but to die, not talking things over with the center. That's what.

And the euphoria from the "granted" democracy seemingly was supposed to have passed already, and the time of demagogy even more so, but just imagine... Some try to prove: "We do not have a right to vote for the preservation of the organization" (Khelve Mind), and others object: "We cannot eliminate it and decide everyone's fate" (Nikolay Gogulan). At what level is this division—national or political?

However, the congress, nonetheless, arrived at certain agreements. Thus, Estonia does not need a mass youth organization now. It would even be unethical to compel people who think differently to join under one banner. The LKSME, by a decision of the delegates of the congress, is not dissolving itself, it is not being done away with (neither from above nor from below), and its members are parting as friends, reserving the right of all "wings" to grow feathers and to form their own organizations on the basis of the old LKSME. Two of them can be named specifically, the Communist Union of Youth of Estonia and the Union of Youth of Estonia. (Generally speaking, four political directions were talked about at the congress, but under the cover of the Program for the Renewal of the LKSME, presented by the staff of the Central Committee and the Provisional Creative Collective, no one is now in a hurry to convene, and the supporters of the dissolution of the Komsomol, aptly called the "liquidators," can unite in their own separate organization, perhaps with a profound sense of humor).

This is really the greatest success of the congress: The political opponents did not rush swiftly with emotional ecstasy to rewrite the program in order to differ from each other radically—each one kept to his own. And the programs, if you look into them, coincide when it comes to the very important positions! Namely, all of them, irrespective of political sympathy and nationalities, recognize the multiplicity of youth organizations in the republic, are standing up for sovereignty, and attribute the same important significance to the meaning of depoliticization of the youth, and, the main thing is that it is being built on a healthy and humanistic foundation that is understood by everyone!

We talked about this with Mikkom Titma, secretary of the Central Committee of the KPE [Communist Party of Estonia] for ideology; he explained the demarcation mechanism this way: "Before the Komsomol congress, there was a real danger that a conflict would arise between the Estonians and non-Estonians. But the congress, nonetheless, was conducted on the basis of a political dispute. What is the difference? Some see in the Komsomol a symbol of the former, and they therefore yell: 'Down, down!' For others the problem of the VLKSM is identified with the problem of the entry of Estonia into the union; therefore, they support the idea of a Komsomol even on the most general questions.

For a long time, sociologists, journalists who cover Estonia,, and simply interested persons, tried to answer this one question: "But why does the youth of the republic not participate in politics?" Why were the attempts to create a youth section in the Popular Front, in the Intermovement, and even in the totally peaceful "greens" not crowned with success? There were many conjectures, but clear answers—alas. Afterwards, when the republic was caught up in a whirlwind of meetings and strikes, everyone heaved a sigh of relief: "Thank heaven that youth is not participating." Because if the most impressionable and emotional part of society took up placards, the spring could finally snap, and then...

Sociologists today state that the young people are tired of politicization, and, therefore, a change is taking place in life's fundamental priorities. They are becoming humane, perhaps. The home, prosperity, a garden, a family, and quiet and favorite work... And no ideologue here will prove that being poor, proud, and idealistically

fired up is better than being a person who is rich and not interested in rallies and meetings...

What will happen now? It is difficult to make predictions—given today's tension in the republic and given the general solemn fear of the initiation of economic independence (such as what occurs before a dive into cold water in a world championship, and the viewers are watching, and watching...).

But I would not begin to dramatize election time. The initiators of the future Communist Union of Youth of Estonia and the Union of Youth of Estonia announce that they recognize only a parliamentary, civilized path in the struggle for youth. Adversaries reproach each other's merits. They are ready to send their delegates or representatives to the 21st VLKSM Congress. They believe that they have not closed the door behind themselves, and they are ready to cooperate with the VLKSM on a new basis.

Intensive work is also going on in the development of a state youth policy in Estonia, and, incidentally, Toyvo Sikk, a former secretary of the Central committee of the LKSME, became one of the authors of a democratic and promising program.

Election time is not easy.

Estonia's Toome on Situation, Reforms

AU0301163890 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 3 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Indrek Toome, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, by Werner Pirker: "Leading by Conviction;" date and place not given]

[Text] Pirker: How does the second session of the Supreme Soviet look from the Baltic viewpoint?

Toome: It was as I expected it to be. The attitude toward the processes of perestroyka is very critical all over the country. The right wing of society is concerned about the steps which have been introduced, even though the supreme leadership is moving toward these conservative forces and courts them. The ultraleftists, on the other hand, are dissatisfied with the slow speed of the development of perestroyka. The center around Gorbachev is trying for reconciliation and speaks about consolidation. I expect the right wing to look for an arrangement with the center in order to consolidate the status quo and to win time so that the political and economic reforms do not become more radical. At the congress the old views are dominating, for instance concerning the question of Article Six (it sets down the leading role of the CPSU—the editor). Only about one-fourth of the delegates has radical voting behavior, while the rest still vote more or less for the status quo. I think that the congress will also end in this way: With a centralist attitude and even a bit to the right from the center. I would like to point out one thing: The supraregional group has made a big mistake by calling for a strike. With this they have isolated themselves and have lost some of their active power.

Pirker: For a person it is difficult to understand when you call followers of a free market economy and privatization "ultraleftists." I would rather consider the supraregional group as the right half in the Soviet parliament.

Toome: I understand you very well. However, one should see the matter from the viewpoint of the logic of perestroyka. There are central forces, and there is a right wing, which is against the reforms. Therefore, in Estonia I would call our "Intermovement" (counterforce to the Popular Front) rightist. I understand ultraleftist as meaning the trend, as Gorbachev once said, of wanting to jump over certain development stages. This is my view, even though you are absolutely correct. Of course, from a leftist position, those who are calling for a market economy are rightists.

Pirker: The focal issue of the political struggle, which is escalating increasingly, is the question of the leading role of the CPSU, in particular concerning its roots in the Constitution. Should one not ask the question more specifically: Which role are the Communists now playing in the Baltic republics?

Toome: Perhaps I should start with my opinion on Article Six. I consider myself a democrat, and therefore I am convinced that in the Constitution there should not be any legislative prerogative for one party. Lenin's method always was that of conviction. If we are convincing, the people will support us. For a long time we neglected holding a dialogue with the people.

In Estonia we do not just have the Communist Party as a political movement. Already the Popular Front has practically constituted itself as a party, too. I also consider the "United Council of Work Collectives" a party. It is close to the Interfront [represents Russians in Latvia], like the Republican Strike Committee and the war veterans. In my view, all of these movements have a right to exist in democratic socialism because they represent certain groups of people. If their activities are within the framework of the Constitution—apart from Article Six—everything is fine. Now we have an Estonian paradox: According to sociological studies, the Communist Party of Estonia [CPE] does not receive a lot of support from the population; the Popular Front, the Historical Preservation Society, and the Greens enjoy far more support. However, both within the framework of the formal and informal structures the most important functions are exercised by members of the CPE. According to opinion polls, many Communists head the list of popular people—the first secretary of the party, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, for instance, which is not intended as bragging. Of course, among the aspiring young politicians there are enough people versed in

demagogy, who know very well how to derogate our party—it has ruined the country, etc. By the way, this is an old political trick.

However, there is no unity within the CPE.

The most important dividing line runs between conservatives and innovators. The dividing lines also run in line with belonging to the respective linguistic groups. The Russian-speaking part of the population mainly supports the Communist Party, and within the party they cling to the administrative old norms. I would like to call this attitude "cosmopolitanism" (in the sense of a nihilistic approach to the question of nationality). Basically, however, they want to replace any national policy by a centralist Russian one.

Pirker: Is the difference between the Popular Front and the Interfront based only on national animosities, or are they not instead two totally different social movements?

Toome: Yes, absolutely. Basically, the population is also divided into two main camps. One part proceeds on the national interests of the Republic. The others deny the national component by referring to the "common home." Yesterday a Lithuanian representative expressed this concisely: If the Russian land does not belong to the Russians, to whom does it belong then? To the Soviet Union? After all, it is a union which is characterized by the fact that it unites various national territories. I am for integration, but this does not rule out a sense of responsibility for one's own national territory.

Pirker: A not inconsiderable part of the activists of the People's Front are party members. However, within this movement the positions of the party are also represented, or is it the other way around?

Toome: I would say it is both ways. However, we have more difficulties in making our positions heard because until 1988 we did not deal with the nature of perestroyka. The then first secretary and other comrades did everything so that perestroyka only made slow progress. It was only under the pressure of these new movements which emerged at that time—among others, the Popular Front—that a renewal of our leadership and, subsequently, a renewal of the party and society took place.

Pirker: The Communist Party of Lithuania wants to become independent from the CPSU. What about the Estonian Communists?

Toome: There are also such positions in the Estonian Communist Party. We have worked out a special program for the party congress of the CPE, which will take place in March. This platform says that the CPE is part of the CPSU, but it emphasizes greater sovereignty. It has its own action program and recognizes the CPSU statute. However, I would like to add: Why is there this collision between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Lithuania? Let us think about it: Why are there Communist Parties of Latvia, Uzbekistan, or Armenia? There is also the CPE. However, there are only CPSU members, no CPE members. This is paradox. How does the CPE want to live up to Article 6, for instance, in a sovereign republic and how does it want to play a leading role in this republic? With the rank of a regional party organization of the CPSU? In the past we were not permitted to publish one single paper in Estonia without the permission of the CPSU Central Committee. While the other parties and movements decide on their programs, the CPE has to coordinate all its actions and activities with the center. Of course, this causes great frustration among the party members. One more thing: What is the will of hundreds of thousands of Communists worth, who voted for their leadership organs, if an official in the center can abolish decisions with one stroke of his pen? This is insulting. In the spirit of Lenin and of equality, and against the spirit of the administrative system of orders, the inner-Soviet party relations must be shaped. Everything practically depends on the democratization of the CPSU.

Estonian Officials View Communist Party Policy

LD0301163190 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1200 GMT 28 Dec 89

[Interview with Vayno Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee; Mikk Titma, member of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau; and Arder Vali, member of the Estonian Communist Party; by correspondents Peter Sookruus and Raul Malk, "in the studio"; from the "Peak Hour" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] How do I rate the activity of Estonian Communist Party in the near future and how is that viewed against what is taking place in Lithuania? [passage omitted] As far as the question most directly is concerned—the sovereignty of the Lithuanian Communist Party—I would like to recall here that we have very clearly expressed our position already within the Estonian Communist Party program positions. It says there that the course of Estonia's sovereignty presupposes the restoration of the Estonian Communist Party in the way of an independent political organization. The Estonian Communist Party must be independent and stand up for Estonian issues. It is completely clear that in this our visions coincide. We cannot, however, imitate the example of another union republic completely. That would be wrong and also unsuitable. The party's integration, however, is another matter.

The issue is: How much would this benefit us if, together with other fraternal parties of union republics, we participate in working out a common CPSU policy. This is only part of the process of the political and party integration. If we can channel directly—with trust, amplification, and clear expression of stance—then that would be beneficial. Barely becoming independent, in the rhetorical meaning of the word, does not mean a thing. [passage omitted]

[Sookruus] The question is also being asked: What did Valno Vyalyas talk about at the CPSU Central Committee plenum? Could you comment briefly? [passage omitted]

[Vyalyas] I can, indeed, say very briefly, and with the key words, first of all, restructuring and the party. It is my understanding that if we wish to restructure the society, the party must be the first one to restructure, ideologically, organizationally, and morally. A self-purge must take place within the party. The party acquires its mandate not through some kind of a constitutional privilege, but solely from the people. The party is no general kind of name but consists of people. [as heard] The party's prestige largely also depends on the wisdom, honesty, conscience, and the prestige of those who call themselves members of the party. Added to this is, naturally, the standards of party leadership role and those who stand at the head of the party. But that in turn again depends on the people who we at this moment elect to lead the party and who we support.

Another word in addition to this on Gorbachev and his policy. He was very frank at the plenum. He said how much his positions are being assessed differently from the left and right, and what attack he faces. At the same time, we see that he very seriously and firmly proceeds along his path. As far as this is concerned, I can say here on the strength of those conversations which have taken place between him and me, how much he supports us and how much he endeavors to understand Estonian issues. Let the radio listener understand this correctly: We are not talking about the phenomenon of some kind of a good tsar. We are talking about an honest and frank party conversation. These things have benefitted the Estonian issue. [passage omitted]

[Titma] Since quite a few people have asked if Vayno Vyalyas supported the Lithuanians at the plenum or not, I would like to simply reproduce the clear stance of Brazauskas at yesterday's Lithuanian Central Committee plenum....

[Vyalyas interrupts] ...at the Bureau....

[Titma]...at the Bureau. His stance that he thanks Vyalyas for the support which he provided at the CPSU Central Committee plenum to the Lithuanians. On my own part, I would like to comment that the Lithuanians endeavored to solve two additional tasks with this move. On the one hand it is indeed clear that the Lithuanian Communist Party also endeavors to achieve authority among the people through this move, to remove these mistakes, let us say, of Marxist theory, of the communist movement as well as those of the union, of CPSU which have all piled up into a load for the communist parties; and on the otherhand to obtain certain points of advantage through this in the power struggle. I personally would not rate the effect of this move as being very high. It is hardly likely that these points of advantage will be largely obtained with this move.

Another, and it seems to me, a considerably more essential question is indeed the making of a completely new-type party—changing the communist party from its head of administrative socialism into a democratic party which is a constituent part of a democratic society. Alongside this party, other parties will stand and actual political pluralism will take place at this kind of organizational level. [passage omitted]

[Vali] If one characterizes the present moment, now at the end of the political year of 1989, you can see that a section of non-Estonians are beginning to acknowledge the truth and the correctness of endeavors. A polarization of the Russian community is taking place which, for example, was vividly demonstrated by the Estonian Peoples' Forum. Assisting this have definitely been the balanced nature of the steps and the determination and the taking account of the interest of all the people of Estonia. An understanding has been reached that this is not only Estonian nationalism but across the whole Soviet Union exactly similar processes are taking place. (passage omitted]

[Malk] We have a question which in my opinion is quite clearly for Mikk Titma. As is known, the communist party possesses about 6-7 percent popularity among the people. Who has authorized it to represent the people? [passage omitted]

[Titma] For the person who asked the question the problem evidently is this: Is power acquired through certain elections, the referendum, and similar things? We are on our way toward this kind of a society. Up to now the power which exists here has also been approved through certain procedures and the power rests in the hands of those people who until now have all belonged to the communist party.

I would dare say even more to answer. A large section of active people are indeed members of the communist party. But now that the situation has changed, their views are very diverse. For example, I, too, have no intention of being together in the future with Kogan and Yarovoy in the same party. That is quite clear. The differences in our views are so big that in the future this will no longer be possible, in a democratic society, to work together.

Yet, at present we come from a society where, while endeavoring to influence the public life of the society and while fighting with the Kogans and Yarovoys, we must work to achieve a democratic society. Roughly 90 percent of the active people in our Estonian society all carry a communist party membership card. It is indeed not to blame for all that which has previously take place. A party member demonstrates clearly with his behavior today if he is together with the people and endeavors to implement the people's will of if in fact he has grown away from the people.

[Sookruus] Also linked to this discussion is a question which I would like to address to Vayno Vyalyas. Should our Estonian Communist Party purge its ranks more

promptly? It is not right to leave everything to chance. The Estonian Communist Party, too, requires pure, high-principled people before everybody disperses into new parties. Also another question is linked here. What is the score with Marju Lauristin, Enn Poldroos and others who are setting up new parties while being CPSU members? The question is directly asked: Should one begin to expel such people from the party?

[Vyalyas] I have already stated that the Communist Party can exist in society with a support mandate from the people only if it purges itself. I am in complete agreement with the questioner. It must be done. But let us recall the very grave mistakes of the past. This purge within the party cannot be carried out with administrative measures. It must instead take place on the basis of party democracy. A whole string of names was mentioned, people with whom I have been working together as a communist for a very, very long time.

A question was asked if they should be expelled from the party because they have begun to found new public movements which also bear the name of parties. There is only one answer I can give. I, as a party Central Committee secretary, cannot and will not expel anybody. This will not be done by the party Central Committee either. [passage omitted] Each individual possesses ethics and a conscience. Each individual has joined this party voluntarily and has signed in their own hand. Here a person sometimes has to place himself opposite, or more correctly, confronting his conscience in a mirror image, and keep counsel inside himself. Who are you? Are you acting correctly? Is this a sign of the times or is it your firm conviction? But the matter is decided according to the most usual party democracy, namely within this party primary organization into which these people belong. [passage omitted]

[Titma] I would like to say that the questioner has proceeded slightly from, well, yesterday's understanding. We are moving into a democratic society and within a democratic society as a rule parties do not expel anybody. As a rule, parties are associations of those people who wish to act together upon a given platform. If a person no longer wishes so, he simply withdraws and moves over to another platform. That is all.

[Vyalyas] Just a little note on this point. It perhaps will remind you where each of us comes from. My origins are known. [from Hiiumaa Island among seafaring people] If a man attempts to leave a boat during a storm when everything is at stake to save everybody's lives, then another time this man is no longer given a place on the boat. If from a boat which is in deep trouble somebody attempts to go, with the fate of the whole crew at stake, then next time nobody sits down at the same table with this man. Third, forgive me but it is said in the seamen's language and it sounds a little harsh, that having once put your hand to the oar, then during a storm it must be so firm that a cramp may set in but you must not let go. [passage omitted]

[Malk] Do you see a problem for the Estonian Communist Party also in perhaps not having been sufficiently clearly expressed as being on the left in Estonian political life? Perhaps the Estonian communist Party has endeavored to be very much a party for the whole population and perhaps the problem has been over the expression of being leftist. Has this not been sufficiently clear?

[Titma] No, I do not believe so. I believe that we, like all the communist parties of Eastern Europe, grapple at the moment with the phenomenon that the communist movement has made grave. Let us say it directly: Mistakes not only of a practical kind but also over certain theoretical positions have been made—For example, vis-a-vis the nationality issue. I believe also that in causing a rift with social democracy, there have been fundamental isues indeed. One must begin reassessing them and a union and joint activity in the future of those on the left is one of the crucial problems from the point of view of world politics. [passage omitted]

Estonian Deputies 'Factions' Air Viewspoints

90UN0471A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 17 Nov 89 p 4

[Report on interview with Estonian Supreme Soviet group leaders: "Factions—A Matter of Time?"]

[Text] The Estonian Supreme Soviet 13th Session continues today. On the eve of the meeting our correspondent V. Akimov met with Pavel Panfilov, chairman of the "For Equal Rights" group of deputies, and Tomas Leyto, member of the "For Democratic Development" group of deputies, and asked them to answer a few questions.

'History Will Decide....'

[Akimov] How would you formulate the basic principles and ideas of your group of deputies?

[Panfilov] They are connected with all questions arising at the present time within the framework of the restructuring processes being solved by the parliamentary path, with regard for the interests of the so-called Russian-speaking group of the electorate.

[Akimov] It was party officials primarily who were at the root of the formation of the group. I have heard the opinion that some people affiliated with the party authorities are attempting once again to establish control of the deputies in this way.

[Panfilov] This question is in itself natural. The more so in that the greatest assertiveness in the group is in fact being displayed currently precisely by the party worker deputies. But does it in that case mean that all that is being done at the present time on the initiative of the party workers must necessarily be of a negative nature? Let us recall how the present Supreme Soviet was formed. It was known that there were to be from Tallinn, for example, I believe, 80 deputies. This matter came up in the gorkom [city party committee] bureau, and, in

accordance with the accepted procedure at that time, the following allocation was scheduled: The corps of deputies had to have so many party workers and so many women, Komsomol [All- Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members and workers. Thus it transpired that among the Russian-speaking deputies workers and party officials are the vast majority. But it is clear today that in contemporary, very politicized, life the deputy's work is very difficult inasmuch as he has to answer both to himself and to the people for the adoption of very important decisions. Opting for the correct behavior and correct decision is difficult for many worker deputies. For this reason a principal task of the group is preparing the deputies for work when in session. We invite specialists and scholars in order that they might provide explanations in respect of new bills and we discuss the situation. A second point. We have absolutely no wish to be in the position of those who are constantly only criticizing and having nothing positive and constructive to suggest. For this reason we set the task of formulating and submitting for examination by the Supreme Soviet specific proposals.

We work quite democratically, it seems to us, in the group of deputies. Although every decision is put to the vote in the group, we emphasize constantly here that any member of the group may act irrespective of the decision adopted in unison. That is, each deputy has every right and a legitimate basis for acting as his conscience dictates, as he himself feels personally with regard to this problem or the other.

[Akimov] Does your group have some specific plan of action for the coming meeting?

[Panfilov] We formulated it during the break at the preceding meeting and have expressed it in writing. In general outline, it appears thus: If the bill on elections to the republic Supreme Soviet is once again in conflict with the USSR Constitution, we will not take part in the vote. But inasmuch as the situation is changing rapidly and we cannot live by decisions adopted yesterday, we will unfailingly meet again before the start of the present sitting and discuss these problems.

[Akimov] One sometimes has the impression that in learning democracy we are borrowing by far from the best models of parliamentary behavior, including, frequently, the substitution of formalized steps—the walkout, for example—for constructivism.

[Panfilov] Please understand, if we begin with this—a walkout—it is understandable. The point being that our group was formed unofficially before the adoption of the new Supreme Soviet standing orders. We have tried everything in our work in the past 2 years in the desire to have our opinion taken into consideration. We have voted against and submitted proposals and, if you remember, have achieved no appreciable results this way. We submitted proposals for the creation of a mechanism for consideration of the opinions of the minority in parliament. Our proposals were not taken into consideration in full. At the last meeting, when the law on elections to the local soviets was being discussed, we presented compromise proposals pertaining to qualifications. To draw attention to themselves the Russian-speaking deputies employed another method—we then declined to participate in the voting. Walking out was the next stage. That is, this was a consecutive process.

[Akimov] You are a professional party official. Consequently, you are involved not only in the practical side of party work but with theory also—philosophy, sociology, policy. Do you not think that the processes which are occurring today, that is, the euphoria in some of the Estonian community and the opposition of the other community, are a consequence of the withering away of some and the appearance of other myths? Some people are clinging to one, others, to another?

[Panfilov] In any event, both are occurring. Conservatism is characteristic to a greater extent of the Russian-speaking population than of Estonians. We recognize this. The past, whether we like it or not, clutches at the hem of our coat. We need to leave it and rid ourselves of it. But this is not that simple a process. We will most likely make many mistakes yet. We cannot today evaluate each action by a single yardstick: You are right or wrong, this is black, this, white. I would not draw the line that distinctly. The future will decide and will show whether we were right or wrong. We are most likely making mistakes in some actions. This, in my view, is excusable until the restructuring processes affect our mentality, our frame of mind. As yet, however, these old things, I repeat, have a hold on us.

'Parliament Is Not a Place for Passions'

[Akimov] Let us begin with a simple question: On what basis was your group of deputies formed?

[Leyto] Our group was the first, it would seem, to be formed in the parliament officially. I personally believe that these groups are generally a temporary phenomenon in the Supreme Soviet. Because factional work—even if not all that precise and not all that clearly traceable at times—is possible only under conditions where various political forces operate. Democracy is young with us, we are living in a transition period, and the present groups of deputies are also a transitional phenomenon. The main aim and mission of our group are contained in its very name. We want, as far as possible, to accelerate the republic's democratic development. The approach in formation of the group is not with us per national characteristics. It incorporates deputies who are prepared to seek a common approach in the determination of democratic paths of development. We discuss common areas of action, of course. But if we cannot find a common language in respect of this problem or other, each deputy has every right to speak and vote as he sees fit. That is, there is no kind of strict discipline in the group, nor is there, most likely, any need for such.

[Akimov] Your group is not purely Estonian in composition?

[Leyto] There are 18 persons in the group. Three are Russians, the rest, Estonians. They are people from different parts of the republic, there being no territorial exclusiveness either. All in the group are communists. We are not fighting to defend the interests of just some one group of the population. We hope that we are upholding the opinion of the large group of people who would like to see the more rapid development of democratic principles in Estonia.

[Akimov] Does your group involve itself in forecasting events in the republic?

[Leyto] The group is young. We do not yet have much experience of joint work. We have not had time to prepare any documents for examination in the Supreme Soviet. But we are trying, adopting this decision or the other and formulating this approach or the other to problems, to forecast the course of events not only in parliament, but also in the republic and in the Union even.

[Akimov] Communists constitute the majority in the different groups of deputies. Is not the existence of different viewpoints among the representatives of the different parliamentary groups on identical problems in this case a consequence of the multitude of opinions on the methods and ways of further development in the party itself?

[Leyto] This is the case, of course. Yes, there are many opinions within the party, on underlying, fundamental issues included. This is contributing to the formation of various deputy groups also. But we need to distinguish between parliamentary activity and party work. And a mechanical transference of the processes occurring in the party to the processes under way in the Supreme Soviet would be a mistake. This cannot be done, it seems to me.

[Akimov] In what frame of mind are you going to the next meeting of the session? You have already had an exchange of opinions on this in your group, evidently?

[Leyto] I shall not speak about the group. We have not met since the Sunday sitting. I shall speak for myself. On Wednesday I visited the "Baltiyskaya manufaktura" and spoke with people. The outfit is non-Estonian. There is concern there, I felt it, but no one was dramatizing the situation, as certain movements are now doing. People's concern is understandable. The political situation with us is in fact not stable. But we should bear in mind one thing: If the non-Estonians living here now feel a connection with this land and feel that Estonia's concerns are their concerns, there can in this case be no question of any infringement of their interests. Talk about the division of people according to sorts is very harmful propaganda, which I can in no way support. If people feel themselves to be temporary residents and see Estonia only as an administrative unit of a great power, this is another matter, and in this case, of course, the approach to their opinion has to be different. In this case it is truly difficult finding a common language on many questions. I personally am going to the session in a calm frame of mind. I have my opinion. I believe that parliament is not the place for fomenting passions. This is to no one's benefit because passions which have spilled beyond the meeting hall are intensified many times over.

The meeting at the "Baltiyskaya Manufaktura" convinced me that once again that those who are saying the most that they express the viewpoint of the Russian-speaking population are not in fact the spokesman for the whole range of opinions. This term—Russian-speaking population—needs to be dispensed with altogether. It is being used currently to unite many different peoples, the knowingly incorrect impression of united masses being created. "Russian-speaking," "non-Estonians"—such nations do not exist. There is a language of communication: Russian. For the cohesion of various peoples this characteristic is important, of course. But speaking of the existence of a common opinion of all those speaking in this language is hardly correct.

I will not maintain that during the meeting with workers of "Baltiyskaya manufaktura" we reached a common opinion on all items. Even at the meeting in the "Mayak" debating club, where there were many extreme statements, we chatted very productively for 3 hours. There were points on which there can be no concessions. But the dialogue was useful and necessary even. We can understand one another.

Latvian Creative Unionists Seek Independent Party

LD0301120590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] The Sajudis News Agency reports that a conference was held in Riga on 29 December by the Communists of the Latvian creative unions. The present situation in the Latvian Communist Party was discussed at the conference.

Ivars Kezbers, second secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, taking part in the conference, said that a nondemocratic leftist party could not exist in a democratic state. One has to look at the events currently taking place in Europe and draw conclusions from these. We also have to carry out such reforms.

A resolution advocating the independence of the Latvian Communist Party has been adopted at the conference and a decision has also been adopted that the Communist Party should renounce the monopoly of power because this has now become possible since amendments were made to Articles 6, 7, and 47 of the Constitution at the last session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet.

The resolution also demands that the Latvian flag, the state anthem, and the state emblem be returned to the people of Latvia at the upcoming session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet.

Conservatives To 'Prevail' at Latvian Plenum

LD0301135390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Sajudis News Agency reports that out of more than 100,000 members of the Latvian Communist Party organization about 60,000 members are supporters of the People's Front. At the same time, only about 30,000 Latvian Communists support the objectives and ideas raised by the Latvian People's Front. Latvians comprise 39 percent in the Communist Party and therefore it is thought that conservative opinions will prevail at the plenum of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee which is due to take place 5 January.

Latvian Program Broadcasts for Last Time

LD0301185490 Riga in Latvian to Europe 0930 GMT 31 Dec 89

[From "Amber Coast" program]

[Excerpts] On the Latvian radio waves, in the Dzintarkrasts ["Amber Coast"] program, Janis Udris and Lauma Amatniece are still together with you today. [passage omitted]

[Udris] Unfortunately, this time your wishes cannot be fulfilled, because this is the last broadcast of Dzintarkrasts. Today, on 31 December 1989, the farewell broadcast is on the air, when Dzintarkrasts and we, its makers, are for the last time together with our listeners near and far away.

Beginning 1 January 1990, Latvian Radio will broadcast a half-hour program to listeners abroad every evening at 1930 hours, Latvian time.

[Amatniece] It will be heard on medium wave on 346 meters, a frequesncy of 1143 kHz; on short wave on 50.5 meters, 5935 kHz. But this will not be Dzintarkrasts.

[Udris] Yes, the new broadcast will be meant only for listeners abroad. This new broadcast will be prepared by another group of journalists, and we wish them success. We, the makers of Dzintarkrasts, who have been together for many years both on good days and bad days, will in the future go our separate ways. [passage omitted on Austrians and Feldmane]

[Amatniece] But Janis Udris will in the future work at the big NOVOSTI news agency. [passage omitted]

[Udris] Latvian Radio began its broadcasts to fellow-countrymen in foreign lands soon after World War II. But our program has been heard since 1959, for the first 10 years as a broadcast to Latvians in foreign parts.

In the beginning of this year, on the anniversary of our program, we gave an insight into the first broadcasts, restored from archive materials; we listened to the memories of the makers of the first Dzintarkrastses and the participants in the broadcasts.

Today, a few statistics. In 31 years, 3,500 of our broadcasts have been heard on the Latvian Radio waves, and more than 10,000 people in all have participated in them.

According to the questionnaire data of Latvian Radio sociologists, in Latvia Dzintarkrasts was listened to by 59.9 percent of those questioned. So then, approximately 700,000 people. Of course, the number of listeners abroad was many times smaller. We were chiefly listened to in Sweden, also in West Germany, and by a very few in Great Britain.

In the course of these years Dzintarkrasts has been at times praised, deservedly and undeservedly blamed. Surely, we earned the most ardent criticism at the founding congress of Interfront. But we, the makers of Dzintarkrasts have always endeavored to serve our country and our people. [passage omitted on Udris looking through Dzintarkrasts archives] The Brezhnevist propaganda methods, the external pathos, in its time, of course, also affected Dzintarkrasts. [passage omitted on some old archive recordings]

Chief of Staff Outlines Draft Defense Law

LD0301125490 Moscow TASS in English 1241 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy:

The drafting of a law on the defence of the USSR is under way in the Soviet Union. This document should become the basis for the legal regulation of matters concerning defence and military development in the Soviet Union.

A military legislative commission has been set up at the Soviet Defence Ministry to work in cooperation with parliamentary committees and commissions and other state and public bodies to elaborate specific provisions of the defence law, in accordance with public opinion.

The commission, headed by General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, had its first session on New Year's Eve.

The defence law should reflect provisions of the Soviet military doctrine, the appropriate powers and duties of state power and administration bodies with regard to defence matters, and the rights and duties of citizens in the defence of the native land, Moiseyev told TASS.

Among the commission's priority tasks he mentioned the elaboration of provisions concerning universal military service and the status of servicemen.

"Many provisions of the USSR defence law should be closely connected with the laws that are now being prepared on property, the economic independence of enterprises and organisations, and regional cost accounting," Moiseyev said.

Armenia's Arutyunyan Gives New Year Address

NC0301212090 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 2 Jan 89

["Address Given by Suren Arutyunyan, First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, on Armenian Television on 31 December 1989"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Text] Dear compatriots, on the threshold of the New Year one wittingly or unwittingly tries to recapitulate everything that characterized the year as a whole. The year 1989 is already fading into history. It was a year each day of which was full of spiritual tension for our people, of difficult, often severe struggle on the path to restructuring our life.

The destructive earthquake left a stubborn wound in the soul of the Armenian people. We experienced the grave sorrow of having lost thousands of our compatriots. At the same time we also felt the strength of charity, goodwill, and philanthropy. As a nation we started to heal our wounds with the help of our friends. The construction and restoration work in the disaster zone was greatly speeded up.

The year 1989 was also a year of hope and struggle. Our people overcame serious trials and manifested their indestructible will to survive and persist. It is gratifying to hear the cry of newborn babies in 75,000 families; they are the cries of eternity. Thousands of new families were formed.

Despite the prevailing serious and tense situation, noticeable steps were taken toward the solution of the economic, social, and environmental problems accumulated over the decades.

In 1989 the foundations were laid for the elimination of the blank spots in the history of our people.

The comprehensive ties between Soviet Armenia and Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] were strengthened and assumed a new quality. The Supreme Soviet of the republic and the National Council of Artsakh, expressing the will of the people, legislatively ratified the reunification of these two segments of the Armenian people.

The passing year could be considered a turning point in the entire history of relations between the motherland and the diaspora. There have never been such productive contacts, practical results, and fruitful dialogues with the representatives of different political currents.

New bridges were built from the motherland to the Armenian communities around the USSR. Reliable guarantees are being created for the cohesion of the entire Armenian people. All these cannot but please us, for only through united forces can we realize the sacred yearnings of our people.

Esteemed friends, only a few minutes separate us from the new year and it is natural and human that we welcome the new year with hope and confidence. I cannot say that it will be an easy year free of all serious concerns. Difficult and tense work awaits us. We must make sure that there is a substantial breakthrough in our effort to heal the wounds of the earthquake, provide normal living conditions for our compatriots who have been forcibly uprooted , and improve the social conditions of the republic's population.

For our people the new year should be a year for national unity; a year for the creation of solid foundations for radical reforms in the republic's public-political and social-economic life, and for the deepening and broadening of restructuring. It should be a year for the consolidation of humanistic thought and universal human values. The 28th party congress and 29th congress of the Armenian Communist Party will be a turning point in the realization of this.

We must now exert all our efforts to revive economically and to function under conditions of economic independence, starting with 1991. The practical development of the free enterprise policy must be realized.

Our great desire is to shake off the fetters of the past, to actively broaden and deepen democracy and openness. However, we must realize that even the best moral intentions mean nothing if no good work comes out of them. The supreme patriotism is not only a desire for the boundless well-being of the motherland. Above all else it is the prudent implementation of that wish.

The annals of our 70-year-old republic and our achievements and losses are more discernible from the point that we have now reached. We must value Soviet Armenia, our motherland, highly, because the eyes of Armenians dispersed throughout the world are upon it. Though our historical road has been difficult, the last 7 decades have been years of spiritual coalescence for the Armenian people and years of national reawakening.

Dear brothers and sisters, on the threshold of the new year I send my good wishes to our entire people, to the Armenian people. I wish happiness and peace in the new year to each family, to the rural and urban workers, to our intellectuals, and to our young people. At this moment, in my thoughts, I clasp the hand of each of you and hope that you may be always imbued with optimism.

I convey my best wishes to our earthquake-stricken compatriots with a special feeling. We comprehend those difficulties and complexities which have besieged the people. Everything is being done and will be done so that you may recover your family peace. I extend my best wishes and gratitude to our brothers, to the workers who came here to help us from the different republics and regions of the country, and to the foreign specialists. I wish all the very best to you, brothers and happiness to your families.

I say to the new citizens of our republic, to our brothers and sisters who have been given shelter in different parts of our republic: You have seen many trials, but now you

Gidaspov Comments on Gorbachev, Article 6

LD0301172890 Moscow World Service in English 0310 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Excerpts] We start out with a profile of Boris Gidaspov, a fairly new and pretty controversial political figure here. [passage omitted] There have been a number of publications in the Western press describing him as an ambitious politician. There have also been a number of publications in the Soviet press, describing him as an opponent, an opposition figure to the country's current leadership—opposing it from the right wing of the political spectrum. This common notoriety has made Gidaspov on of the most popular personalities with the media. He's also granted an interview to Radio Moscow's Boris Markovnikov, and now we offer a transcript.

[Begin recording] [Markovnikov] One of the rallies in Leningrad recently, one that Boris Gidaspov attended, featured slogans censuring policies conducted by President and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. It also reported that he was in fact one of the first to support Gorbachev's drive to decentralize the economy, which is crucial to the economic reform.

[Gidaspov in Russian with superimposed English translation] In any case, just months after Gorbachev was appointed to the post, I was able to wrest a group of enterprises away from the so-called administrative system, from the jurisdiction of the ministries, and to set up this country's first concern. So this showed who I sided with, not in words but in fact. As for mistakes, I don't see any major mistakes on the part of Gorbachev. The thing is that this nation is huge, the political situation is very acute, and Gorbachev is doing a very important job of preventing outright confrontation between forces at opposite ends of the spectrum. I known it's tough for him, and I've been trying to help. What we in Leningrad are advocating can be described as liberal conservatism—or conservative liberalism—but we're also uniting all the forces that can serve the cause of perestroyka.

[Markovnikov] so how does Boris Gidaspov define that theme within the Communist Party that he represents? He is said to be a centrist.

[Gidaspov] A centrist? Well, I am a centrist if you will. In sports terminology, I have always played a half-back.

[Markovnikov] The Communist Party organization in Leningrad seems to be gaining strength. What sort of place does Boris Gidaspov visualize for other public organizations in the circumstances?

[Gidaspov] [Words indistinct] I'm for carrying in our city newspaper [words indistinct] extending a hand of friendship and solidarity to all democratic movements adhering to socialist principles. We are ready to cooperate in any form. Further, it said that preparing for the coming local elections, we are calling on all communists, nonparty people, and the leaders of all movements to take an active part in them—maybe even in a single ballot. In order to implement the ideas of perestroyka, we are perhaps as never before in need of conscientious people who have their views and are bold enough to defend them. We are perfectly aware that firmly adhering to some sort of positions, we get to be a target of criticism—that's inevitable.

[Markovnikov] The past few months, including the recent session of the Congress of People's Deputies, have featured quite a heated debate over Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, stipulating the Communist Party's leading role in society. Now what is Boris Gidaspov's attitude to it?

[Gidaspov] I'm against Article 6. We discussed the issue in Leningrad for about 2 months, and the discussions involved some 200,000 communists. At the same time, I believe that extricating any separate article from the constitution is unreasonable. Now some people want to take out this article and then some kind of extremists turn up and say, let's scrap those articles on human rights. Do you think there are no people who say that? I believe the constitution should be reworked entirely. The thing is that the authoritarian style of leadership in this country is not declared by article 6. Article 6 only appeared in 1977; and what did we have when it wasn't even there? Was it any better? So the article is not the matter. It is that the constitution has to be reworked, and the sooner the better. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Moldavian Pre-Election Campaign Detailed

90UN0565A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 28 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by O. Vladimirov, Kishinev: "Do Not Repeat Mistakes"]

[Text] An important stage in the election campaign has arrived in Moldavia. The nomination of candidates to all echelons of the soviets began today in its work collectives and public organizations according to citizens' places of residence and in military units.

The current campaign is occurring under conditions of increased voter activity, with candidate contests and the participation of new sociopolitical forces. Along with party and trade union organs, which have already published their pre-election platforms, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], veterans' organizations, and women's soviets, and also new public formations—the People's Front of Moldavia, the intermovement "Unitatya-Unity," the "Gagauz-Khalki" movement (the Gagauz people), the society "Renewal," and others.

The new elections law guarantees equal opportunities for candidates' activity for deputy and their proxies and provides for the allocation of resources from enterprise collectives for the election campaign fund. True, there are no such cases yet. Nevertheless, equal quotas of time have already been stipulated for candidate speeches over radio, on television, and in the press. In addition,

according to the new legislation, from the moment of nomination, in fact, both agitation "for" as well as "against" and the independent nomination of candidates is permitted. All of this requires appropriate control over the progress of the campaign on the part of the electoral commissions. There is one more peculiarity—the Supreme Soviet of the republic, in contrast to a number of others, did not adopt a residential qualification. All told, 300 seats have to be distributed in the parliament of the republic and almost 30,000 in electoral districts to local organs of authority. Of course, the main campaign is for seats in the higher legislative organ of the republic.

"We consider the main purpose to be the nomination to it of experienced specialists, scientists, and lawyers," says M. Gimpu, a member of the ispolkom [executive committee] of the People's Front of Moldavia, "so that it is does not turn out as it did at the last session—they voted almost unanimously for the plan and the budget of the republic for next year, formed, in our opinion, according to the residual principle.

"We are also counting on specialists and workers," answered V. Nosov, chairman of the ispolkom of the intermovement "Unity." "However, the work collectives will nominate candidates to local soviets according to their own discretion."

Communists drew a lesson from past elections of USSR People's Deputies, when at that time they relied on the usual practice of noncompetitive selection and, therefore, they lost in a number of cases. In the course of this campaign, a sociopolitical center was established in the House of Political Education of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia.

"Its tasks are to assist representatives of various nationalities living in the republic to find a point of contact on problems that troubled everyone," said V. Ulyatovskiy, supervisor of the House of Political Education. "To achieve this, alas, is not easy: Under conditions of a tense socio- political situation, emotions take precedence over reason at meetings."

"Of course, the current election campaign knows no equal in its sharpness," says V. Kintenko, chairman of the central election commission. "The new elections law provides for an increase in the role of the election commission. Full independence and the absence of orders make it possible for the commission to become the true director of the election campaign. The first results of the nominations will become known no sooner than tomorrow. It will be possible to judge by then the aggressiveness of the sociopolitical forces participating in the campaign. Although, of course, the main result will be known only after the elections to be held on 25 February. The finish of this marathon will be the formation of a corps of deputies of the republic, and also of the managerial organs of soviets at all levels."

Informals Blamed for Fueling Religious Strife

PM0101203790

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 1 January 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 3 an interview with Metropolitan Filaret by own correspondent M. Odinets in Kiev under the heading "On Pecherskiy Hill." The interview is largely devoted to the restoration of Kiev's Pecherskiy Monastery, but also includes the following response by Metropolitan Filaret to the question "What do you think about attempts to seize several Orthodox churches in Lvov, Ternopol, and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts in the Ukraine?":

"I believe that this shows total scorn for our laws and that the violence comes not so much from the Greek Catholics as from certain informal organizations which, striving to attain their unseemly political aims, are using this religious problem to whip up hatred between representatives of the Orthodox and Catholic religions. The entire exarchate is now offering up prayers that there be no enmity between Orthodox and Catholic believers. The Patriarch and the Holy Synod have sent a letter to the Pope asking him to resolve this problem. But, I repeat, the most important thing is that the law should be enforced."

Orthodox Clergymen on Religious Problems in Ukraine

LD2712222789 Moscow TASS in English 2003 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—The hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church accepts with deep grief and alarm the recent tragic development of religious situation in Western regions of Ukraine, speakers at a news conference held today in the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate said.

The news conference was conducted by Archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill. Speakers involved members of the Synod—Metropolitan of Kiev and Galich, Exarch to the Ukraine Filaret, Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna Yuvenaliy, and also clergymen who arrived from dioceses of Western Ukraine.

Archibishop Kirill informed the gathering about the relations being formed in the region between orthodox believers and Catholics of the eastern rite (Uniates). The archbishop said that extremist-minded groups have been seizing orthodox churches in the Lvov, Ternopol, Mukachevo and Ivano-Frankovsk dioceses of the Ukrainian exarchate, driving clergy and believers out of them and depriving them of the opportunity to pray together according to the orthodox religious tradition.

At present in Lvov the orthodox communities keep only four churches out of 19.

The illegal actions have resulted in grave consequences, speakers at the news conference pointed out. Priest Vasiliy Bochalo died as a result of a grave shock, Priest

Joseph Stechni, who was in the Transfiguration Church during the seizure, had myocardial infarction. The dean of the church was a hostage of the persons, who carried out the seizure, for several days. Bishop Makary of Ivano-Frankovsk and Kolomyja, went in protest on a hunger strike and has been refusing food for eight days now.

In connection with the events in Ivano-Frankovsk, his holiness Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and all Russia sent cables to the leadership of the country, U.N. secretary-general, the World Council of Churches, and to the Conference of European Churches. He also sent cables to Pope John Paul the Second and the heads of the local orthodox churches.

Archbishop Kirill recalled that in August of this year Patriarch Pimen sent a special message to Pope John Paul the Second containing a number of proposals for settling the problems of the Uniate Church. The answer of his holiness Pope John Paul the Second was brought to Moscow by a delegation of the Holy See headed by Cardinal Johannes Willebrands, chairman of the Pontifical Council for Christian Unity.

Answering journalists' questions on the possibility of settling the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and Catholics of the eastern rite, Archbishop Kirill said that since people of different religious beliefs live in the territory of Western Ukraine, the church holds that they should be given an opportunity to pray in keeping with their tradition. The archbishop stressed that the orthodox church does not rule out the possibility of legalizing the communities of the Catholics of the eastern rite, which can be legally set up in that territory.

The Russian church believes that problems of relations between churches should be solved only through negotiations. The archbishop added that the time of holding a dialogue should not be postponed any more. A meeting between the two churches can prevent the escalation of the conflict, stop violence and return the situation into a normal channel. Under the existing agreement, this meeting is planned for January 13-17, 1990.

Greek Catholic 'Violence' Protested

LD0201171990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Jan 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A report from Lvov. A large group of Orthodox believers, priests, and monks from the Pochayev Monastery has held a 3-day sit-in in the Lvov offices of the Council for Religious Affairs at the Ukraine's Council of Ministers.

[V. Lyashkov] They occupied practically the entire premises where the apparatus of the council's plenipotentiary for Lvov Oblast works. They are also collecting signatures under an appeal to the local and republican authorities, demanding that the Orthodox be protected from a wave of violence by Greek Catholics.

[Father Feodosiy, Pochayev Monastery] We would like this measure to have effect on the local authorities and on public bodies in order to get cooperation that would lead to the observance of our legislation in the democratic country where we live. Regretfully that is not what we see. Local bodies are currently suggesting that we defend ourselves as best we can against (? in effect) unlawful acts by various groups of people calling themselves christians of various names. In the main these are Catholics. For the Orthodox to use force, to permit such a thing of our Orthodox people, is to call for fratricidal war in western Russia and in the Ukraine. We have come here because many Orthodox people have been asking us to allow them to defend themselves, defend themselves physically. That is impermissible. We fear that very much and that is why we are asking you to help us get the law observed, since we believe we are living in a democratic country, and the laws should remain operative.

[Announcer] You will agree, comrades, that the prevailing situation is very difficult and I would like to recall for you a quote from a statement by the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church: We call on both the Orthodox and the Catholics to pray for each other and to remember that the rights of some cannot be granted at the expense of the rights of others.

New Center for European Civilization Studies

LD2712182289 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—A public and scientific centre for the study of European civilisation was created here today. It will study historical and cultural preconditions for the creation of an all-European home and analyse the integrity and versatility of development on the continent.

Professor Aleksandr Chubaryan said at the opening ceremony that the study of European problems was getting more and more important because of the development of the all-European process. Chubaryan is heading the Institute of General History under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, on the basis of which the centre was created.

He stressed that, apart from tackling purely scientific problems, the centre would promote the deepening of cooperation between the public of the Soviet Union and of European countries and would establish contacts with U.S. scientific institutions.

The centre will analyse historical, cultural and political aspects of cooperation between Europe and Russia, between Europe and Eastern countries. It will have its own annual publication, European Almanach.

Apart from the Institute of General History, the centre was founded by the Institute of European Studies under

the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Soviet Ministry of Culture, the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and the Soviet Cultural Foundation. The council of the centre is headed by Aleksandr Chubaryan and Vadim Zagladin, head of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

New Youth Papers Published in Ufa

LD0401052990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2230 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] Since the beginning of the year our editorial office has received many reports about the new publications in various towns. In Ufa, for instance, two new independent youth newspapers have been published—LENINETS in Russian and MOLODOST in Bashkirian. Previously a single duplicated newspaper was issued in their place. Problems affecting young people, restructuring of Komsomol activities, and the broad spectrum of political life of the republic and the country are still among the priority subjects of the new publications.

Magadan Plenum Replaces Retiring First Secretary

PM2712191589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Magadan CPSU Oblast Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Magadan, 22 Dec—A plenum of the Magadan CPSU Oblast Committee [obkom], which discussed an organizational question, was held today. The plenum complied with the request of A.D. Bogdanov and released him from the duties of first secretary of the party obkom in connection with his retirement.

On the eve of the plenum candidacies for the post of party obkom first secretary were put forward in the oblast's party organizations and debated on a broad democratic basis. In the process 21 names were put forward.

During the first round of the voting no candidate won. In the second round the names of two candidates featured on the ballot paper, that of V.T. Vechkanov, first secretary of the Magadan CPSU City Committee, and V.V. Svekolkin, second secretary of the Magadan CPSU Obkom. The voters gave preference to V.V. Svekolkin who was elected as first secretary of the Magadan CPSU Obkom by a majority of votes.

The plenum proceedings were attended by V.N. Krikhunov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department.

Reader Denounces 'Perniciousness' of Perestroyka

PM0401144390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Letter from reader S. Stavitskiy of Bykovo Settlement, Moscow Oblast: "Anarchist's Proposal"]

[Text] Why do the government and the party refuse to strengthen the economy of kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] but create cooperatives, family contracts, and lease forms at the price of ruining kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the country which created kolkhozes long ago? Whom does this benefit? I believe that it benefits speculators, swindlers, thieves of every stripe, and officials. There was total order in the detachments of Father Makhno [Ukrainian anarchist leader during civil war], and any army could have envied it. I know this not by hearsay....

The time has come to rouse the people to struggle against the plundering and ruining of the country's kolkhozes, sovkhozes, factories, and plants. This is within the power of our press—that is, it is necessary to explain the whole perniciousness of our perestroyka in its present form.

This policy is capable of exacerbating the situation in the country because newly emerged trends will appear, as they have in Estonia and other republics. They hold all the cards now. Your newspaper can and must expose the real culprits—those who are reviving private ownership in the country, exploitation of man by man, and crime at all levels.

Our party has lost its prestige among the people and in the world. However, it can and must revive what has been lost by running the national economy at the proper level—that is, it must build socialism in the country at a level which will summon the people to devote all their energy to the country's common cause. By strengthening our socialist property and not ruining it, as is being done now, the country will emerge from the crisis and celebrate victory. It is necessary only to protect our present, what has not yet been entirely ruined in agriculture and industry. The country's people still believe in their future. They need help.

Economic

Ryzhkov Issues Statement on Economic Program

LD0401104290 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Text] The Soviet prime minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov, has expressed confidence that the adopted program of economic improvements will bring about positive changes in the national economy and in the social sphere. He stressed in a press statement that the program had won a vote of confidence at the recent Congress of People's Deputies. The Congress backed the government's plan of stage by stage economic reform.

Nikolay Ryzhkov named as the immediate priority rallying society for a positive, constructive, and creative approach.

Railways Ministry Notes Freight Shortfalls

LD0201204590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Jan 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Here is an alarming report from the Ministry of Railways. During the 2 days of January, there has been a shortfall of some 4 million tonnes in national economy freight shipped to consumers. I have here a list of enterprises, organizations, and ministries which are guilty of the derangements. Were I to read out all their names we would run out of time. I will tell you only that large shortfalls have taken place not only in the shipments of manufactured goods, but also of foodstuffs: meat, fish, sugar, and other produce.

People's Deputies Call for Anti-Inflation Law

904F0056 Moscow TRUD in Russian 16 Dec 89 p 1

[Appeal from the USSR People's Deputies representing USSR Trade Unions: "On Developing an Anti-Inflation Law"]

[Text] Expressing their extreme concern over the continuing process of worsening economic difficulties, the non-balanced nature of the market, and the increase in prices for goods and services, the USSR people's deputies representing the trade unions consider it necessary to present to the USSR Government a mandate to draw up a draft anti-inflation law as soon as possible.

Recently the USSR Government and the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a number of measures intended to regulate the growth of prices and incomes, strengthen state control over prices, and to increase the output of relatively inexpensive goods and to develop the service sphere.

Although overall we support these and other measures adopted by the USSR Government for improving the economy, at the same time we consider that the above mentioned measures for combatting the growing inflation are clearly insufficient. The workers must be sure that the printing press will not bring to naught the results of the proposed measures.

World practice has developed a rich arsenal of forms and means for combatting inflation. Many of these are completely adaptable for our economy.

An anti-inflation law will be called upon to reliably defend the Soviet man from high prices. In our opinion, it should legislatively determine a guaranteed minimum cost of living, a system of calculating an index of prices and inflation, and procedures for compensatory payments to certain groups of people, for declaring sources of income, and for strict government control over these sources.

We request the rapid preparation of such a law so that it can be reviewed at the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The USSR people's deputies representing the trade unions are ready to participate directly in preparing the draft and will render specific and decisive support to the government in enacting the provisions of this law.

Sverdlovsk Socioeconomic Problems Examined

LD0201185390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1810 GMT 2 Jan 90

[Text] Sverdlovsk, 2 Jan (TASS)—Assessing the causes of the instability in the town's socioeconomic situation in recent days and measures for improving it were the main issues on the agenda of a plenum of the Sverdlovsk city CPSU committee, which ended its work late this evening.

The plenum was convened in connection with the demonstration and meeting on the city's main square on 29 December. On that day, the situation started to become strained at the empty counters of shops. There was a shortfall in central supplies of many goods to Sverdlovsk, and more than 5,000 kinds of goods were absent from the trade network. The vouchers introduced in December for wines and spirits gave rise to an upsurge in speculation, when, in a number of cases, staff in the trade network joined forces with the speculators.

However, the people of Sverdlovsk who spoke at the meeting gave a political assessment of the situation that had arisen. The report given at the plenum by V. Kadochnikov, first secretary of the Sverdlovsk city party committee, and the speeches given by those taking part analyzed what had occured from a political point of view, as well as the responsibility of leading communists for the functioning of the city. The managers of the trade network were unable to distribute in the optimum manner even available products and goods, or to monitor their sales.

Those who spoke at the plenum stressd that the external causes of what occurred were not the main ones. The city was not fulfilling its food program.

The participants in the plenum supported a decision by the bureau of the city CPSU committee on creating a special commission from representatives of labor collectives, people's deputies, and various public organizations for monitoring the state of affairs in the trade network, on the need for a renewal of leading cadres, and on the responsibility of communists at every workplace.

Shortfall in Oil Deliveries to Hungary Reported

LD2812111789 Budapest MTI in English 1031 GMT 28 Dec 89

[Text] Budapest, December 28, 1989 (MTI-Econews)—Hungary will import 200,000 to 250,000 tonnes of crude oil and 30,000 tonnes of petrol from

convertible markets in January for home consumption—a first ever for many decades—because according to official information the Soviet Union will not deliver the total contracted 518,000 tonnes of oil in that month, the monthly ratio of its promissed 6.47 million tonnes of Hungarian deliveries for 1990. Instead, it will ship only 393,000 tonnes in January, Thursday's 'VILAGGAZDASAG', a Budapest economic daily reported, quoting official sources. It is official too that Soviet shipments already for this year will be short of the contracted amount of also 6.47 million tonnes of crude oil with 150,000 tonnes of oil, and 80,000 tonnes of petrol will not be delivered either. [sentence as received]

Soviet shipments supplement a declining Hungarian production, which will probably reach 1.93 million tonnes of crude oil this year, after 1,947 million tonnes of last year. Until now the Soviet Union was the only country from where Hungary imported oil for home consumption.

Rumors in Hungary have that the Romanian aid program is endangering home supplies of motor fuels, but officials quoted in 'VILAGGAZDASAG' said that if there is any shortage to be expected, that will be due to the Soviet delays and not to the aid program. Since last Friday, Hungarian lorries and cars, shipping aid to Romania, used up 20,000 liters of petrol and 30,000 liters of gasoil which was given free of charge, as a contribution of the filling stations to the aid deliveries.

Coal Stocks Held Too Long, Ignites

PM2812163989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 12

[Own correspondent P. Voroshilov dispatch: "Kuzbass Coal Being Wasted"]

[Text] Kemerovo—More than 10 million tonnes of coal has piled up at Kuzbass depots. At many enterprises, especially in the Mezhdurechensk and Myskov coalfields, stocks exceed the maximum permitted level by 5 times. The situation is catastrophic, because coal is starting to burn.

There are several causes. Approximately 1 million tonnes is lying about unused since July, when strike committees stopped not just the extraction but also the dispatch of coal. However, the main blame rests with the railroad workers who have failed to deliver some 250,000 freightcars since the beginning of the year. This debt, despite numerous assurances by Ministry of Railways leaders, is increasing rather than decreasing.

The government clearly ought to admit honestly that it cannot provide for the coalfield's depots to be cleared and should therefore adopt unorthodox measures such as plan adjustment, suspension or reduction to realistic limits of fuel extraction, and authorization for labor collectives to regroup their manpower, using workers to carry out useful repair or construction operations while maintaining their average wages. The two-fold advantage inherent in this is obvious. The senseless squandering of natural resources would stop, and people would obtain some new apartments. It is important also to bear the morale aspect in mind. How can you talk to people about strengthening labor discipline if they see every day that their skill and effort is going up in smoke?

And there is another matter to which I would like to draw your attention. I was told at the local coal supply administration that they had received no panicky telegrams from consumers about undelivered coal. It must be assumed that enterprises mastering the rudiments of economic accountability are satisfied with the present level of deliveries. Why light fires that belch smoke at coal depots? Has the time not come for us to begin to live by common sense rather than the plan?

Magadan Gold Mining Operations Reported

Units Fulfill Extraction Goals

LD0101181890 Magadan Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 18 Dec 89

[Summary] Dalnyy Placer has fulfilled its year's plan for gold extraction, the third unit of the Bilibino combine to prefulfill its year's task.

Gold extractors at Komsomolskiy are 5 days ahead of schedule. Those at the Komsomolskiy facility have completed their year's plan for extraction of gold.

Further Details

LD0101211190 Magadan Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 22 Dec 89

[Summary] The mass washing season is coming to an end. Miners at Berelekh, Komsomolskiy, and Polyarnyy combines and Eksperimentalnyy Placer are working to fulfill their pledges. Today Bilibino started to do the same. Tenke and Srednekan are approaching the fulfillment of their plans. The association as a whole will have completed its plan for the year by the end of the month. But Susuman and Yagodnoye are 2 days behind the month's schedule for gold extraction, and Orotukan nearly 3. Ore enterprises have slackened their work pace somewhat in September.

Artels have worked well: Those at Polyarnyy and Bilibino combines have met their plan, and those at Berelekh and Susuman combines and Eksperimentalnyy Placer are washing sand excellently.

Turf stripping is arousing a lot of concern. Since May, the association has been failing to fulfill its plan for this work, and since the beginning of the year has built up a deficit of more than 9 million cubic meters of turf. Stripping brigades at Bilibino, Komsomolskiy, Polyarnoye, Berelekh, and Srednekan combines and Otrozhniy Placer have been working below capacity in September.

Extraction of underground sand is not going fast enough yet, especially at Polyarnoye.

Wish for 'Simple' Economic Answers Derided

PM2712151789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Dec 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences O. Ozherelyev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, datelined Moscow and published under the rubric "Questions of Theory: Debating Forum": "Renewal: The Economic Vector"]

[Text] History is hardly like a caring nurse. It impassively rejects any forms of social organization which do not stand up to historical competition. No matter how great the burdens of perestroyka may be, the radical renewal of all fundamental structures of Soviet society is a boon.

But renewing society is always a painful process. Only the existence of a scientific long-term vision and of the means to attain the set goal, the existence of an organized approach can render this movement successful. Consequently, the theoretical substantiation and constant updating of perestroyka constitute a mandatory component of the perestroyka process. The vital importance of this process can be seen in connection with M.S. Gorbachev's article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroyka," which stimulates the reinterpretation of many of our theoretical approaches and a thorough verification of the paths for forward movement.

Contours of the Concept

Indeed, perestroyka is not simply an improvement of the country's current social structure. It involves its qualitative renewal on the basis of a conceptual review of the theoretical arsenal of our ideas of society's progress. This is essentially a matter of transition to a new model of socioeconomic development, a breakthrough in the sphere of fundamentally different ideas about the essence of socialism and the forms of its practical implementation.

So, what is this social structure model whose affirmation is demanded by the objective logic of history and for which we are striving?

Naturally, science is still not in a position to provide a fully exhaustive description of it. But its three fundamental mainstays are already obvious today. The first is democracy and freedom. The second is humanism and social justice. The third is the simultaneous coexistence, interconnection, and interdependence of two realities in Soviet society as it undergoes renewal in terms of socialization, collectivity, and the broad development of the individual. Of course, these are just proclaimed values. Our task is to create the appropriate mechanism for their implementation.

Specifically, how is this task being accomplished? First, via the reform of the political system. We are switching from party power to soviet power, from the power of man over man to the power of law, to what is conventionally known as a rule-of-law state. This also presupposes an expansion of the social base of power and a revision of priorities in its exercise.

Second, this task is being accomplished through the renewal of ownership relations, the transition from uniform state ownership to a diversity of ownership forms, including private and mixed forms of ownership.

Third, via the dismantling of the system of direct centralized distribution of resources and results of economic activity, and the creation of a normal, healthy market. This applies not only to the commodity market but also to the markets for capital resources, foreign currency, and manpower.

What do we have at present? What has perestroyka already given us? I would rank first the awakening of the sociopolitical energy of almost all strata of the population. Society is on the move. It has developed a taste for enterprising economic management, a desire at different levels to solve accumulated problems autonomously.

The main factor which today drags us back toward the past comprises the simplistic ideas about the mechanism of social development which have been adopted by theory, practice, and conventional thinking. Technocracy and the simplistic ideas which dominated our society for decades on end continue to nurture faith in the possibility of simple, "technical" solutions to the complex problems of perestroyka. This is noticeable not only at all levels of the national economy's management, from top to bottom, but also among all strata of the population, in the public mind. Administrative edict thinking is not an attribute of state bureaucracy alone. It is a disease, an evil affecting the whole of society, which is considerably and further aggravated by the dominance of schematic-normative ideas about the socialist ideal in the public mind. Its inertia has proved so powerful that overcoming it is an extremely complex task. Here we have, as the saying goes, a dead-hand effect.

The divergence between the adoption of conceptual political decisions and their practical implementation remains, as always, one of our painful problems. It is attributed, on the one hand, to "sabotage" by the economic mechanism inherited from the past and still not fully restructured and, on the other, to flaws in the process of preparing, adopting, and implementing decisions at state level. Correct decisions frequently are not backed up by material resources and a system of economic levers and incentives. They often lack a suitable legal backup, and are made without due consideration for the real interests and opinions of lower-ranking management links and the mentality of specific executants.

Much comes up against one of our society's most acute problems—the poor professional, political, economic, and even general culture. This is the main cause of the dangerous growth of group egoism, of the desire to improve one's own prosperity without stepping up production

activity, by submitting claims and demands and applying direct strong-arm pressure to state institutions, and of the decline in labor discipline. The shortage of culture also played a by no means insignificant role in the exacerbation of ethnic passions and the intensification of social tension in a number of the country's regions.

The experience of historical development shows that the most powerful interest is the master interest. This means that we need primarily radical changes in ownership relations. Therein lies the main highway toward economic recovery and improvement of the economic management mechanism.

The renewal of ownership relations primarily means movement toward their real diversity. Its essence is to ensure equality of all economic subjects before the law, and healthy competition between them with the consumer acting as the sole arbiter. In addition to state ownership, cooperative ownership is developing, having cast off the scales of bureaucratism. A powerful impetus is given to joint stock, mixed, and individual forms of ownership. Life is placing on the agenda the question of private ownership. I am convinced that earned [trudovaya] private property must without fail be granted a "residence permit" in the economic system which is undergoing renewal.

The destatization of economic activity which is now under way does not in any way mean a rejection of state and all-people's property. It will, as always, play a significant role—if not the priority role—in the development of socialism. But not in its ossified, stagnant form. Serious transformations are needed to reveal its potential.

From the theoretical point of view, we still have to figure out what we mean by all-people's property. For a long time, the degree of the statization of property was considered in our country to be a criterion of its "socialist nature." In practice, this led to depersonalization of ownership, the undermining of labor incentives, wage leveling, and workers' indifference to the results and quality of their labor. Now we proceed from the premise that any form of ownership could be deemed socialist, provided that it is proven efficient and rules out man's exploitation of man.

The new concept of the center's functions suggests that the center be limited to: 1) creating general economic and legal conditions for the functioning of enterprises; 2) developing the all-union infrastructure; 3) pursuing an all-union scientific, technical, financial, and tax policy; 4) ensuring the social protection of citizens. In line with this, the centralized planning system will be transformed, and work will be completed on restructuring the organizational structure of sector ministries, whose place will be taken by corporations in the future. New principles underlie the foundations of the concepts of price formation, budget formation, taxation, credit and money regulation, and the banking system. In short, this is a matter of completely replacing the old administrative levers of management and mastering new economic methods and approaches.

From Theory to Practice

Perestroyka, including its economic aspect, is no longer a theoretical concept but a real process, presenting theory with more and more new questions. They include questions about restructuring the basic link of production—the enterprise—and about the market, price formation, republican and local economic accountability, foreign economic ties, and the cadre backup for the new economic system.

A real restructuring of the organizational forms of the basic link—the enterprise—already is being implemented today. The economy encourages the creation of fundamentally new economic formations—multisector concerns, consortiums, extradepartmental corporations, and joint corporations and enterprises. The cooperative system and lease relations are being developed. Enterprises have been given broad rights regarding the utilization of diverse forms of economic management and the creation of sundry production units and centers in the form of joint stock societies and production associations and amalgamations. At the same time, and despite the rights they have acquired, enterprises in the country's national economy are extremely slow in their perestroyka. This is because of the continuing effect of old economic levers and mechanisms. The demolition of the obsolete national economic cart is proceeding timidly, indecisively, and at times even in a contradictory fashion.

The most important avenue of economic reform is the development of the market and of commodity-money relations. Our historical experience has unambiguously proved that attempts to manage a socialist economy without a market inevitably lead to extra-economic coercion, the growth of monopolism, the domination of consumers by producers, and the bureaucratization not only of the economy but also of all social life. At the same time, a recognition of the market's role in our economy poses the problem of creating an effective economic mechanism to regulate it, ensuring reliable protection of society's interests against the market's vagaries.

Attempts to ease controls on commodity-money relations at the initial stage led only to further curtailment of the consumer market, the disappearance of traditional commodities from stores, and the forced introduction of elements of rationed distribution. Much is attributable to the fact that the measures being implemented are not comprehensive, and specifically to lagging in a series of crucial reforms (price formation, taxation, the credit and money system). The transition to wholesale trade in means of production is being implemented too slowly. The creation of the wholesale market is, for all intents and purposes, taking primarily the form of decentralization of the old system.

I think that the main task today is to stabilize the consumer market. Success in this will depend mainly on the long-pressing restructuring of the economy—a fundamental change in the proportion of consumption and accumulation. This requires a state policy aimed at shifting the emphasis in the production activity of enterprises in favor of the consumer sector and ensuring priority development of enterprises and sectors producing consumer goods and services for the population. A certain positive change in this direction underlies the plan for the country's socioeconomic development in 1990.

The consolidation of the consumer market is closely associated with the recovery of the country's financial economy. During the 3 previous 5-year plan periods, the state's expenditure was persistently in excess of its revenue owing to a decline in the efficiency of social production. The emission of money became the main method for covering the deficit.

The government proposes a sharp reduction of state expenditure, primarily on centralized capital investments in the production sphere and the costs of defense and the maintenance of the management apparatus. It is planned to reorganize and eliminate loss-making enterprises in 1990. I assume that the government will have to adopt a more consistent and uncompromising approach here.

Investment policy has been the subject of a tough review. The goal is to sharply reduce the volume of incomplete construction work and to commission on a priority basis consumer-oriented projects and projects in the social and cultural spheres.

At the same time, work is being done to develop a mechanism for effective economic regulation of the population's incomes, making them directly dependent on the end results of labor, preventing the payment of "unearned" money, and encouraging the utilization of enterprises' revenues for the social and production development of labor collectives. An important role in this process has to be played by the taxation reform. The reabsorption of an excessive money supply must also be promoted by new forms for the mobilization of money resources in all sectors of the economy, primarily through a securities market, an end to the practice of paying subsidies to loss-making and low-profitability enterprises, the development of a commercial credit system, and a transfer to credit methods for the financing of capital investment from 1990 onward.

Are these measures necessary? Yes. Are they sufficient? In my view, no. It is necessary to sharply tighten up the credit system. Expensive credit will somewhat curb departmental appetites for capital investments. The State Bank must be independent of the government. Only then will it be able to pursue an autonomous and strong credit policy and to contain the growth of state expenditure. And if the state budget is still in deficit, this deficit ought to be financed not automatically but to the extent that enterprises and the population fund the state's indebtedness. Moreover, this should be done without fail on a voluntary and mutually advantageous basis. Working people's savings must be protected against inflationary devaluation by correspondingly higher interest rates paid by savings banks.

A new role in restructuring the country's economy must be played by the foreign economic complex. The legislative acts and normative documents adopted in the last few years have created a certain legal basis for major transformations in the management, regulation, and functioning of this sphere. Autonomous, economically accountable producers will become the main subject in the USSR's foreign economic ties. Prerequisites have been planned for enterprises to switch to the principles of foreign currency cost recovery and self-financing, and the first foreign currency auctions already have been held, but are we not spending too long a time pondering? Even though this is no simple task, it will demand considerable efforts.

Work will continue to coordinate the reforms and ensure unity between the foreign and domestic economic mechanisms. Interesting ideas are being discussed on the creation of socialist transnational formations and on incentives for the export of capital.

There is great interest in the USSR in the development of relations with international economic organizations. The USSR has declared its intention to become a full member of GATT. The task is to increase by stages the USSR's participation in the activity of international economic organizations like the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The possibility of joining the UN Food and Agriculture Organization also is being examined. We are striving to put an end to the trend toward unjustified statization of relations with these organizations and to encourage their direct involvement in the activity of Soviet enterprises and associations. It is proposed to create a public association for cooperation with international economic organizations, with collective and individual members alike.

The ongoing transformation of foreign economic ties proceeds from the prospect of creating legislation in this sphere, similar to legislation existing in Western countries. This applies to conditions governing foreign currency circulation, the activity of joint enterprises, and relations with international organizations. Ultimately, the new foreign economic mechanism must help turn our economy into what is known as an "open economy."

The radical economic reform will be impossible without preparing people for the new conditions of economic management and life. This applies to the reorientation of their mentality and values as well as to sound professional training.

It is well known that the shortage and insufficient competence of professional cadres apply the brakes to perestroyka. This sets the task of their further training and, whenever necessary, their replacement. But the main point is that the country needs a fundamentally

new system of economic education. Something is being done along this avenue. Textbooks are being developed, academic science and tuition are being integrated, and efforts are being made to raise the standards of tutorial staff and scientific research in higher education establishments.

We also utilize Western experience to a certain extent. World-famous textbooks on economics are being translated. We intend to involve Western scientists more broadly in giving lectures at our education establishments and to develop the system of student exchange and training. It is worth thinking not only of increasing the number of Soviet trainees in Western countries but also of possibly creating long-term joint training centers and programs. This would be a real and useful step along the avenue of integrating the Soviet economy with the world economic system.

Military

Reaction to 8.2 Percent Cut in Defense Budget

Generals Respond

OW3012004989 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 16 Dec 89

[Text] The 1990 Soviet military budget has been announced in Moscow.

Generals Chervov and (Babiyev), representatives of the Soviet Ministry of National Defense, revealed the figures to reporters at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Center.

It was announced at the news briefing that the Soviet Union's total defense outlay next year will be R70,975,800,000, down 8.2% from the 1989 level. The Soviet Armed Forces will number 3,993,000 men by 1 January 1990.

Speaking on this, Gen Chervov said that this is in complete accordance with the decision Mikhail Gorbachev announced at the United Nations last December to cut the Soviet Union's troop strength unilaterally by 500,000 officers and men. As of today, 265,000 troops have been transferred to the reserves. In addition, the Soviet Union also has gone beyond the announced figure by retiring another 173,000 troops with college-level education from the Army. Chervov continued:

[Begin Chervov recording in Russian fading into Mandarin translation] The announced figures serve as further proof that the Soviet leaders are determined to implement the decision to make the Soviet Armed Forces purely defensive in nature. Our Armed Forces have (?acquired) a nonoffensive structure and the Soviet Union's adoption of attack weapons systems as a component part is limited. [end recording]

Gen Chervov said: In addition, the Army, Navy, and Air Force all will change their training exercises. We have reduced drastically the frequency of large-scale exercises. We also have scaled down our programs, within the framework of our military technology plan, for the mass production of weapons and technologies. In accordance with our concept of defense, we have taken more concrete steps for (?comprehensive operation). Fundamentally speaking, this means the practice of openness, predictability, frankness, and a principled line in the military field. In our view, this will enhance trust and is one of the ways to reduce the military threat ultimately.

Speaking about the nature of the Soviet defense budget, Gen (Babiyev) said:

[Begin (Babiyev) recording in Russian fading into Mandarin translation] This budget will enable our country to maintain our national defense at a reasonable and militarily sufficient level and solve all problems in terms of improving the livelihood of our servicemen. [end recording]

He said that the First Soviet Congress of People's Deputies announced that the 1991 military budget will be 14% lower than the 1988 budget, meaning a reduction of R10 billion. This figure definitely will not change.

Deputy Minister Shabanov

OW3012005189 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 19 Dec 89

[Text] Of the Soviet Union's 1990 state budget, total defense spending will amount to R70,975,800,000, or 8.2% lower than the 1989 figure.

At the request of this station, Army General Shabanov, Soviet deputy and deputy minister of national defense, commented on [word indistinct] projects of the Ministry of Defense while [words indistinct].

He said: [words indistinct] people can see that the Soviet Union's defense spending is approximately 15% of the total state budget, a figure lower than that of the United States, where defense spending accounts for approximately 28% of that country's budget. This is very important in principle.

Besides the issue of money, there also is the issue of the commodities used in defense. The demand for ferrous metals, for example, is only 3% of the total national output, while the demand for aluminum accounts for 25% of the total national output. This is fully understandable because aluminum is needed in the manufacture of airplanes.

These figures show that, despite what many people think, the Soviet Union will not have large sums at its disposal for defense spending. In fact, spending on certain major defense projects, such as research and development, is lower than that of 1989. Although this is something I do not agree with, we cannot help it.

The amount of funds available for purchasing weapons and for military construction also has been cut. By

reducing expenses in these areas, we are now able to increase the pay of officers. When the Soviet congress was in session, some deputies proposed that the pay for officers should increase even as we reduce the overall military budget. Our country has done just that. In accordance with a government decision, R1.2 billion has been appropriated for this purpose.

Finally, I want to emphasize that the Soviet Union's military spending reflects the nation's principle of maintaining a reasonably adequate defense. Of course, our country also may plan to cut military spending even further, but this would be carried out on a reciprocal basis.

Moiseyev Addresses Commission on Defense Law

PM0201105590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

[Colonel I. Vashkevich report: "USSR Law on Defense. What Should It Be Like?"]

[Text] A standing nonstaff Military Legislative Commission has been formed by order of the USSR defense minister. It is headed by Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister.

Progress in preparing the draft USSR Law on Defense was examined at the commission's first session. The law is to be the basis of all Soviet legislation on questions of defense and military building. It is intended to reflect the tenets of our military doctrine, as well as define the powers and duties of organs of state power and management, the participation of enterprises and organizations in defense measures, and the rights and duties of citizens in connection with carrying out the patriotic duty of defending the homeland. The session's participants exchanged opinions in all these areas and made specific suggestions.

Summing up the discussion, Army General M.A. Moiseyev emphasized that the USSR Law on Defense affects the interests of all the country's state and public structures, of all the union republics, and of all citizens. Therefore its main points must also be enshrined in the USSR Constitution, in the laws on ownership, on land, and on the socialist enterprise, and in many others. All this presupposes the Military Legislative Commission's active cooperation with USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions and with state and public organs.

The finished version of the draft is to be submitted to the USSR Defense Ministry Collegium in February 1990, and a draft plan of legislative work is to be drawn up by March.

Defense Ministry Declassifies 1937-1941 Documents

LD0201115190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1002 GMT 2 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 Jan (TASS)—TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy writes:

By order of Army General Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister, orders of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, published in 1937-41, are no longer recognized as being in force. The seal of secrecy will now be lifted from them.

"Until just recently the military archives limited access by specialists to many documents and materials of the central bodies of the USSR Defense Ministry," Major General Leonid Ivashov, administrative officer of the USSR Defense Ministry, said today, commenting on this decision to remove the seal of secrecy. He added that the absence of important documents in the work of this group has not made it possible to shed light fully and all round on the activity of the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

General Ivashov, 46, is a candidate of historical sciences. He initiated preparations for the publication, at the Military Press of the Defense Ministry, of a collection of declassified documents, *The History of the Construction of the Red Army: The Years 1937-1941 in Orders of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense [Istoriya Stroitelstva Krasnoy Armii: 1937-1941 g.g. v Prikazakh Narodnogo Komissara Oborony SSSR]*. A tentative date for the collection coming onto bookstore shelves is envisaged at the end of 1990.

As Gen Ivashov says, it involves orders and directives of Kliment Voroshilov, the people's commissar for defense of those years, resolutions of the Chief Military Council of the Red Army, documents reviewing the results of military training of troops and affirming general army and combat regulations.

According to Leonid Ivashov, the collection will contain some 250 documents previously never mentioned in print and categorically withheld from researchers. "For instance, for the year 1937 the collection will have 32 orders," the general stressed. In his opinion, one of the most important of them is Order 72. Ivashov says this order—a kind of message by Voroshilov "to the personnel of the Army regarding the uncovering, by NKVD bodies, of traitors from a military fascist organisation in the Red Army." Ivashov adds, "It was this order that was to become the prelude to unprecedented reprisals against the leading staff of the Army and Navy with Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevskiy at the head." In Ivashov's opinion, this order became a kind of juridical basis for the ensuing mass repressions, as a result of which the flower of the Command Staff was destroyed and the fighting capacity of the Red Army was undermined on the eve of World War II.

"The next step in the declassification of documents will be the preparation of another work of many volumes—a collection of materials containing resolutions of the State Defense Committee and orders of the commander in chief of the USSR Armed Forces for the years 1941-1945," Maj Gen Leonid Ivashov said in conclusion.

Zaykov Comments on Problems of Defense Conversion

LD0201191790 Moscow International Service in Czech 1600 GMT 2 Jan 90

[Text] Lev Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the USSR Defense Council, answered our special correspondent Vyacheslav Terekhov's questions about the problems of conversion in the USSR.

Much is expected in the USSR from conversion—that is, from switching the defense industry to the production of consumer goods. It can be said that conversion is already influencing industries which are connected with the production of consumer goods:

[Begin recording] [Zaykov in Russian with superimposed Czech translation], It is the first time in history that defense expenditures are not growing, but on the contrary are reducing. The military budget will be cut, as against last year, by over 8%. What about conversion? I can say that many people do not understand it correctly and expect it to bring immediate results. If an enterprise used to produce missiles and now is used to produce, let us say, washing machines, it is necessary that the enterprise is changed accordingly and engineers and workers are retrained too. This takes time and money. The money will be provided partially by the budget and partially by the Army. At present, we are not only reducing the production of various types of arms, including nuclear weapons, but we also are withdrawing nuclear missiles from a state of readiness. This provides some financial advantages. Nevertheless, we have no right to do it at the expense of the country's defense capability. We must improve the quality of conventional weapons.

[Terekhov] Does conversion, however, also mean using military production in the civilian sphere?

[Zaykov] I agree with that. It is only possible, however, when military production is similar to civilian production. For example, aircraft designers already have proposed changing over to the production of different types of machinery, to nonmilitary machinery...

[Terekhov, interrupting] Are there people in the USSR who are against conversion?

[Zaykov] It could be said that there are no people in the USSR who are against conversion, but there exist people who are against the changeover from one production sphere to another. The defense industry gave them the possibility of maintaining a higher standard of living. This is really the case. Therefore, important experts are not satisfied because they think that they are not being put to good use. All in all, however, everybody understands that conversion is necessary and that the Army must be reduced. [end recording]

Lizichev Addresses Military Journalists

PM2912143789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Being on the Cutting Edge of Events"]

[Text] A conference-seminar of workers of the military mass media was held in Moscow 18-22 December. Taking part were the permanent correspondents of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN, the chief editors of other central military journals, the editors of district, group, and fleet newspapers, and military correspondents working in the central mass information organs.

Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, delivered a report "on the state of and measures for building up perestroyka in the military press in the new training year and on preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress."

The journalists exchanged experience of their work and discussed ways of providing more skilled and in-depth coverage of fundamental questions of the troops' life and activity at the present stage of perestroyka.

Comrades N. Batarchuk, I. Kovyrin, and V. Strekozov, responsible workers of the CPSU Central Committee, met with the participants in the conference-seminar.

During the "roundtables" there was a thorough talk about the practice of covering problems of international education and interethnic relations in the military press and of historical subjects. Workers from the USSR Defense Ministry Military History Institute and the Military Publishing House took part in the discussion of these questions.

An active exchange of opinions on topical issues of military building at the present stage proceeded at the meeting in which Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces; Colonel General A. Mironov, deputy chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Main Cadres Directorate; Major General N. Bay, deputy chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Central Financial Directorate; Major General S. Filimonov, General Staff chief military censor and chief of the USSR Defense Ministry press center, took part.

The rally was addressed by Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

It was stressed that the perestroyka processes are being increasingly revolutionized and are encompassing all spheres of social life and raising in a new way questions of the forms and methods of the activity of the CPSU, the soviets of people's deputies, and all state and public institutions. Both the objective difficulties of perestroyka and the emotional reaction to them, the speaker said, are inevitable and understandable. They are payment for past blunders, for the acute shortage of mutual

exactingness and of quality in human relations and responsibility to the people.

Despite the difficulties and the attempts by the destructive, antisocialist, and separatist forces to drive a wedge between the Army and the people, to alienate the Army from the CPSU and the Soviet Government, and isolate it from the social processes taking place in the country, the personnel of the Armed Forces are rallied around the party and support its line toward perestroyka. That is the main political result of the work of military cadres and Army and Navy communists.

The second political result is that perestroyka in the Armed Forces is deepening. Army Gen Lizichev described its basic directions, revealed the problems arising on this path, and noted the important contribution of the military press to the activation of renewal processes. The newspapers LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA (Transcaucasus Military District), SUVOROVSKIY NATISK (Far Eastern Military District), FLAG RODINY (Black Sea Fleet), KRASNYY VOIN (Moscow Military District), and the journals KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL and SOVETSKIY VOIN act as the leaders.

One more political result is connected with renewal, democratization, and glasnost. These processes proceeded more rapidly this year than last. And, finally, the speaker noted, we include among the most important political results the fact that the process of politicization has now gripped the overwhelming majority of the personnel, and the moral atmosphere is being cleansed in the soldiers' barracks and the sailors' quarters.

At the same time, Army Gen Lizichev said, the political situation requires a fundamental improvement in the work of the military mass media, especially the district, group, and fleet newspapers and large-edition press. Unfortunately, many of our newspapers and journals often lose a clear political orientation in the items they publish and do not always consider the contradictory nature of the military-political situation, the threat of aggression which really persists, or the complexity of the sociopolitical situation in a number of parts of the country and in the European socialist countries. Many military journalists are so far observing from the sidelines the process of the massive, centralized erosion of socialist ideals, the scourge of the one-sided interpretation of our history, and the discrediting of the party and Army. While resolutely breaking with the ideology of Stalinism and stagnation, the speaker said, we must fully restore the abiding socialist values and place them at the Fatherland's service. The color of our banner has been, is, and will be red and it will always bear the words: Lenin, October, Socialism.

Army Gen Lizichev then described the basic directions in which the main efforts of the military press should be concentrated in the new year.

The year of 1990 is primarily the year of the 28th CPSU Congress. A quite keen political struggle lies ahead. Proceeding from this premise, it is essential to focus attention on the formation of the personnel's ideological conviction and on the explanation of the concept and aims of perestroyka and the socialism toward which we are advancing and to consistently reveal the truly revolutionary nature, depth, and principled nature of the transformations leading to a new quality for our society. That is the first point.

Second, the forthcoming year is the year of the elections to the republican and local soviets of people's deputies. It is already clear today that they will be a serious test for us all. The informal organizations, separatists, and nationalistically inclined elements are eager for power.

Serious preparatory work is needed. Our ideological efforts should be based on the CPSU's election platform. The military press must keenly grasp the trends in public opinion, firmly seize the political initiative, forecast the course of events, propagandize the active champions of perestroyka and their election platforms, and maintain close contact with the local party organs, election commissions, and public organizations.

Third, 1990 is a year of enormous work connected with the fulfillment of the Vienna accords and in connection with the questions discussed in Malta, of work connected with the relocation, retraining, and rearming [perevooruzheniye] of the troops and fleets, with the formations' transition to a new organizational and staff structure, with the second stage of the Armed Forces' reduction, and with preparation for the implementation of the forthcoming treaty on a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms.

That is why the most important task is to ensure the implementation of the party's instructions and the defense minister's demands for the orientation of the building and training of the country's armed forces toward predominantly qualitative parameters. Every press organ must reflect the situation locally, find its way into people's hearts, and sense where the unresolved problems have accumulated and where to look for ways to resolve them.

Fourth, the speaker noted, 1990 will be a year of strenuous work to implement the CPSU Central Committee platform "the party's nationalities party under present conditions."

Journalists must have this subject at the tip of their pens. The newspapers must have their own detailed programs for covering the problems of interethnic relations. These programs must be geared toward a systematic approach in the personnel's study and the training of the commanders and aktiv for work to rally the multiethnic military collectives. They must reflect the problems of patriotic and international education and the satisfaction of the cultural needs of servicemen of different nationalities.

Fifth, the party declares 1990 the year of a resolute offensive against crime. For us it should become a year

of fundamental decisions and actions in the field of strengthening military discipline.

There is tremendous scope here for the military press. And we must "plow" this field deeply and thoroughly.

Army Gen Lizichev stressed in particular that the forthcoming year will be the 120th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin and the 45th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. We must focus efforts on the propaganda of Lenin's ideological and theoretical legacy. In preparing for the victory jubilee we must use the combat traditions of the Soviet people, party, and Armed Forces and the wisdom and experience of veterans and front line soldiers to educate the personnel and all young people. We must also pay tribute to those who died in the war and to the living.

The central question, the speaker stressed, is the journalist's political and moral position. For all the ins and outs and diversity of the political struggle we must not forget that he is a staffer of the party military press. And hence, Army Gen Lizichev said, we see the general line of our newspapers and journals like this:

Coming out at the head of the column and not trudging along behind events.

Attacking, not defending. We do not have the right to sit out events in the trenches.

Working to get ahead.

Forecasting the development of events and being at their cutting edge.

Army Political Chiefs Discuss Ethnic Questions

PM0301092790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Our correspondent report: "At the Level of Party Requirements"]

[Text] A meeting of the ideological aktiv of USSR Defense Ministry's Main and Central Political Directorates has been held. The opening address was delivered by Lieutenant General N. Shlyaga, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

Problems of the restructuring of ideological work were comprehensively examined in the report by Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and during the collective exchange of opinions.

A roundtable on questions of interethnic relations in society and the Army was held within the framework of the meeting.